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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the relations
between Japan and North Korea, identifying each nation's
concept of its own security interests. I have, by way of
introduction, described the present status of Korea, both
north and south, and examined the transitory division
between the two halves of what both profess is a single
divided country. Chapter II examines the strategic signif-
icance of the Korean peninsula to China, the Soviet Union,
the United States, and Japan.
Chapters III and IV discuss North Korea and Japan's
foreign policy goals, especially as they relate to internal
and external security considerations. Chapter V attempts to
determine the nature of the accommodation between North Korea
and Japan, based on their own strategic interests. The effect
of this accommodation on the United States, should it accel-
erate, reaching a positive conclusion; should it drag on with
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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the relations
between Japan and North Korea, and to identify each nation's
concept of its own security interests. Reasons will be
sought for the factors giving rise to accommodation and judg-
ments will be made with regard to past trends and future
prospects of these developments. Fundamentally, assessment
will be made of the effects of detente between Japan and
North Korea on the policies of the United States. Separate
scenarios will be considered for each of these possible future
alternatives: first, if the accommodation accelerates or
achieves positive results; second, if such efforts drag on
achieving little or no progress; and third, if attempts for
rapproachment deteriorate or fail, leaving the relationship
between Japan and North Korea in a worse condition than exists
at present.
I shall, by way of introduction, describe the present
status of Korea, both north and south, and examine the tran-
sitory division between the two halves of what both profess
is a single divided country. Both South Korea and North Korea
have dealt with Japan in the light of their separate existence,
but with full appreciation of the pressures which exist for
ultimate unification. Therefore, Japan has been obliged to
take account of those pressures and deal with both South Korea
10

and North Korea as enduring if somewhat transient entities.
Japan, too, must be prepared for any eventuality in the
Korean peninsula, whether division continues or becomes
sharper or whether unification becomes an accomplished fact.
Japan-North Korea relations must be examined against this
factual background.
Chapter II will examine the strategic significance of
the Korean peninsula to the four major powers directly in-
volved: the United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet
Union. Each nation's perception of its strategic interests
in Korea will be examined, as well as any preference for a
united or divided Korea.
Chapters III and IV will discuss North Korea and Japan's
foreign policy goals. Primarily, the aspects of internal
and external security will be identified, and their relations
with each other, as well as with the United States, China and
the Soviet Union will be examined in that context.
Chapters V and VI will attempt to determine the nature
of the growing accommodation between North Korea and Japan,
based upon their own strategic interests. North Korea's need
for international acceptance and economic ties, and Japan's
essential security requirement of "peace and stability" will
be significant in that regard. Finally, the nature of the
accommodation will be examined within the context of the




At the 1943 Cairo Conference, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Chiang Kai-shek and Winston Churchill jointly declared that
in due course Korea would become free and independent. Over
a third of a century later, Korea is neither free nor inde-
pendent, and does not even exist as a single independent
state. Yet the Korean peninsula is a place of strategic
importance to Japan. Japanese foreign policy must be geared
to the possibility of a changing Korean "order," and United
States' foreign policy should be able to respond likewise.
Korea was liberated from thirty-five years of Japanese
rule by rival United States and Soviet military commands.
The "trusteeship" of Korea was manifested in the December
1945 Moscow Conference and the establishment of a joint US-
USSR commission to settle the question of a unified Korea.
When the commission met formally in 1946, the United States
and the Soviet Union disagreed on whether Korean political
groups who opposed the trusteeship should be included in the
consultations. All efforts to unify Korea foundered on this
point. Subsequently, on August 15, 1946, the Republic of
Korea (South Korea) was inaugurated, followed by the Demo-
cratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) on September
9, 1946.
The United States, acting for the Allied Powers during
the occupation, was mindful of the instability a rearmed
Japan could cause in Asia. The new Japanese Constitution,
effective May 3, 1946, contained thirty-one articles, of
12

which Article 9 renounced war as a "sovereign right of the
nation" and "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war
potential will never be maintained."
When China fell to the communists in 1949, however,
American postwar policy toward Japan shifted rapidly, becom-
ing predicated upon the desire to have an economically re-
2
vitalized Japan to counter communist expansion in Asia.
With United States' assistance, she was able to focus her
efforts towards her economic recovery, trusting her national
security to the United Nations, relying on "the higher ideals
3
now stirring the world for its defense and its protection."
These postwar decisions concerning Korea and Japan have
had lasting effects in Northeast Asia. Today, Japan is a
lightly armed, non-nuclear nation with the world's third
strongest economy. Korea, on the other hand, is still divided;
the northern half allied with the two Asian continential
powers, China and the Soviet Union, and the southern half
allied with the two Pacific ocean powers, Japan and the United
States. Japan's and China's achievement of Great Power status
has complicated the strategic equation in Northeast Asia.
In 1950, shortly after the United States' Secretary of
State, Dean Acheson, omitted South Korea from the United
States' defense perimeter, North Koreans crossed into South
Korea, ostensibly to reunify the Korean peninsula. North
Korea's venture had the tacit, if not outright, support of
the Soviet Union. North Korea's nationalistic attempt at
unification was most likely viewed as an opportunity for
13

communist expansion by the Soviet Union, and by the United
States. The Collective Defense System, not necessarily
Korea's strategic position, was the underlying reason for
United States intervention on behalf of South Korea.
When the United States crossed the thirty-eighth parallel,
entered Pyongyang, and reached the Manchurian border at the
Yalu River, China sent 1,200,000 troops to fight on behalf
of North Korea- -her "buffering neighbor." China's response
to a perceived threat to her national security saved North
Korea from a humiliating defeat, but also served to cement
the North-South division on the Korean peninsula. When the
armistice was signed in 1953, both Koreas were militarily
and economically bankrupt.
Throughout the 1950's, North Korea remained loyally allied
to the Soviet Union, while cultivating relations with China.
When the Sino-Soviet rift became public in 1960, the Confer-
ence of 81 Communist and Workers Parties in Moscow was not
7
attended by either Kim Il-Sung or Mao Tse-Tung. Even though
North Korea was created as a Soviet satellite, she was able,
in a short period, to chart a relatively independent course,
blending Marxist-Leninist ideology with modernizing nationalism
in pursuit of two main goals: (1) developing North Korea,
o
and (2) reunifying the Korean peninsula.
In the latter part of the 1950's, Japan developed a dual-
istic policy in which economics and politics were considered
separate in dealing independently with the continental powers.
This policy secured the normalization of relations with the
14

Soviet Union and commercial ties with China and both Koreas.
The stake of Japan was not very great in either Korea.
During the period 1958 to 1965, North Korea was striving
to thwart any normalization of relations between Japan and
the economically poor South Korean regime. North Korea
believed Japanese economic assistance would strengthen South
Korea enough to make reunification, on terms favorable to
North Korea, difficult. Any outright recognition of South
Korea would also damage North Korea's claim to international
legitimacy. Regardless of the interests of North Korea, the
conflicts between Japan and South Korea prevented a treaty
of normalization between those two countries until 1965.
South Korean leaders envisaged that this treaty required
Japan to recognize only South Korea, restraining Japan from
maintaining any relations with North Korea. But the phrase,
"the government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful
government in Korea as specified in the resolution 195 (III)
of the United Nations General Assembly" was inserted despite
the vehement opposition from the South Korean government.
The Japanese Foreign Minister, Etsusaburo, made it clear to
the Diet that the Japanese government interpreted the juris-
diction of South Korea "as specified in the General Assembly
resolution; in other words, south of the ceasefire line."^--'-
Japan, in establishing relations with South Korea, was not
willing to discount possible future relations with North Korea
In 1965, North Korea was on excellent terms with China
and was receiving military and technical assistance from her
15

"good" neighbor, the Soviet Union. But when she fell short
of her goal in the seven-year economic plan (1961-1967), the
North Korean government, citing South Korean military buildup,
embarked on an official policy of "Chuche"--a national self-
12
reliance program.
Today we are confronted with the weighty task of carrying
on economic construction and defense upbuilding in paral-
lel, to lay a firm material foundation for the prosperity
of all generations to come and establish a sound economic
base which will enable us to readily cope with the great
revolutionary event of the reunification of our country.
All this can be achieved successfully only if the prin-
ciple of self-reliance, the line of building an inde-
pendent national economy is adhered to consistently and
implemented more thoroughly .1*
Chuche served notice to both the Soviet Union and China
that North Korea was serious about developing her economy
without total reliance on her communist benefactors. It is
no coincidence that after Kim's statement in 1967, North
Korea's imports from Japan jumped from 8.2 million dollars
in 1967 to 20.8 million dollars in 1968. 14 North Korea would
accept and cultivate assistance from the non-communist world.
The level of Japanese exports to North Korea showed only slight
growth until President Nixon's China overture of 1971.
The Nixon "shock" of 1971 had a startling effect on both
North Korea and Japan. Japan, encouraged by the pro-South
Korean Sato government and protected by the U.S. -Japan Mutual
Security Treaty, was turning toward South Korea as an area of
great opportunity. New markets and excellent investment
opportunities found Japan deeply entrenched in South Korea.
President Nixon's unanticipated overture to China hastened
the fall of the Sato government and increased internal demand
1 6

for greater ties with North Korea. 15 In November 1971, the
Dietmen's League for Promotion of Japanese- (North) Korean
Friendship was established, with 31 of the 246 Dietmen from
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) .***
North Korea most probably received no Chinese forewarning
of the U.S.-Sino overture, and reacted by seeking additional
ties with Japan to offset a possible loss of support from
China. North Korea toned down all references to Japanese
"militarism," decried the present state of North Korean-
Japanese affairs as "abnormal," and declared 1972 a "year of
friendship with Japan." In January 1972, a private trade
memorandum with Japanese businessmen was signed calling for
increased North Korean- Japanese trade and the establishment
of trade offices in the respective capitals. Private agree-
ments, with no official government ties, could be made without
violating the 1965 treaty of normalization of relations with
South Korea. Significantly, Japanese exports to North Korea
jumped from 28.8 million dollars in 1971 to 93.4 million
dollars in 1972. 18
The economic ties between Japan and North Korea can be
easily evaluated in quantitative terms. These ties are of
special significance since Japan, as a great world economic
power, thereby acknowledges the de facto existence of North
19Korea. Economic relations, although an important indicator,




Japan has been forced to seek, through extragovernmental
channels, solutions to problems involving sensitive and even
volatile political questions. The 1975 North Korean firing
on the "Shosei Maru," a Japanese fishing boat, and the problem
of the North Korean debt to Japan are the types of problems
that a growing number of people feel cannot be resolved without
20
constant contact and even normalization of relations. The
recent North Korean establishment of a military ocean boundary,
within which Japanese ships are not allowed, was called a "big
problem" by Prime Minister Fukuda: "Efforts will be continued
to ensure safe operations by Japanese fishermen concerned,
although the absence of diplomatic ties with North Korea was
21
making it difficult for Japan to deal with the problem."
Japan realizes that more ties with North Korea will pro-
vide more avenues of communication to discuss mutual prob-
lems before they escalate. Japan's Foreign Minister, Hatoyama,
discussed North Korean- Japanese relations on television: "We
will continue to gradually promote trade and personnel and
22
cultural exchanges, thereby furthering mutual understanding."
Japan is aware that both friends and enemies can be transi-
tory in nature. Maintaining avenues of communication in
countries such as North Korea increases Japan's foreign policy
options, should international conditions warrant. Hideake
Kase, a foreign affairs advisor to Prime Minister Fukuda,
stated: "If Japan is threatened, or feels threatened, she
will react, whether the government is one to the left or one
to the right, to ensure to the best of her ability her sur-
23
vival just as would any other nation."
18
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II. THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF KOREA
Korea, divided into two parts at the 38th parallel, is a
peninsula which contains about 50 million people and occupies
an area of 85,000 square miles. Yet, as a divided nation,
Korea has not been able to realize her potential as a nation
with natural resources, a fine industrial base, and a loca-
tion conducive to land and open ocean trade.
North Korea occupies about 47,000 square miles (551)
with a population of 15 million people. She is blessed with
a responsive agricultural sector, and she possesses about 801
of all known mineral deposits in Korea. Many non-ferrous
metals, iron ore reserves (about 2.4 billion tons), and an-
thracite coal are conspicuously present. The northern interior
contains large forest reserves. Power production is based
mainly on hydro- electricity , but the increased demands of in-
dustrialization make thermal electricity increasingly more
important.
North Korea's per capita income (1976) is $340. She has
an armed force of 500,000 troops, supported with 25% of the
gross national product (GNP) . She trades extensively with
China and the Soviet Union, but 10% of her total foreign
trade is with Japan. Her major exports are pig iron, iron
ore, and non-metallic minerals. Her major import items are
machinery, fuel and related oil, chemical and rubber products.
21

South Korea occupies 38,000 square miles (45%) with a
population of 33 million people. She possesses meager natural
resources, consisting of coal, iron ore and graphite. Re-
sources available for energy production consist of coal,
petroleum and hydroelectric potential. In contrast to North
Korea, thermal power accounts for 85% of the total energy
generated.
South Korea's per capita income (1976) is $400. Her
armed forces total 600,000 men supported by 8% of the GNP.
South Korea trades extensively with the United States and
Japan, textiles being her single most important industry.
Both Koreas, weakened through division, must formulate
their internal and external policies with great regard for
the desires of the four nations directly involved in the
peninsula: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and
Japan. Inasmuch as Japan's North Korean relations have mul-
tilateral effects, both nations must consider the interests
and policies of other nations, particularly China, the Soviet
Union, and the United States.
A. CHINA AND KOREA
Since the Soviet Union and China both share North Korea's
northern border, geopolitical proximity could define much of
the importance of the divided peninsula to these two countries
China's security interest, couched in these terms, is stronger
than the Soviet Union's, due to a much longer border shared




The fact that China, not the Soviet Union, responded by
sending troops against the United Nations forces in 1950 shows
how sensitively China views Korea as a potential threat to her
security. China was willing to go so far as to confront the
United States. The issue of maintaining non-hostile neighbors,
a historically important part of Chinese foreign policy, is
relevant today in Korea.
China and the Soviet Union, as the two great communist
powers, continue their struggle for greater influence in other
24
communist countries. Their mutual neighbor, North Korea,
has afforded an excellent opportunity for each country to
expand its sphere of influence.
As long as Korea is divided, China must determine separ-
ate policies for North Korea and South Korea, and it is, of
course, essential for Japan to take careful note of China's
relations with both North and South Korea.
With regard to North Korea, China has depended upon cul-
tural ties with the Koreans, her uncompromising ideological
position against alleged revisionism, and her status as a
"fellow" developing nation to foster closer ties with North
Korea. China's aid program has been less substantial than
25that of the Soviet Union. Since 1970, when Chou en-Lai
made his visit to Pyongyang, North Korean-Chinese relations
have been improving to the detriment of North Korean-Soviet
relations. China's acceptance into the United Nations in
1971 has provided the North Koreans with another strong
spokesman at the world body in addition to the Soviet Union.
23

China's strong support has strengthened the fraternal ties
27between the two countries.
Nevertheless, North Korea has never been exclusively in
the Chinese camp. The fact that China has not been able to
dominate North Korea is due primarily to her inability to
compete with the Soviet Union as a supplier of economic and
2 8
military aid. The Soviet Union has been able to exert in-
fluence in Korea by providing the economic and military sup-
port needed by the Koreans. As an economic partner, the
Soviet Union has not had to be overly concerned with ideo-
logical support to North Korea. In times when the North
Koreans viewed Soviet economic support as insufficient, North
Korean-Chinese ties have deepened.
North Korea's professed major foreign policy objective
is the reunification of the Korean peninsula under communist,
or more specifically, "North Korean communist" rule. China
supports this objective provided that the reunification is
peaceful. She would use her influence to restrain Kim il-Sung
from embarking on a military campaign to bring reunification
about. In view of China's global responsibilities, she is
aware that an adventure similar to the 1950 effort to unite
Korea could involve both Koreas and their major allies in a
widely escalating conflict, which apparently China does not
29
want. China is involved in advancing the needs of her own
people, and is not willing to sacrifice this goal, entering
into conflict with the United States, and possibly Japan and
the Soviet Union, in support of Kim il-Sung ' s dream.
24

Reunification of Korea, while desirable to North Korea, is not
an intrinsic Chinese objective. It must be related to other
Chinese foreign policy goals, and presently China is not
ready to risk a major conflict which is not in defense of her
own national security.
Unilateral action by Kim il-Sung would pose other serious
problems for China. Since China could not compete with the
Soviet Union in the supply of military hardware, such a
conflict would increase North Korea's dependence on the Soviet
Union, lessening China's influence with other communist nations
With regard to South Korea, China's policies must involve
relations with the United States and Japan. China, fully
aware of the commitment of the United States to South Korea
and of the treaty between the United States and Japan, does
not want to become involved with the United States because
of a military clash in Korea. Nor does she wish to see Japan
abandon her status as a lightly armed, non-nuclear power.
Any armed conflict in Korea would most probably involve the
United States in her role as the "protector" of South Korea.
But, if the United States should not support South Korea, it
would cause great consternation in Japan over the lack of
32United States response to her treaty commitments in general.
The latter situation could push Japan toward rearmament. In
short, any conflict in Korea would place China in an uncom-
fortable position relative to the United States and/or Japan.
China supports North Korea's demand that United States
troops must be removed from South Korea, but China's position
25

has been announced in relatively mild statements. 33 This
relatively mild Chinese position concerning United States
troop withdrawals reflects her fear of Japan. Peking feels
that if United States troops were withdrawn from South Korea,
South Korea would be tempted to look more toward Japan for
34
assistance. Such a development would not be welcomed by
China. Furthermore, China would object less to Japanese
expansion of its Self Defense Forces if it were made wholly
within the context of the United States-Japan Mutual Security
35Treaty; China is less perturbed about the threat involved
in United States military power than it would be if Japan
possessed independent comparable military capability.
Given the circumstances described above, China would
proceed cautiously in any possible change of the status quo
on the Korean peninsula. Stability in Korea appears to be the
more advantageous situation for China. She would retain the
security of a friendly, non-menacing buffer state wherein she
could compete with the Soviet Union on ideological terms.
One issue--the issue of Taiwan--is an important factor
in China's possible acceptance of an ultimate 2-Koreas situ-
ation. Professor Ha points out that China would find it
impossible to accept a 2-Koreas settlement until the Taiwan
•7
f.
question is resolved with the United States. Furthermore,
China, in the April 1975 joint Sino-North Korean communique,
referred to North Korea as "the sole legitimate sovereign
state of the Korean nation," severing any immediate Chinese
move toward a 2-Koreas settlement. Notably, the Soviet Union
26

37has not followed suit, privately opting for a "German
TO
formula" for Korea.
Although China is on record against a 2-Koreas settle-
ment, she shows signs of equivocation. Recent events, such
as the Sino-U.S. rapproachment , have shown that China is
concerned with obtaining United States' support to counter
Soviet hostility. The policy shift toward the United States
was presented as an effort to counter the immediate threat,
the Soviet Union, by uniting with a remote power, the United
39States. This involved tempering her objection to the United
States' position on Korea. Traditionally a patient nation,
China may be willing to forego an immediate Taiwan settlement
and grant a concession to the United States in Korea in ex-
change for support in her confrontation with the Soviet Union.
In the event of unification, China's policies would be
modified significantly. Specifically, the strategic impor-
tance of Korea to China would depend on the status of Sino-
Japanese relations. If Sino- Japanese relations continue to
improve, as it appears they will, the unification of Korea
will not be so important to China. A unified, communist Korea
would add little to Chinese security, as Korea would continue
to be primarily a buffer state. Yet China would be forced to
compete with the Soviet Union for influence in the unified,
and more powerful Korean nation. Any unified, communist Korea,
allied with the Soviet Union would be more than a political
embarrassment to China. It would be considered a security
threat. A non-communist Korea, while not a strong possibility,
27

would also be viewed very suspiciously by China, bringing
about a state of increased tension in Northeast Asia.
Due to the cultural and ideological ties between the two
countries, a unified, communist Korea is likely to be "more
closely allied with the Chinese than the Soviet Union, unless
the post-Kim elite becomes obsessed with economic and techno-
logical assistance from the U.S.S.R." But, should technol-
ogy prove to be important, and technological advancement in
a united Korea could make Korea a relatively powerful nation,
Korea would be strongly tempted to approach not only the
Soviet Union, but also Japan and the United States for tech-
nological assistance. Such a development would not be viewed
with favor by China.
China, viewing her security interests in Korea as requir-
ing a friendly buffering state, prefers Korea to remain divided,
given the likely possibilities. She realizes that in quest
for influence, ideological bonds are important, but pragmatic
elements such as economic and military support will predominate.
In this regard, China feels she has much to lose and little
to gain by Korean unification. Professor Clough states that
China "still publicly and privately favors Korean unification,
41but for them, it is not a high priority issue." Indeed,
for political reasons, China does support Korean unification
more strongly than the Soviet Union, but her true strategic
considerations, for the foreseeable future, point toward a
divided, non-menacing Korean peninsula.
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B. THE SOVIET UNION AND KOREA
The Soviet Union shares a ten mile border with North
Korea along the Maritime Provinces. The Soviet Union, as a
neighbor, as the major North Korean source of economic amd
military aid, and as the most powerful nation in the Socialist
world, is involved and concerned with the Korean peninsula.
Lenin's observation that "the road to Paris lies through
Calcutta and Bombay" is still valid in the Soviet Union.
At the end of World War II, Soviet foreign policy was
predicated upon expanding communist ideology. North Korea,
in this context, was extremely important as the vanguard for
the expansion of Soviet influence in Korea and Japan. In the
late 1950' s, however, the Soviet Union shifted her foreign
policy from expansionism to the support of nationalistic move-
ments in newly emerging nations. This policy, called
"revisionism" by China, downgraded North Korea's significance
as an "outpost" in the world communist movement.
With Khrushchev, the Soviet Union adopted a policy of
peaceful coexistence with the West, even to the point of
detente with the United States. Peaceful coexistence was a
realistic appraisal of Soviet needs and capabilities. United
States and Japanese assistance and technology was necessary
to support development of Siberian natural resources- -a high
44priority goal. When these two active doctrines- - support
of national liberation movements and big-power detente- -came
into clash in Vietnam, the Soviet Union opted to support the
former so long as it did not jeopardize the latter.
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The Soviet Union, recognizing the danger of a military con-
flict with the United States, coupled with the advantages
Western technology and capital investment could bring, did
not wish to jeopardize detente while pursuing Asian national
45liberation movements. In 1973, peaceful coexistence was
accepted as part of Soviet doctrine.
So long as a reasonable attempt is made by the West and
the Soviet Union to maintain detente, the Soviet Union will
be unwilling to support any liberation movement in Asia--
47including such a movement by North Korea's Kim il-Sung.
North Korea, as a communist neighbor to the Soviet Union,
is a buffer against South Korean, Japanese, and United States
influence and militarism in East Asia. But, as a superpower,
the Soviet Union is not seriously worried about South Korea
or Japan (at present) threatening her security. With her
large Seventh Fleet and her bases in Japan, the United States
would not really need South Korea if she decided to take mil-
itary action against the Soviet Union. The significance of
North Korea to the Soviet Union becomes, in reality, more
political than military in nature.
The interests of the Soviet Union in the divided Korean
peninsula will be best served by insuring that North Korea
does not jeopardize the Soviet Union's major foreign policy
goals. The Soviet Union's interest in North Korea, then,
will be determined by her relations with the major powers.
Any state of hostilities in Korea, whether precipitated by
North or South Korea, would most likely involve the United
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States and Japan, forcing the Soviet Union to abandon detente
48
and assist North Korea. The Soviet Union, while becoming
embroiled in a conflict not caused by a direct threat to her
national security, would abandon any gains which could be
made by improved relations with the West. The Soviets, on
the tenth anniversary of the Soviet-North Korean defense treaty,
noted that the treaty provided for "coordinated actions" in
the struggle against imperialism- -a not- too- subtle reminder
that she would oppose any unilateral action that could lead
49
to a United States-Soviet confrontation.
If peaceful coexistence with the West can be maintained,
the major Soviet goal in East Asia would be the containment
of China and Chinese influence. Soviet policy toward Korea
can be expected to reflect this goal. Containment requires
the Soviet Union to compete with China, "peacefully," in
countries such as North Korea. Without the strong ideological
and cultural ties the Chinese claim with the North Koreans,
the Soviets have been forced to rely solely on their ability
to supply economic and military aid to the sister communist
neighbor. The fact that containment of China in Soviet
foreign policy is secondary to avoiding a conflict with the
United States and Japan shows the Soviet Union perceives the
Korean situation to be volatile. The Soviet Union, to enhance
containment of Chinese influence, will respond to North Korean
pressure, but not to the point of jeopardizing United States
52detente or relations with Japan.
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The Soviets, while publicly favoring Korean unification,
stress that unification must come about through peaceful
means. This is consistent with Soviet foreign policy, and
the Soviet press has tended to be most enthusiastic about
North Korean statements and actions which emphasize a peace-
ful approach to unification. Unification, furthermore, is not
53
a goal in itself for the Soviet Union. Korean unification
could conceivably be supported by the Soviet Union if it could
be brought about without jeopardizing Soviet relations with
the West, and where the unified Korea would be responsive to
the Soviet Union, vice China. But, even if this could be
accomplished, the end' result would be counterproductive, as
it T.vould negate an important Soviet obj ective- -preventing a
54Sino- Japanese rapproachment . Hence, a united Korea, re-
sponsive to the Soviet Union might have some intrinsic value,
but that value would be more than offset by the repercussions
to other major powers- - specif ically Japan and China.
Any unified Korea which is responsive to China, the United
States, or Japan would be a genuine political embarrassment
to the Soviet Union. It would not, however, pose a threat to
Soviet security, as would a similar situation to China. The
Soviet Union is too powerful to be militarily threatened by
r r
a united Korea.
Soviet national interest would preclude allowing a unified
Korea, influenced by any other nation, to emerge. For that
reason the Soviet Union views the present divided Korea to be
the probable long-term outcome. Cross-recognition, or at
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least more Soviet-South Korean ties might be forthcoming.
The Soviets are content to seek practical solutions which
will reduce the risk of war and preclude political embar-
rassment; hence, a solution similar to the post World War II
German formula would be acceptable, if not favored, by Mos-
cow. The "private" opinion of the Soviet Union seems to
57be that a two-Koreas settlement will be the final solution.
It would be the only solution which would safely allow the
Soviet Union to pursue her major foreign policy goals.
C. THE UNITED STATES AND KOREA
Unlike Japan, China and the Soviet Union, the United
States cannot define Korea's importance in terms of proximity.
Korea lies more than 3000 miles from Hawaii and about 5000
miles from Alaska. Korea has been extremely important to the
United States, however, as the blood of thousands of Americans
spilled in battle will attest. The United States has had a
mutual defense treaty with South Korea since 1954, and to this
day United States troops remain on Korean soil, ready to
insure the survival of the South Korean government.
At the conclusion of World War II, the United States'
Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that "if the enemy were able
to establish a base in Korea, he might be able to interdict
United States communications until United States air and naval
forces in Japan undertakes retaliation against them. More-
over, any offensive operation the United States might wish
5 8
to conduct in Asia would most probably bypass Korea."
United States policy in 1950 was directed toward the protection
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of the security of the Far Eastern regions, not simply in
59defending South Korea itself. United States involvement
in the Korean War was undoubtedly based on this principle.
Subsequent to the Korean War, the United States' primary
foreign policy goal was to avoid an all-out war with the
Soviet Union and China while containing communism. Korea's
strategic significance in United States' Asian policy was
as one of a chain of bases along the Asian periphery- -with
Japan as the anchor.
In the 1960's, Korea became an important forward base
in Asia for the United States' flexible response strategy.
After the emergence of China and Japan to great power status
in the latter 1960 's, Korea became important as the "cross-
roads" where China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United
States were actively engaged in big power politics. The
policy of the United States evolved to stress that no single
nation would be predominant in Northeast Asia.
Today, Korea's strategic importance has become tied to
her relationship with Japan. As Professor Clough states,
"The attitudes toward Korea have become inextricably linked
to their attitudes toward the U. S . -Japanese alliance."
Accordingly, the principal justification for the United
States defense commitment to South Korea is "the potential
damage to U. S. -Japanese relations that would result from the
military conquest of South Korea by North Korea." South
Korea is important to the United States because of her close
relationship with Japan, and our support of South Korea is
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carefully watched by the Japanese. Any outbreak of hostili-
ties in Korea would force the United States to honor her
treaty commitment to South Korea, or face the consequences
of the collapse of Japanese confidence in the United States'
intention to honor her commitment to Japan. Japanese re-
armament, including a nuclear capability, could result,
spurring the Soviet Union and China to further arms buildup.
United States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, stated,
"As long as the security of Korea is regarded as essential
for Japan, the active support of Korea is vital and required
for the preservation of the political stability in Northeast
64Asia." The shift in the strategic significance of Korea is
subtly perceptible. No longer is Korea considered essential
for Japan's protection; Korea's importance to the United
States is interwoven with Japan. How Japan views United
States determination to uphold her mutual defense treaties
in Asia is mirrored by United States actions in Korea.
On January 1, 1975, the United States had an authorized
strength of 42,000 ground troops in South Korea. These troops
also possessed tactical nuclear weapons. " The troops were
originally placed in South Korea in much larger numbers to
deter any North Korean attack on South Korea, and withdrawn
as the tactical situation permitted. Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles, stated: "... we have no obligation under
the treaty to maintain any armed forces at all in Korea. If
it seems wise to us, we could, consistently with the treaty,
wholly withdraw our forces in Korea." At present, the
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United States Second Division is stationed between the
Demilitarized Zone and Seoul; a deterrent against a North
Korean blitz of Seoul, which lies only 30 miles south of the
Demilitarized Zone. Their presence, however, underscores
the United States concern for continued peace in Northeast
Asia. Their location in the path of any probable North
Korean attack does have military significance, but the poli-
tical significance as a "tripwire" ensuring a United States
(\ 7
response to an attack on South Korea is paramount.
As late as August 1975, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
stated the presence of United States forces in South Korea
fi ft
was essential to the stability of the peninsula. But in
1977, Defense Secretary Harold Brown stated that South Korea
was becoming strong enough economically to provide for her
own defense. He said that when the security of South Korea
does not depend on United States ground forces, it would be an
69inherently more stable situation. South Korean President
Park acknowledged, even in 1975, that United States troops
were not required to meet a North Korean attack, but he
stressed the importance of their presence as a guarantee the
United States would respond to an attack with air and sea
forces. They were a strong and viable deterrent to Soviet
70
and Chinese intervention.
This "guarantee," however, locks the United States into
a conflict with the Soviet Union and/or China, should they
support North Korea in an attack into South Korea. Detente
and Chinese rapproachment would be better served if the United
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States in a defensive posture had a flexible, or optional,
response toward hostilities in South Korea. Removal of this
'•tripwire 1 ' would be safer for the United States in the long
run, especially if South Korea could defend herself. Any-
defusing of big power confrontation would be beneficial to
the United States.
The United States' present commitment to South Korea
seems no longer to stand in reasonable relation to the con-
71temporary United States' national interest. The continued
security of Japan or the American interest in Asia does not
require the United States to risk war for the security and
independence of South Korea. As President Carter said, "The
essence of the question is: 'is our country committed on a
permanent basis to keep troops in South Korea even if they
are not needed to maintain the stability of that peninsula
The troop withdrawals show that the United States feels that
South Korea can defend herself against a North Korean attack,
and United States air and naval power would be used as re-
quired to display our continued support for South Korea. As
a "distant" power, it is easier for the United States to dis-
engage from South Korea than for the other three concerned
powers. Yet, the United States must be able to mollify Japan,
for if Japan questions the United States' determination, she
may take other steps, such as nuclear rearmament, to ensure
her security. The United States' continued economic support,
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The close relationship between South Korea and the United
States has other ramifications. South Korea, like North Korea,
needs the support of foreign countries. Any weakening of the
United States' commitment to South Korea is an extremely
dangerous development for Seoul. Presently there are about
150,000 South Koreans in the United States who could be man-
ipulated to develop pro-Seoul support and to curtail opposi-
tion in the United States. Mr. Donald Ranard, former
director of Korean Affairs at the State Department, testified
that, "... at least 85% of their (KCIA) effort, their staff,
their resources in the United States are directed toward the
75intimidation of Koreans resident in the United States."
Research institutes as well have been deemed to be recipients
7 f\
of large amounts of KCIA support. Recent revelations about
KCIA influence-buying of United States legislators is another
example of South Korean attempts to ensure United States
support is forthcoming. Unfortunately for the South Koreans,
when such activities are discovered the tactics prove to be
counterproductive. Radio Pyongyang broadcasts of the scandals,
confirmed by U.S. Armed Forces broadcasts, can only serve to
77
enhance the credibility of Radio Pyongyang. South Korea
further weakens her international position when forced to
state publicly that the Tong-son Park influence buying affair
is not related to pending issues with the United States, such
7 8
as troop withdrawals. Unfortunately, if South Korea does
appear to be weakened by such a chain of events, United
States withdrawal of troops could be more easily interpreted
as abandonment by other nations.
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A united Korea could potentially become a significantly
powerful nation in a decade or so. The United States could
become a major economic partner, especially with the develop-
79
ment of Alaskan resources in the United States. Today,
North Korea is aware of the potentially profitable commercial
ties with the United States. This awareness is tempered,
however, by North Korea's deep-rooted hostility toward the
8
West. Nevertheless, any united Korea would be able to
concentrate on nation-building to a much greater degree than
at present, and that building process would make United States
technology, in return for needed markets, attractive.
It should be recalled, however, that the recent Adminis-
trations have expressed a preference for a 2-Koreas settle-
ment, and the actual behavior of the United States has shown
8
1
her concern for building and strengthening South Korea.
Even with the troop withdrawals, the United States Government
will most likely accede to President Park's request for 1.5
8 2billion dollars in compensatory aid. This policy is geared
toward a permanent North-South settlement. A divided peninsula
with South Korea possessing the military strength to defend
herself from any North Korean attack, allowing the United
States to take a lower posture--a posture not directly con-
fronting the Soviet Union and China-- is the ultimate goal of
the United States' Korean policy.
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D. JAPAN AND KOREA
Japanese-Korean interactions have been documented for
hundreds of years. Korea has been called the dagger pointed
at the heart of Japan, but as much of Asia learned during
World War II, Korea can also provide the roadway for Japan
into Asia.
The tangible ties between lightly-armed, non-nuclear Japan
and a divided Korea are primarily economic. The economic ties
with South Korea are strong indeed. In 1976, their total
trade volume was 4.75 billion dollars. Japan realized a trade
surplus of 907.3 million dollars which reflected the excellent
South Korean markets for Japanese produced goods. Japan
absorbs 40% of South Korea's trade and provides 50% of its
imports. Their trade volume was roughly one-sixth that of the
83Japanese-United States total.
Trade volume is only one indicator of the Japan-South
Korean economic relationship. Since 1962, Japan has become
heavily committed to capital investment in South Korea. She
has far outstripped the United States in this field, account-
ing for 61.61 ($543,878,729) of all foreign investment in
South Korea, as opposed to 19.21 ($169,520,640) for the United
84States. Noticeably, South Korea is changing her foreign
capital inducement policy, stressing European investment in
heavy, chemical and strategic industries, in part to offset
the heavy dependence on Japan.
The Korea Herald , noting these strong economic ties,
stated "that Japan's cooperation with this country (South
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Korea) lies largely in the economic area is indisputable from
both the theoretical and practical points of view." From
a strategic standpoint, this economic relationship cannot be
ignored as it constitutes a major Japanese commitment to the
endurance of the South Korean state. Some analysts consider
the economic relationship to constitute the paramount Stra-
ti
f.
tegic relationship between these two nations. A high rank-
ing government official declared in the Diet, in October 1969,
that "the use of Japanese security forces in South Korea would
not be an unconstitutional act if used in defense of Japanese
8 7
national interests in Korea." Other analysts consider the
economic relationship very important, but not the paramount
one, from a strategic standpoint.
South Korean economic ties are obviously beneficial to
Japan, but she has proven to be more concerned with geopolit-
ical realities than with pure economics. In 1965, Professor
Tanaka Naokichi argued for the necessity of stabilizing the
South Korean economy to counteract the large North Korean-
South Korean trade imbalance favoring North Korea. He argued
that this large imbalance could destroy the status quo in
8 8Korea, to the detriment of Japan. Therefore, while the
large iron, coal, and other non-ferrous metals in North Korea
make that country extremely attractive as a supplier of raw
materials, Japan will proceed cautiously, aware that any
2-Koreas policy must be based on a concern for her own secur-
lty, not simply on an economic basis.
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United States military power in Northeast Asia embodies
American determination to maintain peace and stability in
that part of the world by deterring aggression against Japan
and South Korea and providing the "military balance" to China
and the Soviet Union. The continued drawdown of United States
ground troops in South Korea has accentuated Japanese percep-
tions of Korea's significance.
The continued presence of United States troops in South
Korea is favored by the mainstream of the LDP, business lead-
ers and the Defense Agency. For them, United States military
presence in South Korea counters nearby Soviet and Chinese
forces, improves the climate for Japanese trade and investment
in South Korea and, most importantly, strengthens the credi-
bility of United States' commitment to the defense of South
90Korea and of Japan, itself.
United States' base rights in Japan constitute a major
Japanese involvement with the United States toward maintaining
peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Any United States
intervention in Korea, in compliance with the United States-
South Korean defense treaty, would most probably be staged,
or at least reinforced, from these Japanese bases. The present
United States policy of removing all ground troops from South
Korea only accentuates the importance of Japanese bases to
91
the United States. Troop removal from South Korea presum-
ably would reduce United States involvement in a Korean con-
flict. Such a situation, while eschewing super-power
confrontation, would leave the Korean peninsula in an inher-
ently less stable condition.
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Stability in Korea is critical to Japan. Any Korean
upheaval would have profoundly unsettling effects in Japan,
and it is imperative that Japan know whether the United
States' troop withdrawals from South Korea are due to the
South Koreans' ability to defend themselves or simply United
States retrenchment, focussed in Asia. Japan's reaction to
the United States policy has been relatively mild. Yi Choi-
song, the South Korean opposition leader, voiced regret over
Japan's passive response to the United States action. He
warned Japan that she would not be able to enjoy the present
stability provided by United States troops should hostilities
92
arise.
Hostilities in Korea would force Japan into an unfavorable
strategic posture. Should the situation arise, United States
intervention in Korea would precipitate a bitter controversy
91in Japan over the use of the Japanese bases. While the
Japanese - United States security treaty is looked upon more
and more benevolently by the leftist parties, the use of
Japanese bases in a Korean conflict would be strongly opposed
94
by the JCP and the JSP. Even the DSP and some factions of
the LDP would voice opposition to their use. Japanese approval
of the use of the bases, although contested, would most likely
be granted in order to retain United States support. Japanese
95
troops would not be offered to defend South Korea, however.
Such a development would frighten both China and the Soviet
Union who, seeing a return to Japanese militarism, would react
in a hostile manner toward Japan. Japan, as a lightly armed
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nation, does not desire to incur the wrath of her heavily-
armed neighbors.
Should hostilities break out in Korea and United States
military assistance not be forthcoming, or not be enough to
enable the Seoul Government to survive, Japan would be faced
with a situation in which her own security, reliant heavily
on the United States deterrent force, would be in very serious
doubt. A quick move toward neutralism would be probable,
followed by severe internal pressure to rearm. Most likely
the leftist parties would make considerable political gains
at the expense of the ruling LDP.
Japan's concern for peace and stability in Korea is a
96basic element in her strategic calculations. The Fukuda-
Carter joint communique of 22 March 1977 noted, "... the con-
tinuing importance of the maintenance of peace and stability
of the Korean peninsula for the security of Japan and East
97Asia as a whole." Recent Japanese urging for the admittance
of North and South Korea to the United Nations emphasized that
"peace and stability on the Korean peninsula" are a matter "of
98great concern for Japan." The emphasis on peace and stabil-
ity reflects the true strategic significance of Korea--a
volatile area, close to Japan, which, if immersed in conflict
will involve Japan and the United States in confrontation
with the Soviet Union and China, or will leave Japan a mili-
tarily weak nation with no credible deterrence; an atmosphere
not at all conducive to worldwide economic confidence.
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The emphasis on stability is interpreted by many in the
LDP (and DSP) to reflect Japan's official position that
occupation of South Korea by hostile powers would threaten
Japanese security. Leftist parties and many intellectuals
disagree with this argument, however, stating that if the
Soviet Union and China were interested in the heart of Japan,
99they would not really need Korea. The real problem for
Japan is not that a unified Korea might come under "hostile"
rule, but that the unbalancing or destabilizing effect of the
unification process would adversely involve Japan. This would
imply, further, that Japan could accommodate herself to a
unified Korea ruled by the North Korean regime so long as the
unification process could be accomplished peacefully.
This is not to say that such an occurrence would be favored,
however. As Professor Herbert Passin has stated, "The Japan-
ese Government would probably prefer a continuation of the
status quo . . . but with the uncertainties about the United
States position, the pressures for a new neutral position are
growing stronger. Since Japan already recognizes South Korea
and is deeply involved there, a balance can only be achieved
by a higher degree of recognition of the North."
Japan also has a strong economic interest in maintaining
the present divided Korea. A unified Korea, with the potential
of a strong nation and an aggressive economic structure, would
be a bridgehead to trade with China, generating great competi-
102
tion between those nations with vested interests in Korea.
This situation, added to increasing Korean economic influence
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worldwide, would have an adverse effect on Japanese worldwide
business interests and add a competitor for ever scarce natural
resources. Furthermore, with no common market between North
and South Korea, Japan enjoys trade with both. A relaxation
of tension, or a reunification of Korea, could eliminate a
substantial portion of this already existing trade. Finally,
a unified Korea not sympathetic to Japan would jeopardize
Japanese investments and markets presently in South Korea.
Japan feels that a status quo situation is presently
infinitely better from a national security standpoint and
103from an economic standpoint. Increased trade with North
Korea would seem to reflect this position. Professor Passin's
conviction that increased recognition of North Korea is neces-
sary to retain a balance in Korea is interesting and reminiscent
of Professor Tanaka Naokichi's similar strategy concerning
South Korea in 1965.
46

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II
24. Ha and Leuggert, p. 741.
25. Koh, pp. 82-83, 102.
26. Hugh D. Walker, "Traditional Sino-Korean Relations and
Their Contemporary Implications," Korea and the New
Order in East Asia
,
p. 24.
27. The Sino-Soviet competition in North Korea has been
detailed expertly in Byung-Chul Ko ' s book, The Foreign
Policy of North Korea .
28. Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea
,
(Washington: Brookings, 1976), p. 41.
29. Far Eastern Economic Review , July 29, 1977, p. 13.
30. Hwang Hyun-bong, "A Prospect of Chinese Foreign Policy
and Reunification of Korea," East Asia Review , I,
(Summer, 1974), p. 208.
31. Clough, p. 43.
32. U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy
,
94th Congress, 1975-76, p. 78.
33. Yung-hwan Jo, "The Other Side's Views: Washington-Seoul
Ties," Pacific Community
,
Vol. 8, (July 1977), p. 633.
34. Hwang Hyun-bong, p. 189; and Yong C. Kim, p. 27.
35. Far Eastern Economic Review , September 30, 1977, p. 27.
36. Ha and Lueggert, p. 742.
37. Jo, p. 635.
38. Clough, p. 36




41. Clough, p. 43.
42. Lee Myung-sik, "Korea in the Soviet Union's East Asian
Policy," East Asia Review , I, (Winter, 1974), p. 406.
43. Yong C. Kim, pp. 5-6; and Edmonds, Robin, Soviet Foreign
Policy, 1962-1973 (London: Oxford University Press,
197 5), p. 2.
47

44. Edmonds, pp. 158-159.
45. Lee Myung-sik, pp. 407-408.
46. Edmonds, p. 127.
47. Lee Myung-sik, pp. 417-418.
48. Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security (Washington
Brookings, 1975), p. 169.
49. Morton Abramowitz, "Moving the Glacier: The Two Koreas
and the Powers," Adelphi Papers, No. 80
,
p. 10.
50. Yong C. Kim, p. 14.
51. Ha and Leuggert, p. 741
52. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea
, pp. 38-39.
53. Yong C. Kim, pp. 10-12.
54. Jo, pp. 627-628.
55. Yong C. Kim, p. 12.
56. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea
,
p. 40.
57. Jo, p. 628.
58. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs , II (New York: Signet, 1956),
p . 325.
59. Kang In-duk, "A Threat from the North: The Significant
Aspects of the Contemplated Strategy by the North,"
East Asia Review , I, p. 370.
60. Duk-joo Kim, pp. 518-519; and U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Mutual
Defense Treaty with Korea , 83rd Congress , 2nd Session,
1954, p. 28.
61. Duk-joo Kim, pp. 520-521.






, pp. 1 , 49
.
64. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report, FY 1977 ,
1976, pp. 4, 528.
65. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea, pp. 14-15.
48

66. U.S. Senate Hearings on the Mutual Defense Treaty with
.Korea, 1954, p. 19.
67. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea




69. Christian Science Monitor , July 27, 1977.
70. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea
, pp. 24-25.
71. Yong C. Kim, pp. 47-48.
7 2. U.S. Government, Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents , Vol. 13~, News Conference of May 26, 1977
.
73. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security
, pp. 34-35.
74. U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations,
"Activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in








77. Far Eastern Economic Review , February 25, 1977, p. 58.
78. Haptong , September 12, 1977, as quoted in FBIS, Sept. 12,
1977.
79. Gregory Henderson, "The United States and South Korea,"
Korea and the New Order in East Asia
,
p. 98.
80. Koh, p. 204.
81. Ha and Lueggert, p. 745.
82. Far Eastern Economic Review , July 13, 1977, p. 13; and
June 10, 1977, pp. 10-11.
83. Direction of Trade .
84. Haptong , October 3, 1977, as quoted in FBIS , October 3,
1977.
85. Korea Herald , September 4, 1977, as quoted in FBIS ,
September 6, 1977.
86. See Abramowitz.
87. Soon Sung Cho, "The Changing Pattern of Asian International
Relations and the Prospects for the Unification of Korea,"
Korea and the New Order in East Asia, p. 142.
49

88. Soon Sung Cho , "Japan's Two Korea's Policy and the








92. Haptong , August 6, 1977, as quoted in FBIS , August 9,
1977.




95. Yong C. Kim, p. 58.
96. Far Eastern Economic Review
,
July 29, 1977, p. 13.
97. Facts on File , 1977, p. 209.
98. Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)
,
September 30, 1977,
as quoted in FBIS , October 4, 1977.
99. Yong C. Kim, pp. 53-54; and Hearings before the Sub-







102. Young Whan Kihl , "North-South Relations: Unification?"
in Korea and the New Order in East Asia
,
p. 227.
103. Soon Sung Cho, "Japan's Two Korea's Policy and the
Problems of Korean Unification," p. 718; and Clough,




III. NORTH KOREA'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS
A. NORTH KOREAN INTERNAL SECURITY
North Korea, as any other country, must secure an adequate
degree of internal security to ensure her government's ability
to function. For North Korea, the problems of adequate mili-
tary strength, economic stability, and an orderly succession
to leadership constitute the major facets of her internal
security problem.
1. Adequate Military Strength
The North Korean armed forces operate under the com-
plete control of the Korean Workers Party and the President.
The President is the supreme commander of the armed forces
and the Chairman of the National Defense Committee- -a division
of the Central People's Committee.
Historically, the North Korean armed forces have shown
remarkable growth in manpower and capabilities. 1953-1958 was
a period of military recovery from the Korean War. After the
Chinese People's Liberation Army withdrew from North Korea,
the North Koreans embarked on a campaign to regain the mili-
tary balance on the peninsula. Specifically, the North
Korean armed forces acquired their own military aircraft and
increased their size from 275,000 to 583,000.
In 1960, the relatively unstable Rhee government in
South Korea was overthrown by Park Chung-hee, who established
a strong and firmly-entrenched regime. The greater cohesion
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and stability in South Korea was probably a major cause for
increased North Korean military buildup, including the estab-
lishment of military alliances with both the Soviet Union
and China in 1961. Table I compares the overall growth of
the North Korean armed forces' hardware from 1959 to 1971-
-
a growth which reflects great concern for maintaining military
superiority.
TABLE I 106




Surface to Surface Missil es 12 24
Amphibious Ships 150
Pontoon Bridges 250 420
Osa-I Patrol Boats 4 8
Aircraft 800 850
In December 1962, the trend toward greater military
awareness and capability was articulated in the "Four Great
Military Lines'* adopted by the North Korean government:
(1) convert all the people into armed troops, (2) convert
all the regions and districts into fortresses, (3) convert
all the military personnel into cadres, and (4) convert all
107
the armed forces into modernized units. Along with these
"military lines" came an increased effort to expand heavy
industry to equip the army, and a greater ideological thrust
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in the armed forces. Front line installations and wartime
mobility systems were also undertaken in an effort to upgrade
10 8North Korean military effectiveness.
These programs have been successful in upgrading the
defense capability of North Korea. Table II shows the present
inventory of manpower and equipment which, by any interpreta-
tion, constitutes a formidable force- in-being. But the success
of the "Four Great Military Lines" has not been achieved with-
out severe sacrifice and great cost. From 1965 to 1974, the
North Korean military budget has consumed an average of 13.6%
of the gross national product (GNP) , and the defense appro-
priation for 1976 totaled $878,000,000, or 25% of the GNP. 109
Furthermore, the acquisition of Soviet tanks, naval craft and
aircraft has underscored the North Korean dependence on the
Soviet Union for military support. For future considerations,
it is obvious that the North Korean military strength will be
significantly affected by her overall economic progress.
Therefore, economic development, including heavy industry,
will become an increasingly important factor in her internal
security. Failure to develop her industrial base adequately
will place an ever greater economic burden on the North Korean
people if the present state of military preparedness and capa-
bilities are to be maintained. It would also make North Korea
increasingly dependent on foreign military assistance and,















































The great military mobilization in North Korea has
created some very serious economic problems. North Korea is
faced with a shortage of labor due to the emphasis on military
mobilization, a shortage of capital due to the lack of outside
investment, a lack of technological know-how, and dependence
112
on domestic savings for her economic base. Yet, Kim il-Sung
has stressed that economic construction must be conducted in
parallel with the buildup of national defense. An editorial
in Nodong Sinmun reflected this position: "Economic self-
reliance provides a material foothold for political indepen-
dence. Politics cannot be conceived without economics.
Political independence which is not buttressed by a powerful
113
self-reliant economy amounts to balderdash."
In order to achieve economic growth, North Korea has
embarked on numerous economic "plans." From 1946 to 1950,
North Korea instituted a land reform act and nationalized the
major industries. She also embarked on modest one and two-
year economic "plans" to organize the economy, with aid from
the Soviet Union. In 1954, following the Korean War, North
Korea instituted a three-year economic plan aimed at postwar
rehabilitation. This plan (from 1954 to 1957) was completed
four months ahead of schedule with impressive results. Over-
all industrial output rose almost three times above the 1953
level, and the farm output in 1956 was 81 greater than was
ever achieved under Japanese rule. Yet, much of this plan's
success was due to the enormous amount of aid received from
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the Soviet Union and China. The Soviet Union made a two-year
grant of one billion roubles ($250 million) and cut the out-
standing loan balance to North Korea in half. The Chinese
made a four-year grant of $324,000,000 and considered all
expenses incurred in the Korean War as a gift to the Korean
i 114people.
Upon completion of the three-year economic plan,
North Korea commenced a five-year economic plan (1957-1961)
which placed priority on developing heavy industry. This
pattern of economic development seemed to parallel the classic
Soviet style. North Korea stated that the five-year plan was
intended to completely do away with the colonial economic
structure and replace it with the foundation for an indepen-
dent socialist economy. In 1958, the agricultural collectiv-
ization program was completed. In 1961, the five-year plan
achieved all its stated objectives; however, due to the
growing North Korean-Soviet dissolution during its later
stages, Soviet aid was becoming increasingly harder to obtain.
In 1961 at the Fourth Korean Workers' Party Meeting,
a seven-year economic plan was outlined which was designed to
carry out the technical and cultural revolution simultaneously
Improvement of the North Korean standard of living, with grow-
ing emphasis on light industry and agriculture, were major
points in this plan. During this seven year period, the
strain in North Korean-Soviet political relations became
obvious, affecting the Soviet Union's willingness to supply
economic assistance to North Korea. The Soviet Union, showing
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her dissatisfaction with Pyongyang, increased the price of her
exports to North Korea until they commanded prices higher than
paid on the international market. Since China was heavily
involved in the "Great Leap Forward" during this period, her
117
ability to supply aid to North Korea was marginal, at best.
Besides the economic problems generated by her reliance
on China and the Soviet Union, North Korea embarked on her
"Four Great Military Lines" during this period, incurring
increased costs for the militarization campaign. The addi-
tional costs for armaments, manpower and resource re- allocation,
essentially scuttled many of the economic gains hoped for under
the Seven-Year Plan. By the end of the 1960's, military ex-
118penditure was about 30% of the GNP, reflecting Kim il-Sung's
inability to obtain adequate foreign economic assistance to
support both his economic and military goals.
By 1967, the Seven-Year Plan had to be extended three
119years. If North Korea's great military buildup was to con-
tinue, it was obvious that other sources of supply had to be
established. The European market offered some promise, but
the high transportation costs made it a temporarily unreal-
istic choice. Japan was the only other nation who could
supply North Korea's required additional aid at reasonable
costs. Significantly, in 1968 imports from Japan almost
tripled. The plan, however, still could not be deemed a
success
.
In 1971, North Korea embarked on a six-year economic
plan designed to strengthen the material and technological
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1 20foundation for socialism. Since both Soviet and Chinese
economic and military grants were officially terminated that
same year, and military expenditures totaled 311 of the
budget, Kim il-Sung stressed the need for technological inno-
118
vation and modernization of equipment. Furthermore, this
six-year plan tacitly relied upon Western technology and
121
capital, focusing upon Japan.
In 1973 and 1974, the North Korean trade volume with
Japan was unprecedently high. In this period Japan ranked
second only to the Soviet Union in North Korea's trade vol-
12 2
ume. In 1973, North Korea purchased 27 industrial plants
123
worth $375 million from Japan and the Western countries.
Appendix A details North Korean- Japanese trade during this
period.
On September 23, 1975, the North Korean government
announced that it had reached the goals of the six-year plan
16 months ahead of schedule. The announced statistics, how-
ever, showed that North Korea had attained only 92% of her
goal for pig iron and granulated iron, 86% for steel, and 91%
for cement. Kim il-Sung, in his 1976 New Year's address,
spoke of attaining the still unfulfilled targets of the six-
year plan. Pak Song-chol, the State Administrative Council
Premier, stated on September 8, 1977 that, "last year (1976)
(we) attained proud and rewarding successes in completing the




It appears that, in general, the six-year plan was
successful. Japanese imports were extremely important in
its success, however, and they were the subject of state-
ments made by Kim il-Sung in an interview in August 1977:
. .
.
promoting trade between (North) Korea and Japan is
beneficial to the peoples of the two countries. We
wish for further development of trade between (North)
Korea and Japan.... The Japanese government should sell
everything we want. However, it failed to do so.... we
ordered a large steel mill from Japan to implement the
six-year plan. As a result, Japanese technicians
visited our country for negotiations and a survey. . .
.
According to Western news reports, Japan has refrained
from making a further commitment in this regard. ... 126
For North Korea, ready to embark on a new seven-year
plan in 1978, Japanese imports and technology continue to be
very important. But in 1977 North Korea was saddled with a
colossal international debt estimated to be $1.3 billion for
non-communist countries, and $700 million for communist coun-
tries. Two major reasons for this great debt are: (1) the
great percentage (20-30$) of the budget allocated to national
defense, and (2) the falling world market for North Korea's
chief export--non-ferrous metals. The most important creditor
is Japan, especially since Japanese imports figure heavily in
127North Korea's future economic plans. In March 1976, North
Korea reportedly requested a two-year moratorium on the
Japanese debt repayment. By September 1976, banking sources
in Tokyo estimated the North Korean debt to be $293 million,
128
of which $62 million was overdue. In December, repayment
terms were agreed upon, at a seemingly high interest rate of
7.75%. In June 1977, North Korea again suspended her debt
repayment to Japan, with an outstanding balance of $220
million. 130

North Korea's international monetary woes were high-
lighted when several of her diplomats were asked to leave
Denmark for smuggling. The Far Eastern Economic Review stated
that these activities were ordered by the North Korean govern-
ment in an attempt to obtain badly needed foreign exchange
131funds. Whether this plan constituted such an attempt or
encompassed a smaller-scale escapade on behalf of the officials
concerned cannot be properly determined. The episode served,
however, to embarrass North Korea publicly by emphasizing her
economic plight. Solutions such as reducing military spending
and approaching the Soviet Union for assistance on some sort
of quid pro quo basis, while obvious, will not be undertaken
unless her situation worsens. Most likely, North Korea will
hope for rising worldwide prices for her export items, and
embark on a campaign of greater austerity at home to solve
132her monetary problems.
3 . Succession to Leadership
Any long range solution to North Korea's economic
problems is dependent upon the stability of her leadership.
For this reason, succession is a most important internal
133
security concern in North Korea. As with the Communist
Parties in China and the Soviet Union, no clear-cut successor
can be identified, since succession to power involves intense
political in-fighting among those few in a position to make a
try for leadership. As Figure 1 shows, there are only six
members of the elite Presidium of the Political Committee of
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members, plus ten secretaries and ten heads of the Party
Central Organs, who might be powerful enough to engage in a
post Kim il-Sung power struggle. Since there has been no
leadership succession in North Korea's history, any attempt
to predict Kim's successor would only be guesswork. A long
and bitter power struggle could ensue with a myriad of pos-
sible outcomes, i.e., a pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese leader, a
militant or conciliatory leader, a coalition, etc. Any power
struggle would place North Korea in a position of internal
instability.
Kim il-Sung, no doubt well aware of the crisis a
succession struggle could precipitate, has attempted to in-
sure the continuity of leadership by naming his son, Kim
Chong-il, to be his successor. Since 1972 the cult of Kim
il-Sung has reached great heights, apparently "proving" his
wise leadership to be infallible. Should Kim's infallibility
be accepted as fact, his son--his hand picked successor-




To enhance Kim Chong-il 's position, Kim il-Sung has
removed older leaders, replacing them with his son's con-
temporaries. Notably, Lim Chun-chu, a tutor of Kim Chong-il,
was elevated in September 1975 from thirty-first to ninth on
the Central Peoples' Committee. In April 1976, Kim il was
transferred from the Premiership due to old age and replaced
by Park Sung-chol. In May 1976, Defense Minister Choi Hyun
135
was replaced by Oh Jin-wu.
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Whether the "selection" of Kim Chong-il, coupled
with the elevation of his cronies to major positions of
power in the Party and government, will forestall a succession
crisis remains to be seen. Since May 1976, however, open
opposition to Kim's choice of his son to succeed him has sur-
faced, and in general the replacement of older leaders in
1 7<;
favor of Kim Chong-il 's contemporaries seems to have ceased.
Furthermore, open speculation that Kim Chong-il was
somehow involved in the 1976 axe-wielding incident at Pan-
munjom has surfaced. Possibly to enhance his position as a
strong nationalist, intensely opposed to the United States'
troops in South Korea, he attempted to prove himself. The
silence of the Soviet Union, China, and other allies abroad
show the political disaster of the incident, and attempts to
link it with Kim Chong-il are open manifestations of opposi-
137tion to his emergence to leadership.
After Kim leaves the scene, the debt problem may be
resolved by searching for a more capable administrator than
Kim Chong-il and abandoning Kim il-Sung's Chuche philosophy,
-1 "7 O
siding with either the Soviets or Chinese. The resulting
reduction of military expenses and a more stable international
financial position might be deemed to offset any loss of
independence.
B. NORTH KOREAN EXTERNAL SECURITY
North Korea's foreign policy principles are formulated
by the Supreme Peoples' Assembly-- the elected governmental
body. These principles are converted into hard policy in
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the Foreign Policy Division of the Central Peoples' Committee.
This committee receives inputs from the Supreme Peoples'
Assembly, the President, and the North Korean Workers' Party.
North Korea's foreign policy decision-making process is
illustrated in Figure 2.
Foreign policy execution is vested in the Administrative
Council which, through the Department of Foreign Affairs,
conducts foreign policy with those countries with which North
Korea has diplomatic relations. The Department of Overseas
Economic Operations conducts economic relations with those
nations with which no diplomatic relations have been estab-
lished. The Overseas Culture and Liaison Committee is an
external Government and Party agent which promotes cultural
ties with the countries where no diplomatic ties exist,
especially the newly emerging nations. The high governmental
and Party emphasis on the latter two organizations illustrate
the great importance North Korea places on economic and cul-
tural ties with those nations having no diplomatic relations
with North Korea.
The President of North Korea has the power to ratify and
abrogate treaties, an authority, relatively speaking, greater
141
than the Chairman of the Peoples' Republic of China. Con-
sidering that Kim il-Sung is both the President and Head of
the Korean Workers' Party, his ability to influence North
Korea's foreign policy is practically absolute.
North Korea's most important allies are the Soviet Union

















































main protagonists. Japan, however, seems to occupy a posi-
tion which, while not exactly friendly, is not exactly hostile
either. North Korea, a "shrimp among whales," is trying to
maximize her own security position relative to South Korea's.
Primarily, her immediate objectives include forcing the re-
moval of United States troops from South Korea, isolation of
South Korea politically, and enhancing her own international
position, especially in Japan and the Third world.
1. The Soviet Union and China
North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union and
China are based upon her position as a fellow communist nation
and upon her ability to remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet
rift. Izvestiya's statement that "... North Korea emerged
today as an advanced socialist nation playing a major role
142
among socialist countries" underscores the fact that,
politically, she is important to both the Soviet Union and
China.
Until 1956 the Soviet Union was closely allied with
North Korea, providing great amounts of aid and military
assistance. In 1956, when at the twentieth Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union the cult of personality
was denounced and a peaceful means to socialism was approved,
North Korea continued to support the Soviet Union. After the
Moscow Declaration, calling for bloc unity in 1957, the Soviet
Union became more critical of the North Korean five-year plan's
divergence from the Soviet model, and the subsequent Chinese
offer of economic assistance (and influence) in 1958 was most
welcome. The Great Leap Forward in the same year, while
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abhorred by the Soviet Union, was respected and to some
degree emulated in North Korea.
As the paths of the Soviet Union and China seemed
to diverge in the 1950's and 1960's, North Korea was able
to retain the support of both while charting an independent,
socialist course. In 1960 the Sino-Soviet rift was no longer
a secret. North Korea continued her movement away from the
Soviet Union, exhibited by her conspicuous absence, along
with that of Mao Tse-Tung, from the Conference of 81 Communist
and Workers Party in Moscow. While this activity may be
interpreted by some as decidedly anti-Soviet, it should more
properly be viewed as a move by North Korea to establish her
international independence, refusing to side solely with
either the Soviet Union or China in their dispute. Signifi-
cantly, North Korea signed treaties of Friendship, Cooperation
and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union and China in July
1461961. No doubt the overthrow of the Singman Rhee govern-
ment in South Korea prompted North Korea to secure such
treaties, and the ensuing military buildup in North Korea
required Soviet economic and military assistance. In October
1961, North Korea profusely praised the Soviet Union at the
22nd Soviet Communist Party Congress, while two months later
145
she sided with China on the dispute over revisionism.
This two-handed approach to the major communist powers
was instrumental in securing adequate assistance to meet the
goals of the five-year economic plan and upgrading North
Korean national security through military assistance and
alliances. The events of 1962, however, made North Korean
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neutrality impossible. The Soviet Union, already faced with
confrontation with the United States over Berlin, would not
endorse the rampant anti-American rhetoric in Asia concerning
the China-Taiwan and North-South Korean issues. Soviet aid
to India during the Sino- Indian border dispute was an attempt
to expand her national influence, to the detriment of China.
Finally, the Cuban (Caribbean) Missile Crisis, in which the
Soviet Union publicly backed down under United States pressure,
caused North Korea to question seriously Moscow's willingness
J i r
to defend her, should she be attacked. In January 1963,
a bitter Nodong Sinmun editorial declared:
All fraternal parties are independent and equal and
shape their policies independently in keeping with the
principles of Marxist-Leninism and proceeding from the
specific conditions of their countries. There are big
countries and small countries, but there is no high
party and low party. Precisely for this reason, no
party should interfere in the internal affairs of other
fraternal parties or exert pressures on them, force
their unilateral will upon them and slander them. 147
When all Soviet military assistance had ceased in
1962, North Korea embraced China as her major ally, stopping
148
short, however, of total denouncement of the Soviet Union.
By 1964, Chinese-North Korean relations had reached their
zenith, but when Khrushchev fell from power later that year
North Korea's position became less vitriolic toward the Soviet
tt • 144Union.
In February 1965, Soviet Premier Kosygin paid a
surprise visit to Pyongyang. During his visit, Kosygin
stated that "imperialist intrigues" were the real cause for
dissention in the Communist movement, and he urged strengthening
68

the Soviet-North Korean "fraternal" relationship. 149 North
Korea, experiencing severe economic setbacks due to the
Soviet Union's unwillingness and China's inability to supply
economic assistance, was suddenly faced with the strong pos-
sibility of Japanese-South Korean normalization of relations.
Such a development could mean great Japanese economic assist-
ance, in addition to the United States' military assistance
to South Korea. Without adequate economic and military aid,
North Korea would be far outstripped economically and mili-
tarily by South Korea, even though North Korea was, at that
time, still in a superior position. In May 1965, Soviet
military aid to North Korea was resumed with the signing of
144
a military assistance pact. In June 1965, true to North
Korea's fears, a Treaty of Normalization of Relations between
South Korea and Japan was signed. By June 1966, North Korea
had denounced "narrow-mindedness" and signed an economic and
technical cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union. The
turnabout in bloc relations seemed complete when North Korea
attended the 23rd Soviet Communist Party Congress, receiving
144Chinese criticism for her action.
The period 1967 through 1969 saw little change in
North Korea's position relative to the two major powers, while
the two powers became more deeply embroiled with each other.
In January 1967, the Red Guards blocked the Soviet Embassy in
Peking and Chinese students left Moscow in February. The now
open hostility between Peking and Moscow undoubtedly made
North Korea uneasy. The 1968 Soviet invasion into
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Czechoslovakia was considered an exercise of "hegemony" by
China, while the open Sino-Soviet confrontation over Damansky
Island in 1969 was watched intently worldwide. In September
1969, China conducted her first two nuclear tests in Sinkiang
Province. North Korea was now bordered by two "nuclear"
nations, each eliciting hostility toward the other.
In April 1970, China's Premier, Chou En-lai, visited
Pyongyang in an effort to patch up the deteriorating relations
between the two countries. Chou voiced a strong anti- Japanese
line, exploiting the Japanese-South Korean relationship which
had been recently magnified by the Nixon Doctrine and the
reversion of Okinawa to Japan. While Soviet troops along the
Chinese border had assumed alarming proportions, China could
well have been concerned about further Soviet influence in
North Korea. The possible Soviet- Japanese efforts toward
a Siberian development venture were also a mutual concern of
North Korea and China. Chou's visit seemed to bring less
troubled relations between North Korea and China, and the
press releases seemed to show that China's popularity in
152
North Korea had outdistanced the Soviet Union's. Still,
Soviet trade to North Korea amounted to about one-third of a
billion dollars, accounting for 70% of North Korea's total
r • «. , 153foreign trade.
While China's popularity was resurgent vis a vis the
Soviet Union, China and Japan normalized relations in September
1972. This action reminded North Korea that she was, indeed,
a small player in big-power politics. Her continued neutrality
70

in the Sino-Soviet dispute emphasized her need for military
support, economic support, and close ties with her two power-
ful Asian neighbors.
Presently, the Soviet Union's popularity in North
Korea is relatively low. Such recent Soviet initiatives as
the invitation of South Koreans (1977) to participate in
Soviet athletic events and other cultural exchanges have been
the subject of bitter North Korean protest and boycott.
From the Soviets' standpoint, Kim il-Sung's personality cult
is reminiscent of Stalinist times, and the aggressive, de-
stabilizing foreign policy goal of reunifying Korea is not
deemed to be in the Soviet Union's national interest. Even
in denouncing South Korean-United States "war hysteria," the
Soviet Union is cautious. Speaking of such hysteria as a
threat to those who "truly want to see a fair solution of
the Korean question and the guarantee of a durable peace in
this area of the Far East," the Soviets are careful not to
provide North Korea with unconditional support.
When North Korea captured the USS Pueblo in 1968
she was supported openly by China, but the Soviet Union failed
to back her. The 1969 downing of a United States EC- 121 recon-
144
aissance aircraft received only weak Chinese support. Yet,
the 1976 axe-wielding incident at Panmunjom garnered absolutely
no support from either China or the Soviet Union. This un-
mistakable trend emphasizes North Korea's diplomatic isolation
when she confronts the United States with violence. Further-
more, it suggests the lack of support she can expect should
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she embark on a forceful Korean reunification campaign. 156
The smuggling incident in Scandinavia further labeled North
Korea as an embarrassing ally to both China and the Soviet
Union, most likely to be manifested in measured future
support. This support would be conditional upon North
Korea's loyalty and adopting a policy of increased restraint
in her relations with the United States and South Korea.
2. South Korea and the United States
North Korea's foreign policy objectives concerning
the United States and South Korea were enunciated in 1961,
in the preamble of the North Korean Workers' Party's Fourth
Congress: "... the immediate objective of the party is to
secure the complete victory of socialism for the sake of
fighting against imperialism and feudalism and laying the
groundwork for the construction of a communist society
157throughout the Korean peninsula!' The preamble reflects
a deep hostility toward the United States and an aggressive
policy toward South Korea.
Both North and South Korea publicly desire unifica-
tion, but no common ground has yet been found upon which a
feasible formula could be negotiated. North Korea attempted
to build a revolutionary base in South Korea prior to 1950
and, as a militarily superior country, attempted a forceful
reunification of Korea from 1950 to 1953. Subsequent to
this unsuccessful attempt to reunify Korea, Pyongyang relied
upon psychological warfare, interspersed with infiltration




North-South relations from 1954 to 1960 were rela-
tively amiable, however, as contrasted with the 1962-1968
period which was one of general hostility and increased North
Korean military buildup. Notably, in the 1962-1968 period
the North Korean reunification effort had no planned program.
The effort consisted of random appeals to national sentiment,
agitation of the South Korean people to revolt, and propaganda
"ICO
claims of the superiority of socialism. Since 1968 the
relations between North and South Korea have not generally
improved, but North Korea, however, has pursued her goal of
reunification by establishing a solid program, concentrating
on increasing her own economic development, attempting to
isolate South Korea diplomatically, and cultivating political
1 59
support in the non-aligned nations.
In 1960, Kim il-Sung called for "free general elec-
tions throughout North and South Korea on a democratic basis
without any foreign interference. This is our consistent
stand on the question of national reunification." South
Korea's Singman Rhee insisted that the elections must have
international supervision. The United States, as the only
foreign power in Korea, supported Rhee's position.
Kim il-Sung, acting as the only true Korean nation-
alist, has continued to press for reuniting Korea, peacefully
and with no outside intervention. If nationwide general
elections could not be agreed upon, Kim proposed the estab-
i f\ i
lishment of an interim confederation. He insisted that
South Korea is only a fledgling capitalist state whose
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capitalism is national in nature, and therefore the two
different political philosophies could be peacefully recon-
ciled in a confederation.
South Korea, embracing a strong anti-communist
philosophy, was finally realizing real economic growth in
the 1960's. Bolstered by the strong military support of the
United States, South Korea showed absolutely no inclination
to conspire with the North Korean regime. Most probably the
South Korean leaders were as nationalistic as the North.
Their strength, in striving to ensure the endurance of any
resulting unified Korea, was increased with the passage of
time. United States troops were a strong in-place deterrent
against North Korean aggression and with United States approval
of South Korea's strategy toward Pyongyang, Seoul was content
to maintain the status quo while building her economic and
military strength. Furthermore, North Korea's insistence
upon removing all United States troops from Korea was inter-
preted as a thinly disguised effort to dispose with the
deterrent in order to embark on another military campaign to
unify Korea.
South Korea remains intent on negotiating only from
a position of strength, willing to wait until militarily and
economically she has surpassed the Pyongyang regime. Table
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South Korea's position on unification is evident in
Park Chung hee's interview with Le Monde :
Even if we have to wait a long time for reunification we
totally reject achieving it by violence .... We believe
that peaceful reunification is to all intents and purposes
unattainable in the near future. 164
When asked how unification should come about, Park replied:
"Reunification should be carried out by means of free
elections in the North and the South, taking into
account population proportions."
Le Monde : "If population proportions are taken into
account, that would mean the end of the North Korean
regime.
"
Park: "That could be one of their reasons for refusal."
It is easy to see that in the face of North Korean
pressure for reunification, or even confederacy, the South
Korean hesitancy to embrace any plan appears to be pure
intransigence. South Korea's insistence that United States
troops remain in Korea is based on her desire to guarantee
Korean stability. North Korea, however, portrays the foreign
troops on Korean soil as constituting collusion between a
southern "puppet" regime and United States imperialists to
keep Korea divided. This theme appears incessantly in the
North Korean press. Kil il-Sung's Chuche principle further
enhances his own position as a true Korean patriot, relying
on Korean nationalism to solve Korea's problems.
North Korea is also quick to point toward United States
military exercises staged from Okinawa and the Seventh Fleet
as indications of aggressive attitudes toward North Korea.
A recent "civilian defense drill" held in South Korea was
called provocative by the North Korean press.
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United States troops in South Korea have undoubtedly
been a stabilizing factor on the peninsula, but they have
also been a major impediment to Korean unification. Success-
fully deterring any attack into South Korea, they have per-
mitted her to concentrate on her economic development while
maintaining a much lower per capita defense budget than the
North.
In all the North Korean proposals for reunification,
removal of the United States troops from Korea must be the
initial step. In 1965, Kim il-Sung put forth three points
to reduce tension in Korea: (1) withdraw United States troops,
(2) North and South Korea conclude a peace agreement, and (3)
reduce North and South Korean armies to 100,000 men. The
importance of the United States troops was further underscored
when Kim il-Sung offered to terminate the security pacts with
the Soviet Union and China if South Korea would do likewise
with the United States. 167
Kim's proposals have propaganda value, of course, but
there is more to it than that. In a 1977 Nodong Sinmun edi-
torial it was stated: "The occupation of South Korea by the
United States imperialists and their policy of aggression on
Korea are the basic obstacles to Korean reunification and the
principal cause of menace to peace on Korea and Asia."
North Korea undoubtedly feels that the United States, by her
presence in South Korea and support of Park Chung-hee, is
deliberately and purposefully impeding Korean unification,
attempting to cement a permanent 2-Korea's settlement.
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Furthermore, should any uprising in the South come about,
these United States troops, in collusion with the South
Koreans, could take action against the North. In other words,
the North Koreans perceive a foreign military power on Korean
soil, poised at North Korea. This constitutes an overt threat
169
to her security.
The continued intensity of the North Korean argument
that United States troops must leave South Korea reflects
Pyongyang's fear that these troops do, in fact, present a
threat to her security and to Korean nationalism: "Let us
decisively smash the ' 2-Koreas' plot of United States imper-
ialism and its stooges to keep our nation split forever."
In a 1972 New York Times interview, Kim il-Sung
pointed out that North Korea is in a de facto state of war
with the United States. The American military presence in
South Korea was responsible for the North Korean military
buildup, which in turn slowed down the rise in the North
171Korean living standard. Kim declared furthermore that
United States troops must withdraw from South Korea before
even cultural exchanges can be made between these two coun-
tries. Recent North Korean attempts to replace the armistice
with a peace agreement were predicated upon the troop with-
drawal as a pre-condition. Even this strong desire to estab-
lish some formal ties with the United States must follow the
172primary obj ective- -removal of the United States troops.
North Korean attempts to force government-to-government
contact with the United States, enhancing her international
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position, have drawn highly critical reaction by South Korea
who does not wish to see her position as the only "legal"
government on the Korean peninsula undermined. When the USS
Pueblo was seized by North Korea in 1968, direct negotiations
between the United States and North Korea were made, causing
17?
South Korea to condemn United States' actions. The 1977
helicopter incident was closed when United States military
officers, under the United Nations Command, signed receipts
for the bodies of the dead men and the survivor from the
North Korean and Chinese People's Armies. Again, South Korea
was concerned that the United States was too soft on North
Korea, and was worried that North Korea would successfully
174
negotiate directly with the United States. The North
Korean press spoke of the transfer as if direct government
relations had already been established: "The U.S. Army crew-
man and the bodies of the dead were transfered to the enemy
side thirty minutes later than the scheduled time owing to
175
the U.S. side's delayed typewriting of the receipt."
North Korea also argues that a United States-North
Korean peace treaty should be signed, without South Korea's
presence during negotiations. Such a development would
be a political coup for North Korea at great loss to Seoul.
In June 1977, Secretary of State Vance put forth four
major points describing the United States policy toward North
Korea
:




(2) If North Korea's allies seek to improve relations
with South Korea, the United States will seek to
normalize relations with North Korea.
(3) Negotiations for replacing the armistice with a
lasting accord; and
(4) The United States will participate in any negotia-
tions so long as South Korea is present.! 77
President Carter's pronouncement that United States
troops will be withdrawn from South Korea because they are
no longer required was obviously viewed with relief in North
Korea. The North Korean downing of a United States army
helicopter on July 14, 1977 illustrated the possible vola-
tility of a relatively minor incident. The unusually mild
line taken by North Korea, including the quick return of the
survivor, was most likely due to her intent not to jeopardize
178the troop withdrawals. The usually vociferous press
reports also reflected this conciliatory position:
Whether it was an intentional or unintentional intrusion
of the United States' forces helicopter into the area of
our side, if they had complied with the demand of our
side and had not attempted to flee . . . such unhappy
incident would not have occurred.
l
7 ^
The recent North Korean declaration of a 200-mile
economic zone was sharply denounced in Seoul. The greatly
expanded and modernized South Korean fishing fleet could suffer
the same fate as the small fishing boat that strayed into North
18
Korean waters and was captured in August 1976. The South
Korean government called it an action designed to change the
status quo, which had been maintained since 1953. Her declar-
ation that she would protect her fishermen operating in the
economic zone in July 1977 was followed by the North Korean
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statement in August that she will "permit South Korean small
fishermen to peacefully carry out fishing operations within
181
our economic zone." While the VRPR, a clandestine radio
station monitored in South Korea, said the South Korean fish-
ermen hailed North Korea's lifting of the fishing restriction,
the Seoul government's claim that Pyongyang still holds 32
boats and 405 fishermen shows that the issue of economic
181 18?boundaries remains volatile and unsettling. '
To complicate further the relations between North and
South Korea, the Pyongyang government has declared a 50-mile
military boundary- -in effect, pushing her sovereignty 50
miles seaward. South Korea immediately denounced the action
and sailed a ferryboat from Inchon to the Paengyong-to Islands,
TOT
within the zone, without incident. As the only country to
declare such a zone, North Korea's motives seem to reflect
her uncomfortable feelings relative to her own security.
North Korea undoubtedly feels threatened by a hostile southern
neighbor, growing more powerful daily, who is protected by a
United States military "tripwire." While in the United States
this "tripwire" is viewed as a deterrent against a North
Korean invasion into the South, the North Koreans are genuinely
concerned that any outbreak of North-South hostilities would
involve the United States. Furthermore, with aid and assist-
ance from the Soviet Union and China becoming more "qualified,"
North Korea, extremely concerned about the "destabilizing"
influence of the United States troops, resorted to the 50-mile
military boundary purely as an attempt to increase her own
81

184defensive posture. Its non-negotiability in the Pyongyang-
Tokyo private fisheries talks seems to confirm this evaluation.
South Korean-United States relations have become more
suspect in recent years due to growing opposition to the
repressive Yusin Constitution and the opposition to United
States troop withdrawals. In 1972, the South Korean regime
instituted martial law, becoming openly more repressive toward
political dissidents. As early as 1963, however, Park Chung-
nee stated that, "The United States must understand that the
West European style of democracy is not suited to Korea."
Professor Kim Hyung-il, the President of the Korean Associa-
tion of Southern California and a strong supporter of Park
Chung-hee, is an ardent defender of the internal policies
instituted under the Yusin Constitution. He argues that
South Korea has national determination, motivation, and a
strong ideological stand against communism. In fact, South
Korea needs these qualities to survive, and no criticism of
-| O (L
the government is warranted. Even opposition leader
Yi Choi- sung defended the Yusin system, stating that the
anti-communist law and other restrictive measures are neces-
18 7
sary in South Korea, so long as North Korea exists.
These repressive policies have resulted in numerous
arrests of students and opposition leaders. One count showed
263 political prisoners are still in South Korean jails. The
fact that 14 dissidents were released in 1977 may show South







Still, these policies might have been condoned had
the South Korean government confined her activities within
her own borders. However, the so-called Tong-son Park affair
has strained the relationship between the two governments.
Tong-son Park, a South Korean businessman, was indicted in
1977 for influence-buying, i.e., bribing U.S. legislators.
When Tong-son Park fled the United States and reappeared in
Seoul, the South Korean government was asked to extradite him
to the United States. The subsequent refusal, based on ab-
sence of an extradition agreement, served to inflame anti-Seoul
sentiment and caused speculation that the KCIA was somehow
involved.
Even in 1978 the two governments are attempting to
find a middle ground upon which Tong-son Park can testify
without being liable to prosecution. Former South Korean
opposition leader, Kim Yong-sam, stated, "The government should
set a line under which it can cooperate with the United States
in a way to put an early end to the case instead of giving the
189impression that Pak Ton-son is equal to the government."
The withdrawal of American ground troops from South
Korea, undertaken during this period of strained relations,
must be carefully conducted to avoid the appearance that it
was done in response to the South Korean government's internal
policies or possible duplicity in the Tong-son Park affair.
Defense Minister So Chong-chol, downplaying the troop removal,
stated that he felt the United States would dispatch ground
troops to Korea in the event of another Korean War, but that
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the speed of the response would depend on the urgency of the
189
situation. Park Chung-hee, aware that he will still retain
strong American military support after the troop withdrawal,
has orchestrated his feelings that the removal of the "trip-
wire" does, in fact, weaken Seoul's position. The United
States, eager to emphasize her support for Seoul, has readily
agreed to provide South Korea with $1.9 billion in military
aid to compensate for the United States Second Infantry
n . . . 190Division.
While the argument can be made that the United States
troop removal can make President Park more vulnerable to
political and para-military pressure, it seems that his regime
is strong enough to survive and, as th£ only anti-communist
rallying point in Korea, he may be able to further consolidate
.. 191his power.
Park has also utilized United States' fear of a de-
stabilizing situation in Korea to push hard for reaffirmation
of the United States nuclear deterrent commitment to Seoul.
In a New York Times interview, Park stated that South Korea
would not hesitate to develop a nuclear capability if the
192
American nuclear umbrella were withdrawn. Even though
Seoul signed the non-proliferation treaty, she is starting to
talk more openly about a nuclear option.
South Korea has made some political initiatives on
her own in an attempt to gain greater recognition in the com-
munist world. Presently, she is concentrating on improving
relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries
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Quite openly, South Korea would like to see a Soviet embassy
in Seoul. Such a development would symbolize the Soviet
Union's refusal to back North Korea in an attempt of reunifi-
193
cation by force. Furthermore, in return for Soviet diplo-
matic recognition, South Korea would probably agree to a
United States-North Korean non-aggression pact. Both coun-
tries could benefit from such an event and, since privately
the Soviet Union favors a "German" solution to the Korean
question, tacit recognition of the South Korean state already
194
exists. South Korea would like to purchase Soviet timber
outright, and since the Soviets' 200-mile economic zone
excludes South Korea, presently no fishing agreement can be
signed because no diplomatic avenues for negotiation are
195
open.
The seaport at Vladivostok, with its rail connections
to Europe, is a potentially valuable port for South Korean
business interests. Presently South Korea, using third country
ships, brings export commodities into Vladivostok and then,
using the Trans-Siberian railroad, sends them to Europe. Since
South Korea is attempting to increase the use of her own ships
to counter her balance of payments difficulties, an agreement
to bring South Korean ships into Vladivostok must be worth
, ... , . 196
some political concessions.
3 . Japan
Japan and North Korea have no diplomatic relations,
but Japan's attractiveness to North Korea has been evident
for many years. Politically, North Korea must rely on Koreans
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resident in Japan and her appearance of gaining international
acceptability to influence Japanese policy. North Korea
would like to reduce Japan's support for South Korea while
obtaining Japanese technology and economic assistance, but
even a neutral Japan, not economically and militarily aligned
1 Q7
with South Korea, would be attractive.
In 1956, North Korea commenced overtures toward Japan,
relying of necessity upon people-to-people diplomacy. She
believed that if Japan were to improve her relations with the
Soviet Union and China, North Korea would have a much better
opportunity to secure Japanese rapproachment . Such a series
of events would decrease Japan's dependence on the United
States, elevating the overall North Korean security position
198by downgrading U.S. military presence. This optimistic
feeling toward rapproachment faded by 1958, however, when
Japan openly considered recognizing South Korea as the sole
legitimate government on the Korean peninsula. Also, North
Korea feared that an exclusive Japan-South Korean liaison
199
would bring great economic gains to South Korea.
Relations between North Korea and Japan became more
tenuous until the Japan-South Korean Treaty of Normalization
was signed in 1965; then they deteriorated. North Korea
contended that governmental ties could not be effected until
Korea was united. Furthermore, the North Koreans reserved
the property claims and rights to compensation for the 36
years of Japanese rule in Korea. Finally, the South Korean-
Japanese agreement on the legal status and treatment of
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Koreans in Japan, effected in conjunction with the treaty,
was deemed unjust and discriminatory toward North Korea. 200
In later years, North Korea softened her stand on unification,
but declared that Japan must abrogate the Japan-South Korea
treaty prior to normalization of relations with North Korea.
When the North Korean ballet visited Japan in January
1971, it signaled a thaw in Pyongyang-Tokyo relations.
By September, probably in response to President Nixon's China
overture, Kim il-Sung pushed again for closer North Korean-
Japanese ties. Kim said that establishment of relations
2 2between the two countries was entirely up to Japan. In
November 1971, the North Korean Workers' Party Conference
decided upon "the tactical changes for the immediate problems"--
--a positive policy toward Japan by which North Korea would
seek to normalize relations with Japan and shortcut South
203Korean- Japanese relations. Also in November, Kim il-Sung
stated three principles for normalization of relations:
(1) Removal of discrimination toward pro-North Koreans
in Japan,
(2) Non-interference with the Korean Peoples' efforts
for peace on the Korean peninsula, and
(3) Non-intervention in Korea's internal affairs.
In 1972, a five-year private agreement on trade was
signed by the Committee for Promotion of International Trade
and the Chairman of the Dietman's League for Promotion of
Japanese- (North) Korean Relations. This agreement, the first
of this kind signed by North Korea with a non-communist country,
called for increasing the bilateral trade volume and establish-
u * 205ing trade representatives in each country.
87

When North Korean Vice Premier Park Sung-chol stated,
in 1972, that North Korea was willing to normalize relations
with Japan without abrogation of the South Korean- Japanese
Treaty, it became clear that North Korea was practically
begging for an equi-distant Japanese policy. Pyongyang's
concession, a major change in North Korea's position, was
tendered again by Kim il-Sung in February 1973. 206
During this period North Korea repeatedly called for
Japan to remove her one-sided trade policy toward South Korea
and accept an "unbiased" policy. Furthermore, North Korea
demanded that the Koreans resident in Japan be given the right
to a national education, the right to (North Korean) repatria-
tion, and the right to travel to and from the homeland.
Pyongyang's public proclamations reflected her dual line of
approach toward Japan: she would attempt to convince Japan
to move away from a one-Korea trade policy, and attempt to
secure greater rights for (and influence of) the Koreans
resident in Japan. This group, substantial in number, would
be a major link between North Korea and the leftist parties
in Japan.
Without normal diplomatic relations, North Korea has
had to rely on private agreements between the two countries
and on those Japanese sympathetic toward North Korea to foster
closer ties. When Minobe Ryokichi, the Socialist Governor of
Tokyo, visited Kim il-Sung in October 1971, Kim utilized the
meeting to push hard for increased trade relations, acknowledg-
ing that normalization of political relations would be a long
*- m ~ • • 208time in coming.
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Other "friendly" groups in Japan include the Dietmen's
League, the Japan-Korea Friendship Group, and the Japan-North
Korea Trade Association. These groups, while pushing for
closer North Korean- Japanese ties, also proclaim their support
for Kim il-Sung's nationalistic goal of a united Korea. Each
group, in its public proclamations, systematically denounces
the "2-Koreas" plot of "reactionaries and militarists," calling
for increased Japanese economic and political ties to North
v 209Korea.
Besides the Dietmen's League, the General Federation
of Korean Residents in Japan (Chosoren) constitutes the most
organized and intensive North Korean lobbying effort in Japan.
This entire group of 650,000 Koreans is divided into two
factions: about 400,000 Koreans are loyal to South Korea
(Mindan) , and 250,000 are loyal to North Korea (Chochongnyon)
.
This latter group figures very highly in Pyongyang's foreign
policy toward Japan, having received over $70 million in
210
North Korean aid by the end of 1976.
The Chochongnyon carries out numerous functions for
North Korea. As a lobbying group, it promotes those goals
beneficial to North Korea, such as a pro-North Korean trade
policy, and enlisting the support of the leftist parties in
Japan. It also attempts to enhance its own position within
the Chosoren at the expense of the Mindans. The Chochongnyon,
as a vital link between North Korea and the Japanese leftist
parties, provides the Korean counsels and general propaganda
needed to promote normalization of relations. It also acts
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as a conduit for the arrangements of influential and sympa-
thetic Japanese visitors to North Korea. In 1973, the
Chochongnyon established the Korea- Japan Export- Import Co.,
which functions as North Korea's trade mission in Japan,210, 211
Some members of the Chochongnyon travel to North Korea
to consult with government officials, while others simply are
allowed to visit their homeland. On October 16, 1977 the
36th and 37th groups of Chochongnyon visited North Korea,
receiving a warm reception and the latest North Korean propa-
212ganda. Recently, for the first time North Korean govern-
ment officials attempted to enter Japan in order to take part
in a Chochongnyon meeting. The Japanese Justice Ministry,
however, turned down the visa applications because their entry
was determined to be aimed at conducting political activities
213in Japan. Their involvement in numerous facets of politics,
trade, and propaganda show their importance to Pyongyang.
The Chochongnyon serve a second major purpose; namely,
of conducting subversive operations targeted against South
Korea. The unsuccessful assassination attempt of President
Park, in which his wife was killed, was allegedly conducted
by a group of Chochongnyon. As late as October 29, 1977, the
South Korean press reported a South Korean national from
Japan was sentenced to life imprisonment for espionage in
South Korea. The 21-year old student at Seoul National




The recent North Korean proclamation of a 200-mile
economic zone and a 50-mile military zone has seriously
threatened the Japanese fishing industry. Kim il-Sung, ready
to commence any dialogue with Japan, said "We need to hold a
discussion with officials concerned" to resolve any differ-
ences between the two governments. Japan, willing only
to conduct private talks with North Korea, dispatched a dele-
gation from the Dietmen's League to carry out the full-scale
negotiations concerning Japanese interests in these waters.
North Korea's handling of these talks showed that she
was well aware that Japan, with growing pro-North Korean
leftist support at home, coupled with the prospect of being
denied the use of lucrative fishing grounds by North Korea,
was vulnerable to government pressure. North Korea wanted
a diplomatic breakthrough in these talks to be provided by
the Japanese government in the form of formal signing of a
fisheries pact, or at least Japanese governmental endorsement
of a private agreement.
The talks commenced with the North Korean Cultural
Committee's assertion that, "it will be possible to sign an
agreement between private organizations," but with a guarantee
by the Japanese government. Prime Minister Fukuda assured
a worried South Korean opposition leader, Yi Choi-sung, that
any such agreement between North Korea and Japan would be
217private in nature, without Japanese government guarantees.
On September 6, 1977, the talks foundered on this point and
an interim agreement was signed between the Dietmen's League
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and the North Koreans. The interim agreement allowed small
Japanese fishermen to operate within the economic zone, but
not within the military zone, until June 30, 1978. 218 This
interim agreement served to demonstrate North Korean good
will toward Japan for the present, but placed on record her
determination to obtain some sort of government-to-government
interaction with Japan in the near future. Surely this
immediate solution will allow Japan to determine whether
access to these fishing grounds is worth some sort of public
recognition of North Korea. The fact that Japan was informed
of the blanket restriction to these waters via direct message
between North Korean patrol craft to a Japanese fishing boat,
points out the predicament in which Japan finds herself in
trying to resolve crucial problems with a nation with which
219
no diplomatic ties exist.
4. The Third World
Concerning North Korean relations with Third World
countries, a general trend of economic and cultural contacts,
followed by visitors, negotiations for counselor relations,
220
and an exchange of ambassadors has been employed. This
strategy has been successful to a point. As of August 1977,
North Korea had gained diplomatic relations with 138 nations,
while South Korea had such ties with 142. But only one country,
Togo, has broken diplomatic relations with South Korea to
establish them with the Pyongyang regime. Furthermore, 47
221
countries have diplomatic relations with both Koreas.
As a member of the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations,
North Korea achieved a major diplomatic victory in August 1976
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when the Conference approved a North Korean resolution calling
for the immediate cessation of war preparations in South Korea,
removal of United States troops and nuclear weapons from South




North Korea's admittance to the International Civil
Aviation Organization in Montreal was one of three major
diplomatic successes for her in the month of September 1977.223
From September 10-14, North Korea hosted an international
seminar on Chuche
, which was attended by delegates from 73
nations and four international organizations. The ensuing
declaration denounced the "criminal United States-South Korean
2-Koreas policy."
On September 22, 1977 North Korean Foreign Minister
Ho Tarn was granted an entry visa to the United States to
participate in the Foreign Ministers Conference of Non-Aligned
2 25Nations, opening in New York on September 26. South Korea
was very critical of the visit and, even though Ho Tarn met
with United Nations General Secretary Kurt Waldheim and hosted
a reception, the South Korean press pointed out that he had
made no direct ties with the United States and his reception
9 7 f\
was attended by only 250 of the 2000 invited guests.
These diplomatic successes did not offset such spec-
tacular diplomatic embarrassments as the Scandinavian smuggling
affair and the Panmunjom axe-wielding incident. They did,
however, illustrate that North Korea is actively engaged in
Third World diplomacy, and she is making progress in her quest




North Korea has many serious problems stemming from her
internal and external situation. Internally, North Korea
exists in a delicate position. Insisting on an effective
yet expensive armed force, she has sacrificed the economic
welfare and standard of living of her people. A reduction
of military spending with or without increased trade with the
West could be considered only within the context of improved
relations with South Korea and the United States. Increased
trade and the technology it would bring is desirable, but it
is predicated upon the removal of United States troops from
Korean soil. Japan, an economic power with little current
military might, has immediate potential as a source of the
much needed economic and technological support. The large
outstanding international debt of North Korea has jeopardized
her attractiveness as a potential trading partner, however.
In her external relations, North Korea has been caught
up in the big-power politics of China and the Soviet Union.
She has maintained relative neutrality in the Sino-Soviet
dispute, but she has become highly dependent on their aid
and support. Presently, North Korea's pursuit of international
acceptability and her efforts to force government contacts
with the United States and Japan are the manifestations of
Soviet and Chinese influence to restrain North Korea, in
their own national interests.
North Korea, espousing Korean nationalism, has generated
great fear and mistrust in the United States and South Korea
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with her insistence on United States troop withdrawal from
South Korea as the precurser to unification. With her large
armed forces and the history of her previous military attempt
to unify Korea, Pyongyang's present goal appears to many to
be another military campaign when the United States troops
are gone. Most likely, from the North Korean viewpoint, these
troops constitute a clear threat to her security and, coupled
with a southern neighbor who is openly hostile and growing
stronger each passing day, contribute to a seige mentality
which was most recently manifested in the proclaimed 50-mile
military zone.
South Korea sees the North Koreans as an obvious threat
to their existence and way of life. Her immediate strategy
is to delay the removal of the United States tripwire, biding
her time until her economic and technological base is self-
sufficient. Only in the last few years has South Korea ad-
vanced sufficiently to provide for her own defense, and with
United States pending troop removal from Korea her future
seems to depend on either the desires of the big powers, or
Korean nationalism, as resolved between the two competing
social and political systems.
While Japan recognizes South Korea as the sole legitimate
government on the Korean peninsula, she does maintain economic
and cultural ties with the Pyongyang regime. North Korea,
relying on extra-governmental channels, is trying hard to
establish some political recognition with Japan. Most notably,
the Chochongnyon are utilized to maintain the ties between
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North Korea and Japanese leftist parties, and to serve any
function required to enhance Pyongyang's position in Japan.
The recent Japanese-North Korean efforts to reach an
agreement on fishing rights within the 200-mile economic
boundary proclaimed by North Korea show the importance Pyong-
yang places on obtaining political recognition from Japan.
Yet, North Korea also wishes to improve trade relations with
Japan, hence the interim agreement served to show her good
will toward the Japanese people, while reminding the Japanese
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IV. JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS
Japan enjoys the status of a major power and, with the
world's third most powerful economy, this status seems justi-
fied. Yet Japan's military expenditures are a meager one
percent of her gross national product and her standing armed
forces are only half the size of North Korea's. A Mutual
Security Treaty with the United States provides Japan with
military support, including strategic nuclear deterrence, in
return for United States base rights in Japan.
A. INTERNAL SECURITY
As a lightly-armed, non-nuclear power, Japan's primary
internal security considerations include the status of the
Self Defense Forces, internal political security in the con-
text of possible leftist infusion as the ruling LDP weakens,
and the status of the large group of Koreans resident in Japan.
1. The Self Defense Forces
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution renounces war
as a means of settling international disputes, yet the Japanese
government has maintained a Self Defense Force of about 250,000
men to be utilized purely in a defensive role. Japan spends
about one percent of her GNP on these forces, which equates
to $5 billion, or 5.91 of the national budget. If this
expenditure is placed on a worldwide scale, it would show that
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Japan is in the top ten nations in defense expenditures.
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Japan has not fully united behind the requirement
for, or even the constitutionality of, the Self Defense
Forces. As recently as 1973, the Japanese courts have ren-
dered verdicts ruling the Self Defense Forces unconstitutional.
In the Naganuma case, which was concerned with using public
forest land far a military base, the Superior Court ruled
that Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution makes no dis-
tinction between wars of self-defense and wars of aggression.
Earlier cases, specifically the Sunakawa (1959) and Sakane
cases (1969), ruled that Japan has the inherent right of self
defense, and by inference, the right to maintain self defense
229forces. Naganuma denied these precedents, however, and
while appeals are sure to be in the court system for years,
the ruling itself points out the lack of cohesion behind the
Self Defense Forces.
The utility of the Self Defense Forces was expressed
by Admiral Gayler in testimony before Congress. He stated
that the forces are, in fact, non- threatening to others, and
they are extremely useful in stabilizing that part of the
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world. Their composition, specifically the emphasis on
anti-submarine ships and aircraft, seems to lend credence to
this claim. Commenting on Japan's ability to play a military
role in Asia, Prime Minister Fukuda stated:
It is absolutely out of the question that Japan could
play any role as a military power in Asia. Our consti-
tution prohibits this. But there are other fields in
which our country is powerful- -economy and culture. 231
Significantly, Japanese public opinion polls reflect
a visible trend in favor of maintaining the Self Defense Forces
105

Even supporters of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which
advocates unarmed neutrality, supports the Self Defense
Forces by a 71% - 29% margin. The Japan Communist Party (JCP)
favored them, 511- 49%. 232
While the Self Defense Forces' existence seems to be
accepted in most sectors of Japan, its size, composition and
utilization are matters of issue. Its ability to grow rapidly
is evidenced in the fact that all branches of the service are
heavily over-officered. Many of the officers and senior NCO's
are battle-hardened veterans, contributing the expertise
necessary to mobilize an effective fighting force of four or
five times the present size in an extremely short period of
233
time. This potential is viewed with uneasiness by many
leftists in Japan, including the Democratic Socialist Party
(DSP) and the Komeito. The argument that Japan needs this
234
military potential to uphold her United Nations commitments,
should she be ordered to do so, has been accepted by many in
the LDP.
In 1977 the Japanese Defense Agency, under some urging
by the United States, has sought to upgrade the Self Defense
Forces. Prime Minister Fukuda stated that Japan should
qualitatively improve her defense capabilities while keeping
the security system within the United States Mutual Security
Treaty. Actually, the Self Defense Forces have embarked




First, the Defense Agency has decided, informally,
to acquire 45 P-3C anti-submarine aircraft within the next
ten years. This decision to buy the Lockheed-built aircraft
was made partly in response to United States Secretary of
Defense Harold Brown's request during his July 1977 visit
* t 236to Japan.
Second, in order to build up her security operations
along the 200-mile economic zone, especially in the waters
off northern Japan, the Defense Agency has placed orders for
four 3200-ton helicopter-carrying patrol ships, three YS-11
patrol planes, six high speed patrol boats, and six medium
t. i • .- 237helicopters
.
Third, Japan will produce domestically the aircraft
which is intended to replace the P-3C within ten years.
Mitsubishi Heavy Industry is producing Japan's first domesti-
cally manufactured supersonic jet fighter aircraft, the F-l.
Eighteen of these aircraft are intended to be placed in com-
mission by March 1978, replacing the United States manufactured
23 8F-86F. They will have a maximum speed of Mach 1.6, and
will be considered area defense oriented.
Fourth, the Defense Agency wants a 12.2% increase in
the fiscal year 1977 budget for 1978. The funds are intended
to pay for the additional equipment, plus additional expenses
incurred in paying the wages of Japanese employees at the
United States bases in Japan. If Japan realizes a 6.7% econ-
omic growth rate in 1977, this increase will reflect 0.9% of
240
the GNP vice the 0.88% of 1977. Defense Agency Director
1 07

General Mihara stated in September 1977 that, "The Cabinet
decision on limiting defense expenditures to 1% of GNP is not
a permanently immutable one." l His implication was that if
Japan were going to maintain the sea lanes and secure an anti-
submarine warfare capability within Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger's "Defense Sharing Concept" of 1975, Japan may
be forced to place more money into military hardware and
242training.
2. Political Stability
Ever since its inception in 1955, the Liberal-
Democratic Party (LDP) has been the only party to rule Japan.
However, there are five major political parties in Japan,
each with its own peculiar ideology. In fact, due to the
strong ideology of each party, Japan has been historically
243
unable to conduct supraparty diplomacy. However, now that
the LDP's support has been declining steadily, the leftist
parties, faced with the possibility of future coalition
governments, have moved somewhat away from purely ideological
stands, toward more practical positions. Table V shows the
composition of the Japanese Diet.
The Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States has
been a primary issue in Japanese politics for over the last
two decades. The entrenched LDP, which encompasses the mer-
cantile interests of Japan, has consistently supported the
Mutual Defense Treaty while the DSP, Komeito, JSP and JCP
have opposed it. Yet, in recent years, the leftist parties
have looked much more benevolently upon the treaty in the
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light of practical politics. The Komeito still wants immedi-
ate abrogation of the treaty, and although the JCP officially
favors abrogation, it most likely would not insist upon it
if it were included in any coalition government.
Japan's two socialist parties, the more moderate DSP
and the radical JSP, disagree on the desired fate of the
treaty. The DSP, which formerly wanted to change the treaty,
now openly supports it. The JSP, which has a great deal of
strength in the western part of Japan, openly calls for
abrogation of the treaty through diplomatic means, "after
244
obtaining the understanding and consent of the people."
TABLE V
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A second major area of conflict among the Japanese
political parties concerns the proper relationship between
Japan and the two Koreas. The LDP was responsible for the
1965 Treaty of Normalization between Japan and South Korea.
Furthermore, the LDP has openly supported extensive Japanese
investment and trade with South Korea while refusing to extend
the same policies toward North Korea. Within the LDP, how-
ever, individual members such as Chu j i Kuno , the head of the
Dietmen's League's delegation to the Pyongyang fisheries talks,
have decidedly sympathetic leanings toward North Korea. The
Komeito and the JSP, Japan's second strongest party, are North
Korea's strongest supporters. The Komeito signed a 1972 joint
communique with North Korea calling for normalization of
relations and trade expansion. The 1973 North Korean- JSP
agreement advocated the same policies.
The DSP has not been supportive of Kim il-Sung's
position on United States troop withdrawals from South Korea.
In August 1977, Kasuga Ikko, the visiting Chairman of the DSP,
met with President Park and warned the United States against
any hasty troop withdrawal. Ikko proclaimed that a reliable
peace-keeping instrument set up by the world powers to guar-
antee peace and stability on the Korean peninsula was needed
prior to United States troop withdrawal from South Korea.
247
Ikko's statement was vehemently denounced in North Korea.
The JCP, which lost 10 seats in the 1976 lower House
elections, has become decidedly involved in the Japanese
political process, stressing the welfare of the Japanese
110

people must be paramount, even over the question of North
Korean ties. Isamu Watanabe, a JCP member, stated that,
"The JCP does not approve of a military demarcation line.'^ 48
While he said he understood North Korea's reasons for estab-
lishing her military zone, the Japanese fishermen used to
fish in those waters and it was the JCP's position that they
should still be allowed to do so. The JCP still calls for
normalization of relations between North Korea and Japan,
but it is also critical of Kim il-Sung's growing personality
cult. Significantly, the JCP withdrew its North Korean
249
representative in 1972.
The steady decline of the LDP's power in the Diet
opens up great possibilities for other parties relative to
North Korean policy. While the LDP's long-held position
favoring the Japanese-United States Mutual Security Treaty
seems to be becoming universally accepted, at least tacitly,
by all parties except the Komeito, its pro-South Korean stand
seems not to be gaining many converts. Mr. Herbert Passin,
speaking of the Japanese political situation, stated: "We
must avoid too much pressure on (Japan)
,
particularly on
political issues. These issues are so divisive that we run
250the danger of splitting the country by pushing too hard."
As the LDP's position as sole ruling party in Japan
may be eroding, the prospect of a coalition government with
the leftist parties might force the LDP to gravitate toward
greater North Korean recognition. While the leftist parties,
should they be included in any coalition government, would
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most likely not insist on a radical policy shift, they might
force the Japanese government to accept some lesser form of
government-to-government ties and greater economic inter-
course with North Korea.
3 . Koreans Resident in Japan
Approximately 600,000 Koreans are residing permanently
in Japan. These Koreans represent both North and South Korean
ideology, and they are potentially a vociferous lobbying group
within Japan. In general, Koreans are regarded as undesirable
elements in Japanese society. They are mostly unskilled, have
a very low standard of living, and have a 50% unemployment
rate. They live generally in the Tokyo and Osaka areas. Very
few of them have ever visited the Korean peninsula, but despite
the fact that they speak Japanese they must carry a certificate
of alien registration. Many of these Koreans resident in Japan
do not really want to return to either Korea. In Japan, how-
u • • «.u- 251ever, being Japanese is everything.
In 1965 the "Agreement Concerning Legal Status and
Treatment of Korean Nationals Residing in Japan" was signed
between South Korea and Japan. This agreement committed Japan
to ensure a stable legal status, adequate educational oppor-
tunity, and equal treatment of all Koreans resident in Japan
who registered as "South Koreans." There were numerous diffi-
culties from the start, however. Those Koreans loyal to North
Korea refused to claim permanent residence in Japan under this
agreement, demanding that Japan make a similar agreement with
2 52
the North Korean government. Since Japan did not recognize
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North Korea, such an agreement was impossible. Prime Minister
Sato, a strong supporter of South Korea, publicly stated that
he would urge these people to register as South Koreans,
enabling them to be covered by the agreement. He would not,
however, refuse them permission to change their allegiance
to North Korea. Sato's position did not sway the pro-North
Koreans, and of the 600,000 Koreans resident in Japan only
200,000 actually registered as South Korean citizens. Sato's
position did clearly acknowledge North Korea's de facto
existence, undermining the South Korean cause.
With only 200,000 of the 600,000 Koreans actually
registering as South Koreans resident in Japan, the Japanese
government still had a serious problem concerning the status
of the other 400,000 Koreans. Such an active group, concen-
trated in two major cities, could not be ignored, and should
any one of them commit a deportable offense the problem of
253
where to deport them was not insignificant.
Japan commenced allowing Korean residents to visit
North Korea in 1957. On August 13, 1959 an agreement to
repatriate Koreans in Japan to Pyongyang, negotiated through
the Red Cross, was signed. This agreement, violently opposed
by South Korea, was responsible for the repatriation of some
88,000 Koreans to North Korea by 1960. This document has
been renewed yearly thereafter.
The political activity of these Koreans has been
subject to scrutiny, but with as little overt Japanese
government involvement as possible. In 1974, a group of
113

Koreans residing in Japan traveled to South Korea and
attempted to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-
nee. Since these Koreans were Japanese residents, Japan, to
avoid any accusation of duplicity in the assassination attempt,
issued the Shinna Memorandum which stated that private in-
ternal activities critical of any specific foreign government
255
would not be permitted in Japan.
Recent activities by various Korean groups in Japan
have, however, caused the Japanese government to re-evaluate
this position. On August 12, 1977 a group of 70,000 Koreans
resident in Japan plus 30 South Koreans resident in other
countries met in Tokyo to establish an anti-Park, pro-Seoul
front--The Democratic Unification Front of Overseas Koreans.
This group, highly critical of growing South Korean-Japanese
ties, denounced them as being "at variance with the national
257
sentiment of our people. The South Korean government
demanded that Japan expel these dissidents, and when Japan
refused to do so the pro-Park Korean Youth Council in Tokyo
attempted to break up a meeting of the dissident group.
Japan's response was to arrest 55 members of the Korean Youth
Council--the first time Japanese police has taken such action
2 5 8
since World War II.
South Korea bitterly denounced the Japanese action,
claiming that such action had never been taken against pro-
Pyongyang residents. Japan responded through Yosuke Nakae,
an official in the Foreign Ministry, who stated that Japan
would not "regulate any activities critical of a specific
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foreign government unless they violate the Japanese domestic
laws." This position directly contradicted the 1974 Shinna
Memorandum and served to illustrate Japan's perception of the
intensity of emotion generated by these Korean residents. 259
Perhaps more importantly, it showed Japan's willingness to
allow them to express their views so long as civil disturb-
ances within Japan did not result. The Japanese government,
recognizing the internal unrest that a repressive reaction
toward the anti-Seoul group would bring, preferred simply to
allow them to express their political views. Yet the possi-
bility of adverse South Korean reaction could accelerate
internal unrest. The situation must be handled carefully
so as not to alienate either the leftists or the strong Seoul
supporters in Japan. Above all, domestic tranquility must be
retained, and the increasing tendency of these Koreans to
express openly critical views of South Korea may impede this
internal security goal.
B. EXTERNAL SECURITY
Japan relies on a strong economy, including great world-
wide trade and a large fishing fleet, 40% of whose catch is
7 f\ n
taken within 200 miles of other countries, to sustain her
population. Furthermore, with a relatively small armed force
geared to defensive measures, Japan is strongly dependent on
building and maintaining good relations with her neighbors.
Concerning the United States, the Soviet Union, China and
both Koreas, Japan is committed to programs of greater cooper-
ation and dialogue, working within the United Nations framework-
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The 1977 Diplomacy Bluebook discusses Japan's major approach
in her relations with other nations:
Our nation, as one of the Free World countries, has to
deepen its cooperative relations with the United States
and other friendly countries and, at the same time,
ensure steady progress in its exchanges and dialogues
with China, the Soviet Union and other countries with
different political systems. 261
Relative to the Korea's, Japan desires to maintain her
"essential" goal of stability, a goal emphasized by former
Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa at the Trilateral Commission
in January 1977: "The maintenance of peace and stability in
? f\ 7
the world is a prerequisite for our existence."
1. The United States
Japan's relationship with the United States is based
on her reliance on the United States military power to deter
and combat aggression against her, while she has become a
full-fledged economic competitor with the United States.
This economic competition, while viewed as healthy by many,
also bears the seeds which may cause dissolution between the
two nations.
a. Security Ties
The United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty
acknowledges that Japan, due to her disarmament subsequent
to World War II, lacks the power to defend herself. Granted,
Japan has the sovereign right to enter collective security
arrangements and possesses the inherent right of self-defense;
both the United States and Japan agreed that United States
forces will be maintained in Japan to deter armed aggression.
Furthermore, the treaty specifies that the United States
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expects Japan increasingly to assume responsibility for her
own defense against direct and indirect aggression, avoiding
armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other
than to promote peace and security within the purposes and
principles of the United Nations Charter. The treaty provides
for administrative agreements between the two countries con-
cerning the disposition of the United States troops in Japan,
including the question of base rights. Furthermore, Japan
agreed not to grant, without prior consent of the United
n fi "z
States, any military rights to a third nation.
This treaty cemented a strong military pact between
the two countries, giving Japan a viable strategic deterrent
in return for base rights for United States troops. Until
the late 1960's the Japanese leftist parties, the Soviet Union
and China strongly opposed this treaty, and when it was ex-
tended in a revised form in 1960 it was at the expense of
cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit to Japan and the
resignation of Premier Kishi. Lately, however, most leftist
parties (as well as the LDP) seem to accept the treaty as being
beneficial to Japan's self-interest. Furthermore, since the
Soviet Union and China wish to deny an exclusive Japanese
relationship with the other, both nations seem to be increas-
ingly willing to accept the pact. China, especially wary of
Soviet power in Asia, views the treaty as important and
necessary. 265 Realistically, the treaty can only be viewed
as a great benefit to Japan, who can spend a meager one per-




The base, rights in Japan have become increasingly
a matter of contention, however. As far as Korea is concerned,
the United States would require prior approval from Japan
before staging troops from those bases. As Defense Agency
Director General Mihara stated in July 1977:
We have no intention of unconditionally providing bases
in Japan for that purpose (staging areas during an
emergency on the Korean peninsula). Whatever the cir-
cumstances, this issue will require prior consultation.
Our answer to this question will depend on the circum-
stances . 266
The primary reason for Japan's attitude toward
base rights is undoubtedly her fear of being pulled into a
Korean conflict by the United States. However, a secondary
reason is the doctrine defined by President Nixon, whereby
he stated:
Our alliances are no longer addressed primarily to the
containment of the Soviet Union and China behind an
American shield. They are, instead, addressed to the
creation with those powers of a stable world peace.
That task absolutely requires the maintenance of the
allied strength of the non-communist world. 267
This "Nixon Doctrine" has been widely interpreted
to mean the United States, while not exactly disengaging from
Asia, would expect a military partnership with her allies-
including Japan. The partnership was designed to allow the
United States to provide a "deterrent" against aggression, but
also required the other nations to take a more active role in
? f\ 8
their defense and cooperation with the United States. The
1969 Nixon-Sato joint communique seemed to mark a significant




The question for Japan, however, seems to be how
far she can go in sharing the defense burden in Northeast
Asia without significant rearming. Furthermore, if the United
States is actually retrenching in Asia, the value of the
United States deterrent itself may become a matter of serious
question. In this case, extensive rearming, including nuclear
weapons, is one alternative. Japan has issued three defense
white papers (1970, 1976 and 1977) which carefully evaluated
the strategic balance. While the latest one acknowledges the
United States decline relative to the Soviet Union, it still
gives the United States the strategic edge. The 1977 white
paper noted the American expectations for assistance in secur-
27ity matters from her allies, however.
Given the strategic circumstances, Japan will
continue to embrace the security treaty, and the leftist
parties in Japan are likely to accept it as being in the best
interest of Japan to do so. Yet Japan will probably not go
so far as to become a full military partner of the United
States. As Professor Clough points out, "Japan can probably
contribute more to peace and stability in Ease Asia by remain-
271ing a lightly armed, non-nuclear power . ..." Growing
nuclear proliferation among her Asian neighbors would be an
unsettling development, however, and could prompt her to con-
sider developing her own counter-cities nuclear capability.
Such a capability would be utilized as a deterrent aimed
toward the newly emerging Asian nuclear powers, and so long
as it remained incapable of first-strike accuracy it could
be considered a defensive move.
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Whatever the circumstances, any intensive arming
campaign will frighten Japan's neighbors and cause her to
shift a great amount of her GNP into military production.
It is more likely that Japan, should she be forced to leave
the American military alliance, would entertain serious
thoughts about remaining lightly armed, non-nuclear, and
neutral in the US-USSR-China triangle,
b. Economic Ties
Prime Minister Fukuda, in a speech to the Diet
on July 30, 1977 declared: "Resources and energy problems
are very serious and basic problems because they are linked
to the very foundation of the Japanese economy and the
272peoples' livelihood" Japan's dependence on other nations
for her supply of raw materials is great, and it is predicted
that by 1985 Japan will control only 30% of her domestic raw
material requirements. She is presently highly dependent
upon Europe and the United States, and it appears that long-
term cooperation with these centers of international capital
273
will remain a necessity.
The United States receives 30% of the total
Japanese trade; 14.8% of the total United States exports go
to Japan and 10.8% of the United States imports come from
Japan. Yet this economic relationship appears much like an
underdeveloped country to a developed one. Fifty-eight per-
cent of the United States' exports to Japan are foodstuffs
and raw materials and 25% are machines and machine products.
Seventy- two percent of the United States' imports from Japan
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include heavy industrial and chemical products and 24% light
industrial products, with only 4% constituting raw materials. 274
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) predicted in July 1977 that the Japanese trade surplus
for fiscal year 1977 will approach the record surplus of $11
billion recorded in 1976. Furthermore, on July 31, 1977 the
gold and currency reserves in Japan reached a 52-month high
of $17.6 billion. To combat the ballooning foreign currency
holdings, the Japanese government ordered the sales of yen
to the United States armed forces and diplomatic corps in
27 5
exchange for dollars to cease.
When President Nixon ordered a 16.88% devaluation
of the dollar against the yen in 1971 the result was to make
Japanese goods more expensive, and it became more difficult for
American firms to invest in the Japanese economy. Furthermore,
the United States pressured Japan into buying U.S. Treasury
bills and bonds to prop up the sagging dollar, and Japan has
recently agreed to pay the foreign exchange costs of keeping
the United States bases in Japan.
The American balance of payments problems, viewed
in the context of large Japanese trade surpluses, have raised
serious questions in the United States over Japan's inter-
national economic policies. In July 1977, the United States
Treasury Department and United States Steel Company "filed a
formal dumping complaint against Japanese steelmakers. The
MITI, realizing the poor position of the United States' steel
industry, stated, "The move was regrettable from the standpoint
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of normal development of trade between the United States and
Japan." Since some European mills charge 10% less than Japan,
the dumping charge, filed only against Japan, was received
u-++ i 277bitterly.
The United States' economic zone is another thorny
issue between these two allies. Effective March 1, 1977 the
United States established a 200-mile economic zone but allowed
Japanese fishermen to fish within the zone, on an interim
basis, by paying fees, abiding by fish quotas, and obtaining
entry permits. The Japanese Fisheries Agency estimates that
Japanese fishermen will pay $100 million in 1977 to fish
within the United States economic zone. Negotiations for a
long-term contract are continuing, but this potentially di-
2 78
visive issue will be a recurring one between these two nations.
While there are qualitative economic disagreements
between the United States and Japan, it is important to keep
the two nations from drifting apart on these issues. If the
rift were to become irreversible, Japan might view the United
States' deterrent as a hammer held over Japan's head, or as
less than believable. Either situation would portend uneasi-
ness in Northeast Asia, probably manifested by Japan charting
a course away from the United States, gravitating toward
279
neutrality or rearmament.
2. The Soviet Union and China
a. Security Ties
The Soviet Union and China both have diplomatic
relations with Japan, yet neither has signed a peace treaty
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with her subsequent to World War II. Generally, Japan is
economically attractive to both China and the Soviet Union,
and each of these nations intends to impede the political
alliance of Japan to the other. Japan tends to view the
Soviet Union with mistrust and fear, while fully recognizing
the economic opportunity she may be able to provide. Most
likely, Japan feels the Soviet Union is her only real potential
military threat, and current polls show the Soviet Union to
7 8 ftbe Japan's least popular neighbor.
China and Japan have strong cultural ties. Japan
tends to view China with confidence and, to some degree, pity,
China's economic utility to Japan, including the legendary
2 81China Trade, has not been overlooked by the Japanese.
Japan considers neither nation, at present, to
2 8 2
constitute a dire strategic threat. She is fully aware
that her economic utility to them, in terms of trade, invest-
ment and technology, far outweighs any utility to be gained
by direct aggression against her. Hence, in the official
pronouncements of these nations, talk of increasing bilateral
relations with Japan is a recurring theme.
The single issue standing between a Soviet Union-
Japan peace treaty is the four contested islands north of
Hokkaido. Both nations have deemed them to be necessary for
each one's security, an inviolable part of each nation.
On July 20, 1977 the Soviet Ambassador to Japan
7 7
stated, "The northern islands are not unresolved issues."
On July 30, 1977 Prime Minister Fukuda expressed Japan's
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position concerning the islands to the Diet:
I think that signing a peace treaty after settling the
northern territories issue is the only essential pre-
condition for truly developing bilateral relations on
a stable foundation. 284
Dmitriy Polyanskiy, Soviet Ambassador to Japan, discussed
Japanese-Soviet relations on July 13, 1977:
In the 20 years since signing a joint declaration, the
Soviet Union and Japan have been expanding their bi-
lateral relations along a broad, meandering path ....
Political and economic relations have become more
active and stronger. 285
Japan recognizes China and Taiwan as two separate
entities, unlike her policy toward Korea. In August 1972 the
only obstacle to Sino- Japanese normalization of relations was
removed when, in the Nixon-Tanaka communique, reference to
Taiwan as part of Japan's security perimeter was not made,
thereby tacitly renouncing the earlier position taken in the
7 R f\
1969 Nixon-Sato communique. Today the major question
concerns negotiation of a peace treaty. In September 1977
Foreign Minister Hatoyama declared in the Diet that he con-
sidered the time was right to conclude a Japan-Chinese Treaty
of Peace and Friendship. He stated that Prime Minister
Fukuda's intention was to make the treaty satisfactory to
28 7both sides, emphasizing world peace.
The question of Japan's ties with the United
States, especially concerning the Mutual Defense Treaty,
does not really seem to be a detrimental factor in Japan's
relations with the Soviet Union and China. While it consti-
tutes a strong deterrent against aggression, the Soviet Union's
need for Western technology and investment, coupled with the
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tremendously destabilizing effect direct aggression on Japan
would have world-wide, make such a course of action most un-
likely, with or without the treaty. China views the Japanese-
United States Defense Treaty almost benevolently. Any Chinese
desire to weaken Japan's economic position in Asia has been
subordinated to Sino- Japanese rapproachment in the face of
2 88Soviet hostility. In fact, China has normalized relations
with Japan while improving relations with the United States.
The Chinese Foreign Minister, Chi Peng-fei, stated in October
1973: "Japan should not be under the guardianship of the
United States indefinitely, but it is desirable for Japan to
have its independent self-defense forces. However, it is
unrealistic for Japan to abrogate the Security Treaty
a- + i ..289immediately.
"
Obviously, the stability assured by a non-nuclear
lightly-armed Japan, coupled with the deterrent of the United
States military power, especially the Seventh Fleet, is in
the national interests of both China and the Soviet Union.
Therefore, it is unlikely that they would make a major issue
of the treaty in their relations with Japan,
b. Economic Relations
Japan's trade with the Soviet Union and China is
detailed in Appendix A. Concerning the Soviet Union, the
mutual benefits accruing to both nations with the development
of Siberian natural resources have great promise. In April
1973, Japan and the Soviet Union signed a protocol for an
Export- Import Bank credit of $1.05 billion in tied loans at
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6.3751 for eight years. In return for development of Yakuta
gas and coking coal and Siberian timber, the Soviet Union
will repay Japan with deliveries of hard coal, gas and logs,
and she will purchase other Japanese manufactured goods. 290
The "Siberian venture" has continued to expand
with Japan pledging another $90 million in bank loans to
develop coal deposits in Yakutsk, and additional United
States-Japan funds will be committed to the development of
natural gas as soon as the Soviet Union ascertains the de-
posits are greater than one trillion cubic meters. Further-
more, the Export-Import Bank in October 1977 agreed to provide
bank loans of $100 million to finance Soviet imports of large
2 91
caliber steel tubes from Japan.
Besides this mainland exploration and development,
a joint Soviet- Japanese oil venture formed in August 1977
made a significant oil discovery off the northernmost tip of
Sakhalin Island. By the autumn of 1978, the quantity and
quality of this discovery should be determined, but presently
292it could easily prove to be the largest oil deposit in Asia.
China is extremely wary of such economic cooper-
ation between the Soviet Union and Japan. Development of the
vast, hidden Soviet natural resources would only make the
Soviet Union more powerful. Furthermore, greater economic
ties between the- Soviet Union and Japan could portend greater
shared and vested interests between the two nations--a situa-
293
tion China would find unsatisfactory.
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For China's part, agreements that would provide
-Japan with Chinese coal and oil, in return for the foreign
currency reserves to purchase Japanese technology, are pend-
ing. Since Japan is China's largest trading partner today,
former Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fuyiyama's statement that
China is showing a positive stance toward induction of
advanced Japanese technology to modernize industry, science,
294
agriculture and national defense, is understandable.
The Sino- Japanese trade is not solely an effort
by China to obtain Japanese technology. Japan imported over
one billion dollars worth of Chinese materials during the
first nine months of 1977, a great percentage of which was
295
oil and coal. Surely, with the Japanese dependence on
world-wide sources of raw materials, China's resources and
proximity make her trade almost an economic necessity for
Japan.
c. Fishing Rights
In March 1977, the Soviet Union extended her
economic zone from 12 to 200 miles. In 1976, Japan caught
one million tons of fish in these waters, accounting for 501
of the northern Pacific catch. Therefore, in March 1977,
when thirteen Japanese fishing boats returned home, unable to
fish in "Soviet" waters, the impact of the Soviet Union's
action was painfully obvious. Japan responded by proclaiming
her own 200-mile economic zone, effective July 1, 1977. The
zone was considered bilateral in nature; that is, it applied
only to those nations who enforced the 200-mile limit
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against Japan. China and South Korea were not targets of
the Japanese economic zone.
In June 1977 an interim fishing agreement between
Japan and the Soviet Union was signed. This agreement, remain-
ing in effect until December 31, 1977, established a quota of
455,000 tons for Japan for the period June-December 1977.
This agreement required Japan to obtain fishing licenses and
pay quota fees, imposed a total ban on salmon and herring
within these waters, and reduced total Japanese fishing take
by 361. Consequently, Japanese retail fish prices have doubled
and tripled over the last year, resulting in losses of over
? Q 7$1 billion to the Japanese economy.
There was Japanese concern that the Soviet Union
might push Japan to sign an agreement giving at least tacit
recognition to Soviet sovereignty claims over four disputed
islands north of Hokkaido. The interim agreement, however,
sidestepped the issue of these islands, stating it would not
"prejudice the positions" of either government on the "various
problems concerning mutual relations." A de facto joint fish-
298ing area around those islands was thereby established.
The pact seems to show that the Soviet Union does not wish to
see the fishing rights issue cause a deterioration in the two
countries' relations. With the warming of the Sino-Soviet
dispute and the Japanese participation in the Siberian devel-
opment project, the Soviet Union obviously feels she needs
?QQ
Japan. Significantly, after the interim agreement was
signed, a five-year extension of the 20-year old bilateral
«. a * i . , 300trade pact was also signed.
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Japan established quotas of 335,000 tons, a 31.2%
reduction from last year, on the Soviet Union fishing fleet's
catch within Japan's economic zone. Following the Soviets*
example in their implementation of the agreement, however,
Japan agreed not to collect fees from the Soviets. In October
1977 the interim agreements, due to expire in December, were
3 01
extended one year.
For the small Japanese fisherman, the right to
fish is an extremely important issue. Japan, faced with
reduced "take" by her fishermen within the Soviets' 200-mile
zone, is attempting to compensate them by approving $295 mil-
lion in emergency funds to be used for lost wages and sever-
ence bonuses. Japan must be careful not to force the Soviet
Union to implement more severe restrictions against Japanese
fishing interests.
3. Korea
Japan's relations with divided Korea have centered
around extensive trade and investment in South Korea and
measured commercial intercourse with North Korea. South
Korea's security has been closely linked with Japan's, while
Japan and North Korea do not even have diplomatic relations.
Strategic considerations, specifically peace and stability
303in Korea, appear to be the overriding concern of Japan,
yet South Korea's economic utility and North Korea's economic





Officially, the Japanese government professes
that if a nation gains control over the Korean peninsula
which is in direct opposition to Japanese influence, Japan
would view it as a threat to her national security. 304
Implicitly, Japan does not rule out a 2-Koreas policy with
this position, but practically, any move toward North Korea
is viewed with dire concern in South Korea. Any undermining
of South Korea's position vis-a-vis North Korea would, at
least theoretically, make the Korean peninsula more vulnerable
to control by a "hostile" regime.
Prime Minister Fukuda, in a televised press con-
ference, stated:
The division of the Korean peninsula ... is a national
tragedy. It is really desirable that Korea be unified
peacefully through dialogue, not through an armed conquest
by either of the two...
Japan sincerely hopes that the Korean peninsula, our
closest neighbor, will prosper in peace. In concrete
terms, the best way is for the two sides to hold a
dialogue. Japan should cooperate as a neighbor in help-
ing to create such an atmosphere. 305
While calling the division a "national tragedy," Fukuda showed
Japan's concern in Korea, but he also pointed out that Japan
was willing to use her abilities to create favorable condi-
tions for a North-South Korean dialogue. Foreign Minister
Hatoyama stated at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan
that Japan and the United States should make more contacts
with North Korea while China and the Soviet Union should follow
"^ C\ ft
a similar pattern with South Korea to ease tension in Korea.
While some writers feel that Hatoyama • s position is extremely
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dangerous and could upset the power balance in Northeast
307
Asia, the statement shows the serious thought given to
increased ties with North Korea by the Japanese government.
Furthermore, it tends to point out that Japan would like to
increase ties with North Korea, but not at the expense of
destabilizing the Korean peninsula- -hence the desire for
similar moves toward South Korea by the Soviet Union and
China.
South Korea's security was declared "essential"
to Japan in the 1969 Nixon-Sato joint communique. In 1972,
however, the second Nixon-Sato communique and the Nixon-Tanaka
communique (September 1, 1972) omitted any reference to South
Korea as being "essential to Japan's own security." Signifi-
cantly, in the 1975 Ford-Miki communique and the 1977 Fukuda-
Carter communique the emphasis on the importance of the Korean
peninsula shifted toward maintaining peace and stability on
the entire peninsula- -not just in South Korea.
This shift in official position emphasized not
only Japan's concern with regional peace and stability, but
also Japan's recognition that North Korea was a factor which
must be reckoned with. If stability on the Korean peninsula
is important to Japan, she cannot ignore the northern half of
Korea. Japan's dilemma is how to increase relations with North
Korea without alienating South Korea. Surely political recog-
nition is presently out of the question, but economic and
cultural ties, within bounds, could be maintained. Furthermore,
if Japan is to function as a catalyst for peace in Korea, she
must have some North Korean ties.
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One of Japan's major difficulties in formulating
and implementing any Korean policy which is designed to bring
about a situation favorable to Japan is the natural animosity
and distrust between the Korean and Japanese peoples. The
South Koreans feel the Japanese are selfish and arrogant
people who will doublecross them should South Korea ever get
30 8into serious difficulty. Furthermore, even in this period
of a reduced United States military presence in South Korea
the Seoul regime is careful not to forge close military ties
with Japan.
Close Japanese military ties would be very
unpopular in South Korea. Japanese militarism is certainly
a strong Korean memory, and any Seoul government would be in
major political trouble if it seriously entertained the idea
of allowing Japanese troops on Korean soil. Japanese economic
assistance, especially during the fourth 5-year plan (1977-
1981), is most welcome, however. Support of this kind is both
309beneficial and, while not altogether trusted, non-menacing.
North Korea speaks often of Japanese militarism
in the press. Anti- Japanese rhetoric aside, one gets the
distinct impression that although no immediate fear of Japan
exists, the spectre of Japanese military activism clearly
310
exists in North Korea.
On May 4, 1977 the Seoul bureau of Japan's Yomiuri
Shimbun was closed by the South Korean government. The edi-
tors allegedly praised Kim il-Sung, although they claimed
their statement was misinterpreted. They refused, however,
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to clarify the statement, thereby infuriating the South
311Koreans. This incident occurred at the height of nego-
tiations over the Japan-South Korean joint oil venture and
served to illustrate the inherent Korean mistrust of the
Japanese. The joint oil development pact has had severe
trouble in the Diet, and Japan's invitation to North Korean
politicians to come to Japan and work on new trade and fish-
ing agreements while the joint venture needed strong govern-
ment support in the Diet, served to amplify Korean mistrust
r T 312of Japan.
North Korea's establishment of expanded economic
and military zones has created serious security problems for
Japan. The establishment of the 200-mile economic zone
effective August 1, 1977 meant Japan has had to rely on third
countries to ascertain North Korea's intent. Furthermore,
should South Korea counter this move by establishing her own
200-mile economic zone, Japan would find the situation much
313
more complex. The JCP leader, Tetsuzo Fuwa, stated that
Japan and North Korea should reach a bilateral fishing agree-
314
ment and establish diplomatic relations. The government
chose to negotiate privately with North Korea, and a newly
formed "Japan-North Korea Fishing Council" sent a three-man
delegation with the Dietmen who went to North Korea to nego-
315tiate a settlement.
Japan watched as the "Shinyo Maru," a small fish-
ing boat, was boarded by North Koreans within the economic
zone. North Korea's message was clear: the 200-mile zone
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would be enforced. Japan's response was to warn all Japanese
shipping to remain clear of the economic zone. Subsequent
negotiations by the Dietmen's League and North Korean offi-
cials commenced with some speculation that the Japanese
Government, in its quest for securing an agreement, might
317
endorse it. When the Japanese government later made it
clear that no endorsement of any private agreement with North
Korea would take place, the talks foundered. The resultant
interim agreement kept the door open to future negotiations,
but the joint statement made upon conclusion of the talks,
calling for removal of United States troops from South Korea,
was denounced by the Foreign Ministry as running counter to
318Japan's official position.
The JCP ' s position was again put forward by Isamu
Watanabe who took part in the fishing talks. He stated that
the interim agreement, which allowed Japanese fishing boats
of less than 200 tons to fish within the economic (but not
the military) zone, should have been negotiated by the Japanese
government. He claimed that about 600 fishing boats would be
put out of operation due to the Japanese government's refusal
319
to endorse the agreement.
While future negotiations are inevitable, the
question of Japanese government participation remains. If
the fishing loss is significant, surely the JCP will collect
political capital, perhaps forcing the ruling LDP to consider
some sort of direct negotiation, or at least endorsement of
a privately negotiated agreement.
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The 50-mile military boundary was soundly denounced
in Japan. The Asahi Evening News pointed out that since the
airlines do not pass through this zone and since trading ships
have always obtained North Korean permission to transit these
waters anyway, the 50-mile zone would not really effect Japan.
Yet, the paper realized that a step-by-step process toward
normalization was necessary so that direct talks could be
3 20
made to eliminate misunderstandings between the two countries.
Any trend toward closer relations between North
Korea and Japan has repercussions in South Korea. While Japan
has been willing to improve relations with North Korea, the
economic and strategic importance attached to South Korea has
321
made Japan unwilling to do so at Seoul's expense. The
great economic ties between Japan and South Korea make cooper-
ation between the two countries of extreme importance. Japan
is susceptible to South Korean economic pressure, but South
Korea's growing economic dependence on Japan makes her gener-
322
ally unwilling to strain their relationship.
Japan has attempted to minimize the "shock" any
move toward North Korea might create. In May 1976, the
Japanese chief delegate to the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development in Nairobi invited North Korea's coun-
323
terpart to his official reception. At the 1977 South
Korea-Japan Ministers Conference, Foreign Minister Hatoyama
explained that Japan would be careful not to hinder friendly
relations with South Korea in promoting her relations with
North Korea. South Korea's response warned that a shift in
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world attention toward North Korea would not favor a stabil-
ized Korean peninsula- -an acknowledgement of Japan's 2-Koreas
policy and an exhibition of her understanding of Japan's
a 324strategic needs.
The North Korean- Japanese fishing rights talks
have come under intensive South Korean scrutiny. The South
Korean government asked its Embassy in Tokyo to determine
whether the Japanese government was promoting a fishing agree-
ment with Pyongyang. South Korea made it clear that it would
consider such Japanese government involvement to violate the
basic spirit of the 1965 Japan-South Korean Treaty of Normal-
ization. Speculation that Japan might negotiate a government-
to-government fishing agreement caused South Korea great
concern, even to the point of speculation about establishing
325
her own 200-mile economic zone.
The subject of the Japan-North Korean fishing
rights talks was an important topic at the Japan-South Korean
Ministers Conference. Deputy Premier Nam Tok-u officially
protested the visit of the Dietmen's League to North Korea.
Japan's Foreign Minister Hatoyama replied that the delegation
which went to North Korea was private in nature and it was
\ 9 ft
not connected with the Japanese government.
l No doubt the
strong South Korean reaction to the talks was a factor in the
Japanese government's decision not to endorse any private
agreement with North Korea.
The strong feelings of the South Koreans, coupled
with the political and economic pressure they can exert on
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Japan probably account for some of the Japanese reluctance
to forge closer North Korean ties. Japan must weigh South
Korean pressure against Japan's inability to talk with a
country in close proximity about serious mutual problems,
b. Economic Ties
Japan's economic relations with Korea encompass
a recognition by Japan that raw materials are not unlimited
and free trade must not be taken for granted. The fiscal
year 1977 White Paper cited three major problem areas in the
Japanese economy:
(1) There is a gap between brisk exports and sluggish
import demands,
(2) Japan has a fast-expanding trade surplus, and
3 27
(3) Consumer-enterprise pricing problems exist.
Many South Koreans believe that the growing Japan-
ese accommodation toward North Korea is based upon a desire to
create markets and a raw material supply. This 2-Koreas
policy would be, then, economically motivated and would reflect
suspicious attitudes toward Japan. If growing ties with North
Korea are economically motivated, it could mean that Japan is
likely to adopt any policy which benefits her economy regard-
3 28
less of the political consequences to the Free World. The
economic significance of Japan's actions notwithstanding, she
is primarily motivated by strategic security concerns and her
actions should be viewed in that context.
With regard to sources of raw materials, it is
obvious that South Korea is not a major source of supply.




manufactured products. In 1976 the major South Korean
exports to Japan were shellfish and other marine products,
•7 •? n
garments and textiles, coal and pig iron, and iron ore.
South Korea's growing dependence on thermal power generation
indicates her domestic needs of coal may preclude large future
exports of this item to Japan.
North Korea, conversely, does not offer great
potential as a market for finished Japanese goods, but she
does offer great potential as a supplier of mineral resources
331for Japanese industries. Japan's hunger for raw materials
will grow in the future, forcing her to concentrate on exploi-
tation of all available raw material sources. Besides the
mineral deposits in North Korea, the waters within her 200-
mile fishing zone are a lucrative source of fish, which is
vital to Japan. The present 200-ton limitation on the size
of fishing vessels allowed in these waters makes future nego-
tiations necessary.
Japan's trade volume with South Korea is quite
large in dollar value, but it accounts for only 3% of the total
Japanese trade. From the South Korean standpoint, 39% of her
imports come from Japan and 25% of her exports go to Japan.
Furthermore, by the end of 1976 Japanese companies were re-
sponsible for 66.6% of the total foreign investment in South
332
Korea in value, and 80% in number of projects. Tourism,
growing in popularity in Japan, is an important source of
revenue in South Korea. 1976 was an outstanding year for
South Korean tourism, 58% of which came from Japan and 20%
333from the United States.
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South Korea has also been saddled with large
trade deficits with Japan, and these deficits are increasing
over time. According to a Bank of Korea report, South Korea's
trade deficits with Japan are:
1962-1966 -- $ 624 million
1967-1971 -- 2,769 million --.
1972-1976 -- 4,179 million. 4
These chronic trade imbalances eat up the small surplus South
335Korea earns in her total trade with other countries. Com-
modity prices in South Korea have risen at twice the rate of
advanced nations and the average rate of wholesale price index
rise is 18.2%. While the South Korean economy has grown,
the great dependence on Japan is obvious. Yet, in times when
Japanese trade policy is being criticized world-wide, the
value of the South Korean markets to Japan cannot be over-
estimated.
North Korea, with severe international debt prob-
lems, has been unable to secure good credit and extended terms
with Japanese banks in her quest to expand trade with Japan.
Pyongyang views Japan as a potential major source of economic
and technological assistance.
Japan-North Korean trade had been totally insig-
nificant until April 1961 when Japan relaxed the "ban" on
trade with North Korea and instituted a "barter system" of
trade through a third nation- -usually France. In November
1962, the barter restrictions were dropped but trade did not
show substantial growth. 337 The trade volume has tended to
show little real growth except for the major jumps in the
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1967-68 and 1971-72 periods. As Appendix A shows, however,
Japanese-North Korean trade has remained substantially at the
same level since 1972. The total trade volume, while not
insignificant from North Korean or Japanese viewpoints, is
still a great deal smaller than the North Koreans and many
Japanese would like. This 2-Koreas trade policy of Japan
seems to be motivated by other than pure economic desires.338
While trade does exist and has shown substantial growth since
1967, the fact that it has not exhibited a steady growth is
significant. So long as ties can be maintained between Japan
and North Korea without alienating South Korea, Japan can
soothe the vociferous left wing opposition at home and create
an atmosphere whereby access to raw materials can be devel-





Japan is a world economic power who possesses a relatively
small Self Defense Force, supported by only one percent of her
GNP. These Self Defense Forces, numbering only half the size
of North Korea's armed forces, possess excellent anti-submarine
warfare and area air defense capabilities. Even though some
internal efforts to eliminate the Self Defense Forces have
occurred, it appears that they are generally accepted by a
wide cross-section of the Japanese population. Japan is pres-
ently attempting to produce fighter and anti-submarine air-




The LDP has ruled Japan since its inception, but it has
steadily lost seats in the Diet, presently holding only a
small majority. While the LDP's strong support of the United
States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty appears to have gained
universal acceptance with Japan, its strong support of South
Korea has not. The Komeito and the JSP are very strong sup-
porters of North Korea, and the JCP, in order to regain poli-
tical strength, favors direct government negotiations with
North Korea to solve the fishing rights problems. Any con-
tinued loss of seats by the LDP may force it to consider
seriously the pro-North Korean positions of the leftist
political parties.
Six hundred thousand Koreans live in Japan as second class
citizens. The pro-Pyongyang group, the Chochongnyon, acts as
a lobbying group within Japan and functions as the North
Korean trade mission. They have used Japan as a gateway into
South Korea for espionage and terrorist purposes, however, to'
Japan's embarrassment. Furthermore, the internal political
activities of pro-Seoul, anti-Park Chung-hee groups and pro-
Par^ Chung-hee groups is a threat to Japanese internal security
Presently it appears that Japan will allow these groups to
express their political views so long as Japanese laws are
not broken.
Japan-United States relations are based on the Mutual
Defense Treaty and strong economic ties. The treaty, gener-
ally accepted in Japan, commits the United States to Japan's
defense in return for base rights on Japanese soil. Their use,
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however, in an emergency in Korea would cause great concern
in Japan, and while the Japanese government would probably
consent to their use, Japan's consent would not be automatic.
Japan's $11 billion trade surplus, coupled with United
States' trade deficits and the 200-mile economic zone wherein
Japan must pay over $100 million in fees, are two sensitive
areas of mutual concern.
Japan has diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet
Union, but no post-World War II peace treaty has been signed
with either. While negotiations with China appear imminent,
the question of four northern islands has impeded any treaty
negotiations with the Soviet Union. Japan views the Soviet
Union as her least popular neighbor and her only true military
threat. The 200-mile Soviet economic zone has hurt the
Japanese fishing industry, but development of the Siberian
natural resources has promise of economic benefit to Japan
as well as to the Soviet Union.
China seems willing to sell coal and oil to Japan and to
purchase Japanese technology. Both the Soviet Union and China
desire to prevent exclusive relations with Japan by each other,
and both nations condone the Japan-United States Mutual Defense
Treaty for that reason.
Japan's greatest national security goal in Korea is to
keep the Korean peninsula stable. She has strong economic
ties with South Korea and measured ties with North Korea.
While Japan would probably like to develop greater economic
relations with Pyongyang, South Korea is quick to exert
142

pressure against such moves by Japan. The recent fishery
talks were most likely not endorsed by the Japanese govern-
ment due to extensive South Korean pressure. North Korea
would like greater ties with Japan and is pushing hard for
government- to- government talks.
Japan and Korea have great mutual animosity stemming from
the Japanese occupation of Korea (1910-1945). Korean distrust
of Japan makes military ties involving Japan unlikely.
Economically, South Korea provides Japan with excellent
markets and North Korea's natural resources are potentially
valuable sources of raw materials for Japan. South Korea
has a large trade deficit to Japan and North Korea's inter-
national credit is poor. The North Korean 200-mile economic
zone potentially will hurt Japanese fishing interests.
Significantly, North Korean- Japanese trade has not shown
steady growth, indicating that Japan's concern is more stra-
tegically than economically motivated. Her goal seems to be
establishing lines of communication with North Korea in order
to exert pressure to keep the peninsula stable, while develop-
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V. THE NATURE OF THE JAPAN-NORTH KOREA ACCOMMODATION
Considering the prevailing animosity and distrust between
the Korean and Japanese peoples, it seems evident that any
Korean- Japanese accommodation must be based upon tangible
benefits to the nations concerned. Given the present divided
Korea where both halves display a unique national interest at
the expense of the other, any Japanese accommodation with
North Korea must be accomplished in an incremental manner to
avoid sharp alienation of South Korea, and to avoid the
appearance of any abrupt change in' Japanese foreign policy.
While Japan and North Korea have economic and political
ties with the Soviet Union and China, they have attempted to
341
chart an equidistant course relative to both Asian powers.
Generally, North Korea and Japan do not wish to side exclusively
with one power because such action would trigger political
repercussions from the other. Also, an equidistant position
between the two communist powers can bring advantages to both
nations. North Korea has obtained the military and economic
support of both China and the Soviet Union; and Japan, while
remaining a lightly-armed nation, has been able to establish
new raw material sources with both the Soviet Union and China.
North Korea and Japan are aware that they are unable to
influence the outcome of the Sino-Soviet power struggle, yet
they have been ready to benefit from each nation* s attempt to
contain the other. The present North Korean- Japan accommodation
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is based upon the assumption that the Sino-Soviet power
struggle will continue for the foreseeable future. Within
this context, North Korea can gain international prestige by
successfully pursuing her independent foreign policy with
Japan while gaining the technology and capital she has been
unable to obtain from the Soviet Union and China. Japan can
gain some leverage against the Soviet Union and China through
342greater vested interests in Communist North Korea, and
greater regional economic integration.
The North Korean- Japanese accommodation has two major
components: political and economic. Each component seems
to show North Korea pushing for greater relations with Japan,
while Japan seems to be resisting- -up to a point. Japan's
"essential" security goal- - stability in East Asia--is her
primary motivation for seeking an accommodation with North
Korea.
A. THE POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION
It was pointed out in Chapter II that Japan believes her
national interests would best be served with the maintenance
of peace and stability in Korea. Furthermore, the volatility
of the Korean situation is recognized by all four major powers
concerned with Korea, all of whom favor a status quo resolu-
tion—a 2-Korea's settlement-- as the solution most conducive
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to their shared national interest--peace and stability.




What Japan really wants is stability in Korea. They are
worried about any major destabilizing situation .... If
North Korea could peacefully take over South Korea, Japan
would not like it. but it would be all right if there is
not a big fuss. 344
It appears that Japan recognizes that if she is to play
any role in Northeast Asia that role must be exercised within
the context of a lightly- armed, non-nuclear power. Fur-
thermore, her efforts must be focused toward maintenance of
peace and stability in Korea, and her policies should reflect
her recognition that neither North Korea nor South Korea must
346gain a sharply destabilizing advantage over the other.
Since Japan's international and regional influence lies in
the economic and diplomatic realm, it is these fields that
Japan must utilize to maintain peace and stability in North-
east Asia.
Japan recognizes that South Korea's economic strength is
greater than North Korea's, and even with the proposed United
States troop withdrawals from South Korea the Seoul government
will be able to muster roughly equivalent military strength
with North Korea within a relatively short time. Furthermore,
Japan and North Korea are aware that Japan's extensive economic
involvement in South Korea, in terms of vast trade and capital
investment, has been greatly instrumental in maintaining and
strengthening the South Korean regime. North Korea fears,
and Japan recognizes, that exclusive Japanese economic ties
with Seoul would accelerate South Korea's emerging preeminence
on the Korean peninsula, placing North Korea in an untenable
situation. 347 The 50-mile military zone established by
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Pyongyang mirrors this fear. Japan, if she desires to keep
South Korea from attaining a sharply destabilizing advantage
over North Korea, must act to strengthen North Korea's
economy.
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party is coming under. con-
sistently greater pressure to grant some sort of governmental
recognition to North Korea. Leftist political parties within
Japan are intensifying their efforts to influence the Japanese
government to recognize North Korea. The vociferous Korean
minority in Japan is a source of continued lobbying, whose
desires and potential are undoubtedly considered by the
Japanese government. The Japanese press also seems to be
more openly in favor of a pro-North Korean effort from Japan.
The Mainachi Daily News on September 8, 1977 recognized that
Pyongyang must no longer be ignored, recommending that the
Japanese government proceed to normalize relations with North
349Korea. The Japanese Foreign Ministry, in admitting that
Japan intended to promote greater relations with North Korea,
seemed to indicate that the political trend of accommodation
would be conducted in a manner designed not to harm existing
350Japan- South Korean relations.
North Korea, by establishing a 200-mile economic zone,
has created an issue of potential significance to the Japanese
government. In fact, it appears Japan gave serious consider-
ation to endorsing a private fishing agreement with North
Korea but succumbed to extensive South Korean pressure to
351
keep the agreement totally private in nature. The interim
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agreement, which expires in June 1978, has given Japan some
breathing room, but it seems only to put off the inevitable
political and economic decision Japan faces: Is possible
alienation of South Korea worth the needed access to these
fishing grounds? Should the Japanese fishing industry suffer
greatly due to exclusion from many worldwide fishing areas,
Japanese internal political pressure to grant North Korea some
political recognition in return for access to these nearby
fishing areas may become intense. In general, Japan realizes
that any political acknowledgement of North Korea will strain
352Seoul-Tokyo relations, but Japan obviously feels that a
slow, almost reticent movement toward North Korean recognition
will keep her ties with the Seoul government from breaking.
From North Korea's standpoint, while immediate diplomatic
ties with Japan are desirable, Kim il-Sung is realistic enough
to know that they will not be forthcoming in the immediate
future. Such concerns as fishing rights are excellent
vehicles with which to convey North Korea's argument that
government recognition is necessary, but Kim's willingness to
allow the Japanese government to delay a decision on recog-
nition, rather than be forced to move more quickly than she
feels is prudent, displays an excellent grasp of the political
realities involved between the two governments.
North Korea's diplomatic successes in the Third World are
significant. Her ability to secure diplomatic relations with
138 nations (to 142 for South Kore-a) boosts Pyongyang's claim
of international legitimacy and acceptance. This, in turn,
154

makes her political acceptance by Japan more palatable.
Furthermore, the fact that 47 nations have diplomatic rela-
tions with both Korea's can be interpreted to reflect growing
international recognition of a 2-Korea's settlement. Future
less vitriolic behavior by Kim il-Sung would serve to
strengthen international willingness to accept the two-Korea's
«.+i * 354settlement
.
North Korea's main foreign policy goal is to reunify the
Korean peninsula, but her primary national security goal must
be the preservation of the existing Pyongyang regime. The
fact that North Korea has serious internal problems concerning
succession to leadership and international economic instability
indicates that she must be able to solve these immediate
problems before embarking on any reunification campaign. Any
type of government recognition by Japan, even an endorsement
of a private fishing pact, would grant North Korea greater
international acceptance, perhaps even to the point of en-
hancing her international economic position. Japanese recog-
nition of North Korea could bring North Korea closer to
resolving international debt problems and, in turn, stabilizing
the ruling regime.
The political accommodation between Japan and North Korea
is progressing surely, although not nearly as rapidly as North
Korea would like. Japan realizes that some government con-
tacts are necessary if she is going to be successful in main-
Itaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
North Korea
desires Japanese political acceptance to stabilize her internal
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security problems and to open up greater Free World lines of
trade. So long as the Sino-Soviet dispute rages, North Korea
and Japan will share vested interests with each other. And,
so long as these interests can be pursued without severe
alienation of South Korea by Japan, Japan and North Korea can
further their major security interests by mutual accommodation,
B. THE ECONOMIC ACCOMMODATION
At first glance it appears that Japan's quest for new
sources of raw materials and North Korea's desire for Western
technology are so complementary that economic accommodation
between these two countries is inevitable. The added factor
of proximity only accentuates the prospective gains to be
realized by each country through economic accommodation. Yet,
as Figure 3 shows, the trend of economic relations since 1972
has been erratic, with little actual overall change. While
the present trade volume between Japan and North Korea is not
insignificant, it has not increased to the extent that might
normally be expected, given the complementary nature of the
3 55
trade. North Korea has repeatedly attempted to secure
more loans, credits and direct purchase of Japanese industrial
products and technology, but she has generally met with
T . . 356Japanese resistance.
Japanese reluctance to expand North Korean trade is based
on her judicious use of her economic might in pursuing her
357 • •
primary goal of stability in Korea. Japan, recognizing
that the world's supply of raw materials is limited, has great
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export of manufactured goods. 3 Her reluctance to expand
raw material imports from North Korea while expanding her
exports of finished goods to North Korea is not determined
solely by economic considerations. Japan feels, at present,
that greatly expanded trade with Pyongyang, while possible,
would benefit North Korea to such an extent that the power
balance in Northeast Asia would be jeopardized. Japan is
careful not to use her primary foreign policy weapon- -economic
power- -in a capricious manner. She is aware that South Korea
will outstrip North Korea militarily in a few years, and
Japan's strategy seems to be based upon developing economic
channels of communication which can be greatly expanded when
it is strategically beneficial to do so. Furthermore, Japan
would receive the raw materials required for her capital-
intensive economy. From a strategic standpoint, the time to
expand trade with North Korea would occur when South Korea
becomes almost the military equal to North Korea.
By utilizing her great economic power in this manner,
Japan can add materially to the stability in Northeast Asia
by helping to create and maintain a situation of relative
parity between the two Korea's. There is a second factor
that must be considered in Japan's economic policy toward
North Korea, however- -North Korea's unsatisfactory interna-
tional monetary position. The fact that total trade between
the two countries has been declining since 1974 shows the
reluctance of Japanese businessmen, who actually conduct the
financial transactions, to make strong financial commitments
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to a regime with which Japan has no diplomatic relations
and which is in such poor financial condition that her endur-
ance may be questioned. North Korea's inability to pay her
debts, coupled with an immense outlay for her national
defense, undoubtedly constitute an internal security problem
of the magnitude that Japanese government guarantees would
be required to overcome the general reluctance to invest or
grant credit to Pyongyang.
A policy of government guarantees to private businessmen
would be interpreted as direct economic assistance by many
Free World nations, including South Korea. Specifically, such
a policy would be alarming to many and would signal an abrupt
shift in Japanese foreign policy--a shift which could be de-
stabilizing at the present time. Hence, further economic
involvement in North Korea would be predicated upon Pyongyang's
ability to regain a semblance of fiscal responsibility.
Japan desires to maintain economic ties with North Korea,
not for their immediate, direct benefit but for their political
importance as lines of quasi-official communication. These
economic ties constitute the foundation for expanded future
trade with North Korea--trade deemed essential to maintain
the relative military-economic parity between the two Korea's,
while establishing a new major source for raw material imports.
C . SUMMARY
North Korea, to attain the level of international recog-
nition she deems necessary, needs political recognition by
Japan and the economic boost Japanese trade can bring.
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Japan desires to maintain peace and stability in Northeast
Asia and to secure future new sources of raw materials. This
is the nature of the North Korean- Japanese accommodation. It
is realistic in view of the position both nations maintain
relative to China and the Soviet Union, and it recognizes
South Korea's permanence as a nation. This "new order" in
Asia relies heavily on the political and economic integration
T f. f\
of North Korea with Japan.
The prospect of permanent division of Korea and North
Korea's growing international status are great incentives
for Japan to normalize relations in the foreseeable future--
or at least to establish some form of government-to-government
ties. Yet, a divided Korea may not be an enduring reality.
Whether the strong Korean nationalism will prove to destroy
the peace in Korea remains to be seen, but Japan's Korean
policy is designed to create a situation where both Korea's
possess relative economic-military parity. If Korean reunifi-
cation should come about, Japan's policy is designed to create
an atmosphere wherein both sides, as relative equals, will be
forced to combine peacefully. The resulting form of the Korean
nation, while it may not be totally friendly with Japan,
\ f\ 7
would most likely not be hostile either.
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VI. UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS
The Japan-North Korea accommodation has specific impli-
cations for the security interests of the United States.
Depending on the s-uccess of the accommodation, United States
policy options will be structured upon such considerations
as any change in Japanese considerations of the scope and
role of the Self-Defense Forces, Japanese internal politics,
American ability to maintain a presence in the Western Pacific,
and the political status of the Korean peninsula.
Paramount in United States policy options for Northeast
Asia must be the maintenance of peace and stability in that
area of the world while avoiding any big-power confrontation.
The Japan-North Korea accommodation, based on the national
interests of those nations as described in this work, could
accelerate, reaching a positive conclusion; could remain as
is, with little or no progress; or it could fail, leaving
relations between North Korea and Japan in a worse condition
than presently exists. This chapter will discuss the effect
that such trends could have in Northeast Asia and on the
security interests of the United States.
A. CASE 1: SHOULD THE ACCOMMODATION REACH POSITIVE RESULTS
If the North Korea-Japan accommodation succeeds to a point
of expanded economic relations with government-to-government
contact, Japan would have succeeded in diversifying her sources
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for raw materials and establishing better methods of communi-
cation with her neighbor. North Korea would have gained the
international prestige and the economic benefits which are
required to resolve her acute financial troubles and impart
internal stability.
In Japan, a successful North Korean accommodation would
probably result in continuation of the present role and scope
of the Self-Defense Forces and the Mutual Security Treaty with
the United States. Should better relations with North Korea
evolve, with the concurrent development of nearby sources of
raw materials, Japan would enjoy a relatively more stable
regional situation in which she would be a highly visible
partner in large scale regional economic integration. The
Self-Defense Forces, receiving about one percent of the gross
national product in 1977, could maintain the present trend of
qualitative improvement of defensive capabilities. With a




one percent of the GNP at reasonable economic growth rates,
the Self-Defense Forces would be sufficiently strong to pro-
vide large-area defense of Japan against any conventional
threat. This gradual strengthening of defensive -forces , within
the context of the United States-Japan Security Treaty, would
be generally non-provocative, especially in the eyes of the
Koreans and the Chinese. Should a Japan-North Korea
accommodation succeed, it appears that the Self-Defense
Forces will exhibit gradual growth, funded by one percent of
Japan's GNP. A defensive force, more capable of area defense
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close to the Japanese homeland is the most probable role and
scope of the Self-Defense Forces.
If the Self-Defense Force were maintained within this
scope, Japan would still rely on the United States for stra-
tegic deterrence and defense of her distant sea lanes. Her
strong dependence on distant raw materials make this latter
commitment extremely important. In return for this military
commitment by the United States, Japan would likely continue
to accept the condition of the Mutual Security Treaty, giving
the United States base rights in Japan. She would, however,
maintain final control over their use by the United States




emphasized this position in 1977, closer ties with North
Korea would prompt Japan to reiterate it in unequivocable
terms
.
Japan would attempt to ensure that she would not auto-
matically become involved in any Korean conflict because of
United States actions, while securing the military commitment
of the United States to protect Japan's distant sea lanes and
provide strategic deterrence. Franklin Weinstein's assertion
that, "The military facilities maintained in Japan by the
United States have been, and remain, of major importance to
the maintenance of America's strategic posture in Asia."
has been supported by Admiral Noel Gaylor, the Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific. 367 The fact that the United States
views Japanese bases to be extremely important suggests that
Japan could successfully pursue this defensive military policy
within the context of the Mutual Security Treaty.
165

Should an accommodation between Pyongyang and Tokyo come
to fruition, depriving the Japanese leftist parties of a
major political issue, the question of the possible utiliza-
tion of American bases in Japan could become the major leftist
issue. Surely, so long as Japan chooses to rely on American
military power for strategic deterrence and protection of her
distant sea lanes, these base facilities would be made avail-
able to the United States subject to Japanese approval on
their use in any conflict. This visible presence of American
military power in the Western Pacific is a potent declaration
of American willingness and ability to ensure peace and sta-
•7
f. Q
bility in Northeast Asia. It would continue to counter
Soviet and Chinese military power, reaffirming the American
military commitment toward Japan and South Korea. Yet, the
leftist parties would be willing to exploit the American
presence should it adversely affect Japan in her dealings
with China or the Soviet Union.
If the ruling LDP could engineer a successful accommoda-
tion with North Korea, the problems of internal party politics
and the Korean minorities in Japan could be defused. The
growing leftist and intellectual support of an accommodation
with North Korea would be mollified to the extent that a major
political issue would be denied to the JSP and Komeito. The
LDP's stature as a pragmatic party able to engineer practical
policies would also be enhanced. Furthermore, the securing
of proximate sources of raw materials for the Japanese economy




The pro-North Korean Chochongnyon would obviously favor
any Japanese acceptance of North Korea. A two-Korea's policy
would enhance the stature of this group within the Korean
residents' community, and it would seem to give momentum to
their cause. The fact that Japan proved to be "even-handed"
with both Korea's obviously would not please totally both
groups of Korean residents, but by recognizing the legitimacy
of both "mother countries" it could defuse a potentially
volatile internal security problem. The Japanese government
could then negotiate an agreement on the status of those
Koreans loyal to North Korea and insist that all political
activity in Japan which is directed against another country
cease, or those found guilty face deportation.
A key variable, and the one least likely to be predicted,
is the status of the political situation on the Korean penin-
sula. It is assumed in this paper that a successful accommo-
dation can be achieved when both Korea's have achieved relative
parity in the military- economic field. If Japan's policy can
successfully bring about relative parity between the two
Korea's, regardless of any policy of cross-recognition by the
other three powers, it can serve to aid in Korean reunifica-
tion.
In general, the four major powers favor the maintenance
of two Korea's, while the Korean people have to balance the
benefit of a united Korea with the compromises necessary to
bring such a situation about. In short, any united Korea
can emerge only from within the peninsula. Professor Henderson
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noted that Korean nationalism was resurgent and that Kim's
personality cult does have nationalistic components. Fur-
thermore, South Korea's abandonment of the American model of
democracy seems to be suitable for reconciling the politcal
37position of North Korea, albeit any unified Korea would
not likely be modeled after a Western democracy.
Realistically, a successful Japanese-North Korean
accommodation would be vociferously opposed in Seoul. South
Korea would be outraged by an overt move toward Pyongyang,
straining South Korean- Japanese relations to their very limit.
Yet, the extensive economic intercourse between Japan and
South Korea must be evaluated realistically in Seoul as a
tangible Japanese commitment to South Korea's existence.
Seoul, understandably frustrated by a Japan-North Korea
accommodation, must realize that Japan has a great interest
in Korean stability and the South Korean economic ties. As
an independent nation she would be forced to evaluate her own
national objectives in the light of political reality. Reac-
tion by severing ties with Japan would destroy South Korean
economic growth and stability, further benefiting North Korea,
A major move to create stronger trade ties with Western
Europe, 371 at Japan's expense, might be a more realistic
South Korean reaction.
A successful move toward North Korea could create the





In concrete terms, the best way is for the two sides
to hold a dialogue. Japan should cooperate as a
neighbor in helping to create such an atmosphere. I
think that there is a way. I am not in a position to
say specifically what Japan will do. 372
While the culmination of a two-Korea's policy may not be
enough to counter the big-power preference for a peaceful,
but divided Korea, it would not necessarily hurt the Korean
situation. It might force both Korea's into earnest dialogue
concerning the political solution which would best benefit
the Korean people.
From the United States' viewpoint, a positive Pyongyang-
Tokyo accord could enable the United States to avoid big-power
confrontation in Asia by removing the "tripwire" created by
the presence of United States troops in South Korea. So long
as relative military parity exists between the two Korea's,
the United States could withdraw her troops from the Korean
peninsula, relying on the naval forces of the Seventh Fleet
and forward-deployed Air Force units to project her military
power
.
The United States, in response to a successful North
Korean- Japanese accommodation, co\ld promote peace and sta-
bility in Northeast Asia by:
(1) Maintaining a strong air force and naval presence
to counter Soviet and Chinese military power, and
(2) Adopt a policy geared to obtain Soviet and Chinese
recognition of South Korea in return for United
States recognition of North Korea, obtaining guar-
antees from the big powers insuring the security
of both Korea's.
The strong American miltiary presence in the Western
Pacific can be maintained with air and naval forces utilizing
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Japanese bases. Such a posture would essentially continue
present American military policy. Removal of United States
troops from South Korea, when Seoul can independently insure
her own survival against a North Korean attack, would no
longer guarantee United States involvement in a Korean con-
flict. The units of the Seventh Fleet and Air Force units
based in Japan and Okinawa could be maintained in numbers
large enough to constitute a credible military force.
A cross-recognition plan would constitute a shift in
United States policy. If it were accompanied with guarantees
by the four powers, however, it would not appear as a manifes-
tation of American abandonment of South Korea. In fact,
given South Korea's quest for Soviet rapproachment , any United
States initiative to secure Soviet recognition of Seoul would
give South Korea a strategic and psychological boost. With
the continued military support of the United States, Seoul
would likely accept a settlement whereby the United States
would recognize North Korea in return for Soviet recognition
of Seoul.
In an era of successful Japanese-North Korean accommoda-
tion, Chinese willingness to accept a four-power cross-recog-
nition plan would become crucial. Since China values highly
North Korea's importance as a buffering state, she would
jealously guard against the infusion of Western influence
there. The overall advantage in gaining South Korean recog-
nition appears to center around increasing China's influence
in Korea, especially if a reunified nation should subsequently
emerge. A major impediment to Chinese acceptance, of a
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cross-recognition plan would be the parallel which might be
373drawn with Taiwan. Furthermore, Soviet rapproachment with
South Korea might deter China from renouncing her recognition
of Pyongyang as the sole legitimate government in Korea.
The fact that the trend toward cross-recognition of both
Korea's would have been initiated by lightly-armed, non-
nuclear Japan might temper Chinese resistance, especially in
the face of strong South Korean resentment toward Tokyo.
Furthermore, so long as the United States retained the South
Korean Mutual Security Treaty, close ties with North Korea
would not be forthcoming. So long as Japanese-Chinese rela-
tions are good, a cross-recognition plan in Korea might be
accepted by China. A successful Japanese-North Korean
accommodation would mean Japanese technology, rather than the
military might of any other nation, served as the medium to
initiate Western ties with North Korea. Full cross-recognition
by the other three powers could then be pursued positively by
the United States.
B. CASE 2: SHOULD THE ACCOMMODATION CONTINUE
ITS PRESENT TREND WITH LITTLE RESULTS
Should the present situation in Northeast Asia continue,
showing little relative change in the Japan-North Korea rela-
tionship, the area would be one of growing uncertainty. Seoul,
genuinely distrustful of the Japanese, would most likely con-
tinue to exert political pressure on Japan while looking toward
Europe to diversify her sources of investment and trade.
Pyongyang, uncomfortably watching the growing strength of the
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South Korean regime, would likely become bitter over Japan-
ese reluctance to pursue closer ties. Japan, unwilling to
move more forthrightly toward North Korea, would encourage
greater internal political discord over this issue and over
the status of the Self-Defense Forces.
So long as the Korean question is unsettled, Japan will
remain in a region of growing uncertainty. Such a situation
would prompt Tokyo to consider seriously whether her security
could adequately be maintained as a lightly-armed power,
relying on United States' deterrent force. Furthermore, the
question of utilization of Japanese bases for an emergency
in Korea would become increasingly tenuous. Should an emer-
gency in Korea occur, which cannot be discounted in an un-
certain political atmosphere, Japan might find it impossible
? "7 A
to escape being drawn into a conflict by the United States.
In 1975, Prime Minister Miki declared:
Japan is, constitutionally and by the deep-rooted
convictions of its people, a non-military state. We
have foreswarn the acquisition of offensive weapons,
and will never acquire nuclear weapons. I believe
this stance is a positive contribution to Asian peace-
building. 375
This statement of Japan's military intentions indicates that
she will attempt to continue to rely on United States' deter-
rent force for her overall security. The United States, how-
ever, under the Nixon doctrine seems to desire Japan to
undertake a greater role in overall regional security. In
an era of uncertainty, Japan may question whether the United
States would abandon Japan, especially after Vietnam and upon
•7 n fi
removing her troops from South Korea. The temptation to
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expand the Self-Defense Forces, spending three or four times
the current rate of GNP investment, would be initially great,
but the counter- action- -remaining a lightly- armed power while
pursuing a role of greater neutrality- -might subsequently
prevail.
As a lightly-armed power in an era of regional uncertainty,
Japan would alarm neither China nor Korea, and by pursuing a
more neutral policy in response to the lack of credible Amer-
ican deterrence, Japan would actually become less likely to
be drawn by the United States into a conflict in Korea. Fur-
thermore, the Self-Defense Forces have been conservatively
evaluated as capable of repulsing up to ten Soviet divisions
attempting to land on Japanese soil. With other global con-
siderations, it is not conceivable that the Soviet Union would
divert so many divisions from Eastern Europe or the Chinese
377border to launch an attack on Japan. Any growing capa-
bility of the Self-Defense Forces to defend Japan's sea lines
of communication, except for distant regions, could be achieved
by this overall defense policy. In reality, the present level
of defense is sufficient for Japan to defend herself, alone,
from anything except an all out invasion by the Soviet Union
or China, or a serious global effort to stop distant flow of
resources- to Japan. In hearings before the House Subcommittee
on Future Foreign Policy, Professor Clough pointed out the
strategic significance of the Malacca Straits to Japan, but
affirmed Japan's intent was to protect them by building up
diplomatic relations with nations in that region--not by
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building up their armed forces. 3 The question for Japan,
should the credibility of the United States' deterrent be
questioned, is not rearmament but whether to pursue a quasi-
neutral foreign policy.
For Japan, if the North Korean accommodation progresses
slowly, or not at all, the LDP would most probably face strong,
growing opposition from the leftist parties. Furthermore, use
of the Chochongnyon to lobby for North Korean interests would
increase, creating a volatile situation within the Japanese
Korean minority. Should the Japan-North Korea accommodation
stagnate, the LDP's thin majority would be faced with growing
regional discontent. Japan's security would be entrusted to
a lightly-armed Self-Defense Force, reliant upon a United
States deterrence of increasingly questionable value. A
policy which could not alleviate the regional tension nor
quell growing unrest within Japan could lose the support of
the Japanese voters. While the LDP has generally been looked
upon as the party which can "get things done," an uncertain
situation in Northeast Asia might convince the Japanese voters
•that leftist ideas are relevant to reducing regional tension.
Whether the LDP would be able to retain power amidst growing
criticism would remain to be seen, however such issues as
fishing rights and raw material diversification would have
to be addressed realistically. Failure to address these goals
might spur the Japanese to elect a new government which would
accept leftist doctrine.
From Korea's standpoint, failure of the Japan-North Korea
accommodation to progress at a moderate rate would be viewed
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favorably by South Korea who desires to prolong the Korean
division until she achieves undisputed preeminence on the
peninsula. North Korea, conversely, would appear to be beg-
ging hard and receiving little in return. Should North Korea
perceive Japanese policy to promote Seoul's position, she
could be tempted to secure Soviet economic and military assist-
ance, abandoning her equidistant policy between the two Commun-
ist giants. This policy, should it be adopted, would signal
Pyongyang's impatience with Japan and her willingness to
accept advancing Soviet influence. The entire area would
undoubtedly view such a situation with alarm. Furthermore,
should North Korea feel threatened, or feel forced to nego-
tiate through weakness, the prospects for reunifying Korea
378peacefully would be reduced. An equitable, enduring set-
tlement in Korea must be predicated upon two relatively equal
entities attempting to seek a common solution.
From the United States' viewpoint, questionable success
of the Japan-North Korea accommodation would retain Japanese
enthusiasm for a strong United States military presence in
Northeast Asia. As time goes on, however, the United States
must pursue a policy in Northeast Asia which would defeat any
379trend toward Japanese neutralism and North Korean alliance
with the Soviet Union.
Primarily, the United States must maintain an honest and
credible deterrent. If possible, the United States could re-
move her ground troops from South Korea, thereby avoiding a
potential direct big-power confrontation. The forward-deployed
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air and naval forces in the Western Pacific, ready to honor
American treaty commitments, would be the visible deterrent
force. Strong public pronouncements and honest consultation
with Japan and South Korea regarding regional security
requirements would also be necessary.
To maintain a credible deterrence, the United States must
define Japan to be strongly within her national security in-
terests and pledge support in relation to that position. We
must do the same for South Korea and avoid troop withdrawal
until South Korea is the military equivalent of North Korea.
If, however, vociferous objection by Japan and South Korea
toward removal of American ground troops from South Korea
occurs, the United States would then find it difficult to
remove them and maintain a credible deterrent. In that case,
United States effort must be aimed, with that of Japan and
South Korea, toward defusing volatile regional situations
which would call the credibility of our deterrent into effect
From a regional standpoint, closer United States ties
with North Korea must be predicated upon removal of American
troops from South Korea. The United States, in her quest for
regional stability, must be willing to pull her troops from
South Korea, but only after South Korean security can be
assured and with the consent of Seoul and Tokyo. Japan could
pursue a policy of gradually increasing relations with North
Korea, so long as Sino- Japanese relations are relatively good
and so long .as United States support is strong. Gradual
Japanese movement toward North Korea might not be feared by
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China, who traditionally does not desire strong neighbors
or weak neighbors allied with strong nations. The United
States could act to offset the intense South Korean opposi-
tion to a pro-North Korean policy by Japan, which would man-
ifest itself in a relatively short time considering the
regional uncertainty.
South Korea's opposition, under such circumstances,
would be specifically orchestrated to force Japan to cease
her pro-Pyongyang policy. Yet, South Korea must be reminded
that the United States possesses the military might in the
Japan-South Korea-United States triangle and that the military
balance has not shifted toward Pyongyang. If the initial
Japanese move toward North Korea were successful, the United
States could then act within the United Nations to initiate
a full cross-recognition plan for both Korea's. If United
States troops were still present in South Korea, they could
be removed at the plan's inception, upon obtaining guarantees
of non-interference from China and the Soviet Union.
A situation in which North Korea might potentially move
closer to the Soviet Union could be averted by a cross-
recognition scheme, but such a plan might thereby be opposed
by Moscow. If the present political situation appeared to
benefit the Soviet Union, to China's detriment, the pro-North
Korean policy of Japan and the United States might encounter
Chinese support, but Soviet resistance. Soviet resistance
could be fatal, but North Korea's dogged reluctance to be
subordinated to either China or the Soviet Union could be
177

reflected in her willingness to obtain Western aid despite
her growing impatience. Thus, such a plan might be plausible.
C. CASE 3: SHOULD THE ACCOMMODATION FAIL
If the North Korea- Japan accommodation fails, leaving
relations between the two countries in worse condition than
exists at present, both nations would have failed to secure
the benefits the accommodation could bring. Each nation
would, accordingly, be strongly tempted to seek other solu-
tions .
Japan, failing to diversify her sources of raw materials,
would remain dependent on sources far from her borders.
Severing of prospective ties with North Korea would deprive
Japan of a lever to be used against the Soviet Union, and the
nearby Soviet naval presence would constitute an ominous
threat to Japan's sea lines of communication. In fact, by
acting within the context of the United States-Japan Mutual
Security Treaty, Japan could embark on a campaign to strengthen
her Self-Defense Forces, enhancing her indigenous capability
to keep her distant sea lines of communication open. By
focusing three to four percent of her GNP into the Self-
Defense Forces, Japan, while eschewing nuclear weapons, could
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upgrade these Self-Defense Forces considerably.
Any significant increase in Japanese military spending
subsequent to a failure of a Tokyo- Pyongyang accommodation,
would be alarming for China and both Korea's. The spectre
of Japanese militarism is most unpleasant and still feared.
Any such move by Japan, besides alarming her neighbors,
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could force North Korea to side closer with the Soviet Union
for military and economic support. China would then feel
doubly uncomfortable-
-Japanese militarism in addition to
North Korean-Soviet rapproachment would not be at all wel-
comed by China.
This added capability of the Self -Defense Forces,




American military support mandatory for the period in which
Japan was involved in upgrading her forces. Japan is acutely
aware that increased Japanese military capability would be
viewed with alarm in Northeast Asia, and she would have to
convince China that such a move was within the bounds of the
Security Treaty. Furthermore, United States support of Japan,
including strong reaffirmation of the commitment to deter
aggression, would be necessary to portray a Japan building
up her military posture in a defensive manner, not moving
away from the United States.
Failure of the North Korea-Japan accommodation would have
specific repercussions within Japan. The ruling LDP would
widen the schism between the ruling party and the leftist
parties over the North Korean question, eliminating the needed
middle ground upon which compromises are made. No doubt the
breakdown between the two countries would result in lost
opportunity for new sources of raw materials and access to
fishing grounds, which are necessary for the Japanese liveli-
hood. Furthermore, it would signal de facto closer ties with
South Korea. The leftist ability to articulate a pro-North
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Korean position has grown in recent years, and the logic
would still be applicable. In short, the LDP, failing to
incorporate the North Korean issue, could not defeat it
totally either. Quite possibly the LDP would retain the
leadership for a while, but the opposition would be more
able to capitalize on this issue, coupled with the proven
inability of the LDP to carry out a pro-North Korean policy.
The LDP could face a serious challenge to its leadership in
a very short time.
The Chochongnyon would undoubtedly become more bitter
toward the Japanese government and, with urging from Pyongyang,
could engage in various disruptive tactics to emphasize the
failure of the Japanese government to secure an accommodation
with Pyongyang. This situation would be distressing for the
LDP and would serve to accentuate its failure. Failure in
any foreign policy endeavor could be fatal for the ruling LDP.
If the failure of the accommodation would tend to polarize
Japanese internal politics while alarming Koreans and Chinese,
it would also serve to widen the gulf between the two Korea's.
South Korea, willing to wait until she emerges as the pre-
eminent power on the Korean peninsula, would undoubtedly
welcome the breakdown between the two countries. North Korea,
conversely, would find herself more isolated and more in need
of economic and military support. Without it, she could not
hope to negotiate with South Korea on favorable terms. Her
national survival could depend on strengthening the Pyongyang
regime dramatically. Most likely she would consider enlisting
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the support of the Soviet Union in return for concessi ons
^8 2demanded by Moscow.
~ Greater Soviet influence at China's
expense would be the obvious Soviet demand, along with aban-
donment of any "independent" foreign policy. While this
would be a bitter pill for North Korea to swallow, it would
probably be the only way she could obtain the necessary sup-
port required for national survival, which is predicated upon
maintaining relative parity with Seoul.
The question of Korean reunification, as stated earlier,
must be solved between the two Korea's. With the Soviet Union
favoring a two-Korea's settlement, it seems that Korean re-
unification would be set back should North Korea resort to
close ties with the Soviet Union. A North Korea, inferior
militarily and economically to South Korea, strongly reliant
on the Soviet Union, would be primarily concerned with national
survival
.
The United States, viewing this situation in Northeast
Asia, would have a more difficult task in maintaining peace
and stability. Fundamentally, as Japan's dissatisfaction with
North Korea mounts, the United States must insure she can
project a deterrent acceptable to Japan, while limiting the
scope and rapidity of any Japanese defense build-up. While
an overt Japan-North Korea rift would be inherently destabil-
izing, the United States would have to minimize any further
destabilization of the situation. So long as Japanese defense
spending remained around one percent of the GNP , her policy





Japan would have reason to rely greater on United States
military power to keep her distant sea lanes open and to
project a credible strategic deterrence. While this would
ostensibly strengthen the Japan-United States alliance, Japan
would examine the American commitment with harsh objectivity.
The United States may be called upon to keep ground troops in
South Korea as a "guarantee" of American involvement in the
strategic equation ensuring peace and stability in Northeast
Asia. Such a request would act to keep the United States in
a direct big-power confrontation, but given a North Korean-
Japanese rift, the presence of American troops may be required
to emphasize the strong United States commitment to the peace
and stability of the region. If North Korea must secure
Soviet aid to survive, however, the United States might pursue
a policy of mutual restraint with the Soviet Union concerning
both Korea's, designed to avoid any direct American- Soviet
confrontation. Yet, such a policy, if made on a bilateral
basis, might adversely affect American-Chinese relations.
A quadrilateral cross-recognition plan for both Korea's
would be a good way to keep North Korea from gravitating
closely toward the Soviet Union, and it might enable the
United States to remove the "tripwire" from Korean soil.
Such a plan would be most difficult to implement, however,
because of the regional hostility and the potential oppor-
tunity for the Soviet Union to contain China further in North
Korea. China could seemingly acquiese to such a plan in order
to combat growing Soviet influence, accepting some Western
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ties with North Korea more easily than extensive Soviet
ties
.
Any successful cross-recognition plan must have concur-
rent guarantees from the four major powers. Such guarantees,
predicated on non-interference in an intra-Korean conflict,
might eliminate any potential big-power confrontation in
Korea. It might also persuade Japan to retain her lightly-
armed status without requiring dangerous guarantees of com-
mitment from the United States.
With the heightened regional hostility and the potential
gains to be made by the Soviet Union, the success of such a
plan would be highly questionable. If the two Korea's were
not relatively equal in the economic-military realm, such a
cross-recognition plan would serve to leave half of the
peninsula at the mercy of the other. Such a situation,
coupled with big-power restraint, would not be conducive to
Korean tranquility. Furthermore, should North Korea insist
on the removal of United States troops from South Korea prior
to embracing any relations with the United States, the United
States may be forced to chose whether to pursue a cross-
recognition scheme or to emphasize her commitment to Japan
and South Korea. The overall benefits of a successful cross-
recognition plan under these circumstances are great, but the
possibility of its success appears to be remote. American
security interests would best be preserved by strengthening
the Japan-United States alliance and keeping a strong military
presence in the Western Pacific.
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Regardless of the trend taken by the North Korean-
Japanese accommodation, it seems evident that the United
States must take the initiative to ensure that her security
interests in this volatile area are preserved. A positive
outcome seems to be in the best interest of the United
States, who could follow Japan's lead, pushing for cross-
recognition of both Korea's in an era of generally positive
feelings. It seems likely that sooner or later, unless a
dramatic North-South breakthrough occurs, a cross-recognition
plan of some kind will be necessary. Hopefully, it can be
accomplished in a positive, creative manner, and not as a
reaction to events which could have been predicted, given
the national interests of the nations concerned. Korean
reunification is then possible, so long as both halves of
the Korean nation can negotiate from strength. Japan's North
Korean accommodation, if it succeeds, could place both Korea's
in that positive negotiating position.
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JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES AND
SOUTH KOREA* (in $1,000,000)
JAPAN EXPORTS TO JAPAN IMPORTS FROM
YEAR U.S. (SOUTH KOREA)
(334.8)
U.S. (SOUTH KOREA)
1966 3,009.8 2,658.1 (72.0)
1967 3,048.8 (407.0) 3,212.7 (92.4)
1968 4,132.7 (602.7) 3,528.6 (101.6)
1969 5,017.1 (767.3) 4,094.1 (133.9)
1970 6,015. (818.2) 5,564.3 (229.0)
1971 7,616.9 (857.1) 4,983.0 (273.6)
1972 8,981.3 (980.5) 5,855.7 (426. 1)
1973 9,572.9 (1,792.7) 9,277.7 (1,214.1)
1974 12,928.5 (2,655.1) 12,681.0 (1,566. 6)
1975 11,242.4 (2,246.4) 11,617.8 (1,306.7)
1976 15,922.9 (2,828.4) 11,864.5 (1,919.1)
*Source: Direction of Trade
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JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND
CHINA* (in $1,000,000)
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JAPAN-NORTH KOREA TRADE STATISTICS*
(in $1,000,000)
(NORTH KOREA IMPORTS FROM JAPAN) (NORTH KOREA EXPORTS TO JAPAN)
















JAPAN-UNITED STATES JOINT COMMUNIQUES
THE 1969 SATO-NIXON COMMUNIQUE
1. President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato met in Washington
on Nov. 19, 20, and 21 to exchange views on the present inter-
national situation and on other matters of mutual interest to
the United States and Japan.
2. The President and the Prime Minister recognized that
both the United States and Japan have greatly benefited from
their close association in a variety of fields, and they de-
clared that, guided by their common principles of democracy
and liberty, the two countries would maintain and strengthen
their fruitful cooperation in the continuing search for world
peace and prosperity and in particular for the relaxation of
international tensions. The President expressed his and his
Government's deep interest in Asia, and stated his belief that
the United States and Japan should cooperate in contributing
to the peace and prosperity of the region. The Prime Minister
stated that Japan would make further active contributions to
the peace and prosperity of Asia.
3. The President and the Prime Minister exchanged frank
views on the current international situation, with particular
attention to developments in the Far East. The President,
while emphasizing that the countries in the area were expected
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to make their own efforts for the stabi lity of the area, gave
assurance that the United States would continue to contribute
to the maintenance of international peace and security in the
Far East by honouring its defence treaty oblig ations in the
area. The Prime Minister, appreciating the determination of
the United States, stressed that it was important for the peace
and security of the Far East that the United States should be
in a position to carry out fully its obligations referred to
by the President. He further expressed his recognition that,
in the light of the present situation, the presence of U.S.
forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability
of the area.
4. The President and the Prime Minister specifically noted
the continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime
Minister deeply appreciated the peace-keeping efforts of the
United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the
Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security. The
President and the Prime Minister shared the hope that Communist
China would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude
in its external relations. The President referred to the treaty
obligations of his country to the Republic of China, which the
United States would uphold. The Prime Minister said that the
maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also
a most important factor for the security of Japan. The Presi-
dent described the earnest efforts made by the United States
for a peaceful and just settlement of the Vietnam problem. The
President and the Prime Minister expressed the strong hope that
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the war in Vietnam would be concluded before return of the
administration rights over Okinawa to Japan. In this connec-
tion they agreed that, should peace in Vietnam not have been
realized realized by the time reversion of Okinawa is scheduled
to take place, the two Governments would fully consult with
each other in the light of the situation at that time so that
reversion would be accomplished without affecting the United
States' efforts to assure the South Vietnamese people the oppor-
tunity to determine their own political future without outside
interference. The Prime Minister stated that Japan was explor-
ing what role she could play in bringing about stability in the
Indo-China area.
5. In light of the current situation and the prospects in
the Far East, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that
they highly valued the role played by the [U. S. -Japanese] Treaty
of Mutual Cooperation and Security in maintaining the peace and
security of the Far East including Japan, and they affirmed the
intention of the two Governments firmly to maintain the treaty
on the basis of mutual trust and common evaluation of the inter-
national situation. They further agreed that the two Govern-
ents should maintain close contact with each other on matters
ffecting the peace and security of the Far East including
Japan, and on the implementation of the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security,
6. The Prime Minister emphasized his view that the time
had come to respond to the strong desire of the people of Japan,





rights oyer Okinawa returned to Japan on the basis of the
friendly relations between the United States and Japan, and
thereby to restore Okinawa to its normal status. The President
expressed appreciation of the Prime Minister's view. The Pres-
ident and the Prime Minister also recognized the vital role
played by U.S. forces in Okinawa in the present situation in
the Far East. As a result of their discussion it was agreed
that the mutual security interests of the United States and
Japan could be accommodated within arrangements for the return
of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. They there-
fore agreed that the two Governments would immediately enter
into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accom-
plishing the early reversion of Okinawa without detriment to
the security of the Far East including Japan. They further
agreed to expedite the consultations with a view to accomplish-
ing the reversion, hopefully during 1972, subject to the con-
clusion of these specific arrangements with the necessary
legislative support. In this connection, the Prime Minister
made clear the intention of his Government, following reversion,
to assume gradually the responsibility for the immediate defence
of Okinawa as part of Japan's defence efforts for her own ter-
ritories. The President and the Prime Minister agreed also
that the United States would retain under the terms of the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security such military facil-




7. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that, upon
return of the administrative rights, the Treaty of Mutual Co-
operation and Security and its related arrangements would
apply to Okinawa without modification thereof. In this connec-
tion, the Prime Minister affirmed the recognition of his
Government that the security of Japan could not be adequately
maintained without international peace and security in the Far
East, and therefore the security of countries in the Far East
was a matter of serious concern for Japan. The Prime Minister
was of the view that, in the light of such recognition on the
part of the Japanese Government, the return of the administra-
tive rights over Okinawa in the manner agreed above should not
hinder the effective discharge of the international obligations
assumed by the United States for the defence of countries in
the Far East including Japan. The President replied that he
shared the Prime Minister's view.
8. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular
sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and
the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such senti-
ment. The President expressed his deep understanding and
assured the Prime Minister that, without prejudice to the
position of the U.S. Government with respect to the prior
consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out
in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Govern-
ment as described by the Prime Minister.
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13. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that
attention to the economic needs of the developing countries
was essential to the development of international peace and
stability. The Prime Minister stated the intention of the
Japanese Government to expand and improve its aid programmes
in Asia commensurate with the economic growth of Japan. The
President welcomed this statement and confirmed that the United
States would continue to contribute to the economic development
of Asia. The President and Prime Minister recognized that
there would be major requirements for the post-war rehabilita-
tion of Vietnam and elsewhere in South-East Asia. The Prime
Minister stated the intention of the Japanese Government to
make a substantial contribution to this end.
Source: Keesing's , 1969, p. 23699 (clauses 9, 10, 11, 12, 14
and 15 have been omitted) . Underscoring, mine.
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MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER KAKUEI TANAKA OF JAPAN
Joint Statement by President Nixon and Prime Minister Tanakafollowing their meetings at Kuilima Hotel, Oahu, Hawaii
September 1, 1972.
1. Prime Minister Tanaka and President Nixon met in Hawaii
August 31 - September 1 for wide ranging discussions on a number
of topics of mutual interest. The talks were held in an atmos-
phere of warmth and mutual trust reflecting the long history of
friendship between Japan and the United States. Both leaders
expressed the hope that their meeting would mark the beginning
of a new chapter in the course of developing ever closer bonds
between the two countries.
2. The Prime Minister and the President reviewed the cur-
rent international situation and the prospects for the relaxa-
tion of tension and peaceful solutions to current problems in
the world, with particular reference to Asia. It was stressed
that the maintenance and strengthening of the close ties of
friendship and cooperation between the two countries would
continue to be an important factor for peace and stability in
the evolving world situation. Both leaders reaffirmed the
intention of the two governments to maintain the Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security between the two countries, and
agreed that the two governments would continue to cooperate
through close consultations with a view to ensuring smooth and
effective implementation of the Treaty.
3. In discussing the increasing indications for peace and
stability in Asia, the Prime Minister and the President welcomed
the recent opening of dialogue in the Korean Peninsula, and the
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increasingly active efforts of Asian countries for self-reliance
and regional cooperation, and shared the hope for an early
realization of peace in Indochina. The Prime Minister and the
President recognized that the President's recent visits to the
People's Republic of China and the USSR were a significant step
forward. In this context, they shared the hope that the forth-
coming visit of the Prime Minister to the People's Republic of
China would also serve to further the trend for the relaxation
of tension in Asia.
4. The Prime Minister and the President discussed the
recent agreements reached by the United States and the USSR on
the limitation of ballistic missile defenses and the interim
arrangement of the limitation of strategic offensive missiles,
and they agreed that such measures represented an important
step forward in limiting strategic arms and contributing to
world peace. They agreed to consult on the need for further
steps to control strategic arms.
5. The Prime Minister and the President exchanged views
in a broad perspective on issues related to economic, trade and
financial matters. The Prime Minister and the President empha-
sized the great importance of economic relations between Japan
and the United States. Both leaders expressed their conviction
that their talks would contribute to closer cooperation between
the two countries in dealing with economic issues of a bilateral
and global nature.
6. The Prime Minister and the President shared the view
that fundamental reform of the international monetary system
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is essential. They committed their governments to work rapidly
to achieve such reform. In trade, they reaffirmed the February
1972 commitments of both countries to initiate and actively
support multilateral trade negotiations covering both industry
and agriculture in 1973. In this connection they noted the
need in the forthcoming trade negotiations to lay the basis
for further trade expansion through reduction of tariff and
non- tariff barriers as well as formulations of a multilateral
non-discriminatory safeguard mechanism.
7. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that both
countries would endeavor to move towards a better equilibrium
in their balance of payments and trade positions. In this
regard, the President explained the measures undertaken by the
United States to improve its trade and payments position and
stated that the Government of the United States was urging U.S.
firms to expand the volume of exports through increased produc-
tivity and improved market research, particularly to Japan.
The Prime Minister indicated that the Government of Japan would
also try to promote imports from the United States and that it
was the intention of the Government of Japan to reduce the
imbalance to a more manageable size within a reasonable period
of time. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that it
would be most valuable to hold future meetings at a high level
to review evolving economic relationships, and that they intend
to hold a meeting of the Joint United States-Japan Committee
on Trade and Economic Affairs as early in 1973 as feasible.
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8. The Prime Minister and the President noted the endeav-
ors of the two countries, in cooperation with other developed
countries, to help bring stability and prosperity to the devel-
oping countries in Asia and other regions of the world. They
acknowledged the need for adequate levels of official develop-
ment assistance on appropriate terms. They also reaffirmed
that the two governments intend to continue to help strengthen
the international financial institutions for the purpose of
economic development of the developing countries.
9. The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed the
need to promote efforts to improve the mutual understanding of
the cultural, social and other backgrounds between the peoples
of the two countries. They agreed further that new and im-
proved programs of cultural and educational exchange are an
important means to this end. In this connection the President
underlined his high hopes for the successful activities of the
Japan Foundation to be inaugurated in October this year.
10. The Prime Minister and the President noted with satis-
faction the growing momentum of cooperation between the two
countries in increasingly diverse fields under the common aims
of maintaining and promoting peace and prosperity of the world
and the well-being of their countrymen. They agreed to strengthen
and expand the already close cooperation between the two coun-
tries in controlling the illegal traffic in narcotics and other
dangerous drugs, and they also agreed on the need for further
bilateral and multilateral cooperation concerning the develop-
ment and better utilization of energy and mineral resources and
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on the pressing problems of environmental protection and pol-
lution control. They pledged to continue appropriate assistance
through the UN and its specialized agencies for the solution
of problems caused by too rapid population growth.
11. The Prime Minister and the President discussed cooper-
ation in space exploration including Japan's goal of launching
geo- stationary communications and other applications satellites.
The President welcomed Japan's active interest in and study on
the launching of a meteorological satellite in support of the
global atmospheric research program.
12. The Prime Minister and the President expressed satis-
faction with their talks and agreed to continue to maintain
close personal contact.




VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER TAKEO MIKI OF JAPAN
Joint Statement by President Ford and Prime Minister Miki
at the Conclusion of Their Meetings. August 6, 1975.
The Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the United
States, recognizing that the Japanese and American peoples
share fundamental democratic values and are joined together
by ties of mutual trust and cooperation, affirm that their two
nations will continue to work together to build a more open
and free international community, and state as follows:
--A more stable and peaceful world order requires the accept-
ance by all nations of certain principles of international
conduct, and the establishment of a creative international
dialogue-
-
transcending differences of ideology, tradition
or stages of development.
--Those principles must include respect for the sovereignty
of all nations, recognition of the legitimate interests of
others, attitudes of mutual respect in international deal-
ings, determination to seek the peaceful resolution of
differences among nations, and firm commitment to social
justice and economic progress around the globe.
--Japan and the United States pledge to support these prin-
ciples, and to nurture a dialogue among nations which
reflects them. They will expand and strengthen their
cooperation in many fields of joint endeavor. Recognizing
that equitable and durable peace in Asia is essential to
that of the entire world, Japan and the United States will
extend every support to efforts of the countries of the
region to consolidate such a peace.
201

--International economic and social relations should promote
the prosperity of all peoples and the aspirations and
creativity of individuals and nations. The interests of
developed as well as developing countries, and of consumers
as well as producers of raw materials, must be accommodated
in a manner which advances the well being of all and brings
closer the goal of social and economic justice.
--In a world made small by science and technology, as well
as by trade and communications, interdependence among na-
tions has become a reality affecting the lives and welfare
of all peoples. International economic institutions and
systems must function in a manner reflecting that inter-
dependence and promoting a cooperative rather than a con-
frontational approach to economic issues.
--The suffering caused by disease and hunger is a most serious
and poignant impediment to a humane international economic
and social order. The financial, educational and techno-
logical resources of developed countries give them a special
responsibility for the alleviation of these conditions. It
is imperative that there be an increasingly effective shar-
ing of knowledge, resources and organizational skill among
all countries to hasten the day when these scourges will
be eliminated from the earth. In these endeavors also,
Japan and the United States will contribute fully.
Source: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.
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VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER TAKEO FUKUDA OF JAPAN
U.S. -Japanese Joint Communique Issued at the Conclusion
of Prime Minister Fukuda's Visit. March 22, 1977.
President Carter and Prime Minister Fukuda met in Washington
March 21 and 22 for a comprehensive and fruitful exchange of
views on matters of mutual interest.
They expressed satisfaction that through the meetings, a
relationship of free and candid dialogue and mutual trust was
established between the new leaders of the governments of the
United States and Japan. They agreed that the two Governments
would maintain close contact and consultation on all matters
of common concern.
The President and the Prime Minister expressed their deter-
mination that the two countries, recognizing their respective
responsibilities as industrialized democracies, endeavor to
bring about a more peaceful and prosperous international com-
munity. To this end, they agreed that it is essential for the
industrialized democracies to develop harmonized positions
toward major economic issues through close consultation. They
agreed further that it is important to sustain and develop
dialogue and cooperation with countries whose political systems
differ and which are in varying stages of economic development.
The President and the Prime Minister noted with satisfaction
that the friendly and cooperative relations between the United
States and Japan have continued to expand throughout diverse
areas in the lives of the two peoples--not only in economic
and political interchange, but in such varied fields as science
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and technology, medicine, education and culture. They looked
forward to further collaboration on both private and govern-
mental levels in all these areas. The President and the -Prime
Minister confirmed their common determination to further
strengthen the partnership between their two countries, based
on shared democratic values and a deep respect for individual
freedom and fundamental human rights.
The President and the Prime Minister confirmed their common
recognition that the interdependence of nations requires that
the industrial countries manage their economies with due con-
sideration for global economic needs, including those of the
developing nations. They agreed that economic recovery of the
industrialized democracies is indispensable to the stable growth
of the international economy, and that nations with large-scale
economies, including the United States and Japan, while seeking
to avoid recrudescent inflation, should contribute to the stim-
ulation of the world economy in a manner commensurate with
their respective situations. They agreed that both Governments
would continue to consult closely to this end.
They agreed that a liberal world trading system is essential
for the sound development of the world economy, and in this
connection expressed their determination to seek significant
early progress in the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations and to bring those negotiations to a successful
conclusion as soon as possible.
They reconfirmed the need for the nations concerned, in-
cluding the United States and Japan, to address constructively
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the issues posed in the North-South relationship. They noted
the continuing seriousness of the global energy problem and
reconfirmed the importance of taking further steps to conserve
energy and to develop new and alternative energy sources.
They agreed on the necessity of intensified consumer country
cooperation in the International Energy Agency and of contin-
ued promotion of cooperation between the oil- importing and
oil-producing countries. They agreed that both Governments
would continue their efforts to identify and promote positive
solutions to these issues, and would endeavor to bring the
Ministerial Meeting of the Conference on International Economic
Cooperation to a successful conclusion.
The President and the Prime Minister welcomed the convening
in London in May of the summit conference of the major indus-
trial countries. They expressed their expectation that the
conference, in a spirit of cooperation and solidarity, would
serve as a forum for a constructive and creative exchange of
views on problems confronting the world economy.
The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the current
international situation, and reaffirmed their recognition that
the maintenance of a durable peace in the Asian-Pacific region
is necessary for world peace and security.
They agreed that the close cooperative relationship between
the United States and Japan, joined by bonds of friendship and
trust, is indispensable to a stable international political
structure in the Asian-Pacific region. They noted that the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United
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States and Japan has greatly contributed to the maintenance
of peace and security in the Far East, and expressed their
conviction that the firm maintenance of the Treaty serves the
long-term interests of both countries.
The President reaffirmed that the United States as a
Pacific nation, maintains a strong interest in the Asian-
Pacific region, and will continue to play an active and con-
structive role there. He added that the United States will
honor its security commitments and intends to retain a balanced
and flexible military presence in the Western Pacific. The
Prime Minister welcomed this affirmation by the United States
and expressed his intention that Japan would further contribute
to the stability and development of that region in various
fields, including economic development.
Noting the activities of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, the President and the Prime Minister valued highly the
efforts of its member countries to strengthen their self-
reliance and the resilience of the region. They also reaffirmed
that the two countries are prepared to continue cooperation
and assistance in support of the efforts of the ASEAN countries
toward regional cohesion and development.
Taking note of the situation in Indochina, they expressed
the view that the peaceful and stable development of this area
would be desirable for the future of Southeast Asia as a whole.
The President and the Prime Minister noted the continuing
importance of the maintenance of peace and stability on the
Korean Peninsula for the security of Japan and East Asia as a
whole
.
They agreed on the desirability of continued efforts
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to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula and strongly hoped
for an early resumption of the dialogue between the South and
the North. In connection with the intended withdrawal of
United States ground forces in the Republic of Korea, the
President stated that the United States, after consultation
with the Republic of Korea and also with Japan, would proceed
in ways which would not endanger the peace on the Peninsula.
He affirmed that the United States remains committed to the
defense of the Republic of Korea.
The President and the Prime Minister emphasized that, as
a first step toward the most urgent task of nuclear disarma-
ment, nuclear testing in all environments should be banned
promptly. With respect to the international transfer of con-
ventional weapons, they emphasized that measures to restrain
such transfers should be considered by the international com-
munity as a matter of priority. In connection with the preven-
tion of nuclear proliferation, the President welcomed the
ratification by Japan last year of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
The President and the Prime Minister, recognizing the
important role the United Nations is playing in the contempo-
rary world, agreed that Japan and the United States should
cooperate for the strengthening of that organization. In this
connection, the President expressed his belief that Japan is
fully qualified to become a permanent member of the Security
Council of the United Nations, and stated American support for
that objective. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation
for the President's statement.
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The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed that the
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should not lead
to nuclear proliferation. In this connection, the President
expressed his determination to develop United States policies
which would support a more effective non-proliferation regime.
The Prime Minister stated that for Japan, a party to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and a highly industrialized state heavily
dependent on imported energy resources, it is essential to
progress toward implementation of its program for the develop-
ment and utilization of nuclear energy. The President agreed
to give full consideration to Japan's position regarding its
energy needs in connection with the formulation of a new nuclear
policy by the United States. The President and the Prime Min-
ister agreed on the necessity for close cooperation between
the United States and Japan in developing a workable policy
which will meet Japan's concerns and contribute to a more
effective non-proliferation regime.
The President and the Prime Minister discussed matters
concerning bilateral trade, fisheries, and civil aviation.
They agreed on the importance of continued close consultation
and cooperation between the two Governments to attain mutually
acceptable and equitable solutions to problems pending between
the United States and Japan.
The Prime Minister conveyed an invitation from the Govern-
ment of Japan to President and Mrs. Carter to visit Japan. The
President accepted this invitation with deep appreciation and





EXCERPT FROM SECRETARY VANCE'S ADDRESS
TO ASIA SOCIETY, JUNE 29, 1977
AMERICA'S ROLE IN CONSOLIDATING A PEACEFUL
BALANCE AND PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH IN ASIA
Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea has made good use of the opportunities
provided by peace on the peninsula to become increasingly self-
reliant and self-sufficient. The standard of living of its
people has improved significantly over the past decade; its
trade has grown enormously; its agriculture has been revolu-
tionized.
Our security commitment to the Republic of Korea and our
determination to maintain it are essential to the preservation
of peace in Northeast Asia.
South Korea's growth and strength are the basis for Presi-
dent Carter's decision to proceed with a carefully phased with-
drawal of American ground troops. This will be done in a way
that will not endanger the security of South Korea. We will
also seek, with the concurrence of the Congress, to strengthen
South Korea's defense capabilities. Furthermore:
--Our ground troops constitute only about five percent of
the total ground troops committed to the defense of South Korea.
--The gradual withdrawal of these troops over four to five
years will be offset by the growing strength and self-confidence
of the South Korean armed forces.
--Our air, naval, and other supporting elements will remain.
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--We are working closely with the Koreans to help them
increase their own defense capabilities.
The United States and the Republic of Korea share a strong
desire to establish a durable framework for maintaining peace
and stability on the peninsula.
--We support the entry of North and South Korea into the
United Nations without prejudice to ultimate reunification.
--We are prepared to move toward improved relations with
North Korea provided North Korea's allies take steps to improve
relations with South Korea.
--We have proposed negotiations to replace the existing
armistice with more permanent arrangements.
--We have offered to meet for this purpose with South and
North Korea and the People's Republic of China, as the parties
most immediately concerned, and to explore with them the pos-
sibilities for a larger conference with Korea's other neighbors,
including the Soviet Union. We will enter any negotiations
over the future of the peninsula only with the participation of
the Republic of Korea.





Clough, Ralph N. East Asia and U.S. Security. Washington
Brookings, 1975.
Deterrence and Defense in Korea. Washington:
Brookings , 1976.
Edmonds, Robin. Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962-73. London:
Oxford University Press, 1975.
Halliday, Jon, and McCormack, Gavin. Japanese Imperialism
Today . New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973.
Institute of Eastern and Western Affairs. Economy of North
Korea . Seoul: Chungang Ilbo, 1973.
International Institute of Strategic Studies. The Military
Balance, 1976-1977. London, 1976.
Kim, Il-Sung. For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of
Korea . New York: International Publishers, 1975.
Kim, Kwan Bong. The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Insta-
bility of the Korea Political System. New York: Praeger,
1971.
Kim, Yong C. (ed.). Foreign Policies of Korea. Washington,
1973.
Major Powers and Korea. Silver Spring, Md: Research
Institute on Korean Affairs, 1973.
Kiyosaki, Wayne S. North Korea's Foreign Relations. New York:
Praeger, 1976.
Koh, Byung Chul. The Foreign Policy of North Korea. New York:
Praeger, 1969.
Manglapus, Raul S. Japan in Southeast Asia: Collision Course.
Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1976.
Mendel, Douglas H. , Jr. The Japanese People and Foreign Policy
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961
.
Morley, James W. (ed.). Forecast for Japan: Security in the
1970's. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.
211

Japan and Korea: America's Allies in the Pacific.
New York: Walker and Co. , 1965.
Nahm, Andrew C. (ed.). Korea and the New Order in East Asia.
Western Michigan University, 1975.
Park Chung-Hee. The Country, the Revolution and I. Seoul,
1963.
Roth, Patrick H. Japanese Postwar and Security Defense.
Master's Thesis, University of Washington, 1973.
South-North Coordinating Committee. A White Paper on the
South-North Dialogue in Korea. Seoul: SNCC, 1975.
Truman, Harry S. Memoirs , II, New York: Signet, 1956.
Wagner, Edward W. The Korean Minority in Japan. New York:
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951.
Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research. The Balance of
Power in the Asian-Pacific Area. Washington, 1968.
Wu, Yuan-li. U.S. Policy and Strategic Interests in the Western
Pacific. New York: Crane, Russak and Co. , 1975.
B. ARTICLES
Abramowitz, Morton. "Moving the Glacier: The Two Koreas and
the Powers," Adelphi Papers No. 80 , 1971.
Baerwald, Hans H. "Nikkan Kokkai: The Japan-Korea Treaty Diet,"
Cases in Comparative Politics in Asia , 1970.
Cho, Soon Sung. "Japan's Two Korea's Policy and the Problems
of Korean Unification," Asian Survey , VII, (October 1967),
703-725.
Chun Chung-whan. "The Divided Nation in International Detente
and Korea's National Security," East Asia Review , II (Summer
1975)
, pp. 166-187.
Chung, Kiwon. "Japanese-North Korean Relations," Asian Survey ,
IV, (April 1964), pp. 788-803.
de Camp, Richard. "The Asian Development Bank," Remaking Asia ,
Mark Selden (ed.). New York: Random House, 1974.
Ha, Joseph M. and Lueggert, Gregory M. "A Korean Settlement:
The Prospects and Problems," Asian Survey , XVII (August
1977)
.
Hwang, Hyun-bong. "A Prospect of Chinese Foreign Policy and




Ikematsu, Fumio. "The ROK- Japan Treaty and Political Parties,"
Contemporary Japan
,
XXVIII, (May 1966), pp. 494-519.
Jo, Yung-hwan. "The Other Sides' Views: Washington-Seoul
Ties," Pacific Community
,
Vol. 8, (July 1977), pp. 625-643.
Kang, In-duk. "A Threat from the North: The Significant Aspects
of the Contemplated Strategy by the North," East Asia
Review , I, (Winter 1974), pp. 368-387.
'The United Front Strategy and Communization Tactics
of North Korea," East Asia Review , IV, (Spring 1977),
pp. 2-22.
Kim, Duk-joo. "The U.S. and Japan's Policy on Peace and
Security in Korea," East Asia Review
,
III, (Winter 1976)
pp . 515- 537
.
Kim, Gaab-chol. "Reflections on the Origin and Development
of the Chuche Idea in North Korea: The Impact of Sino-
Soviet Competition," East Asia Review , II, (Summer 1975),
pp. 145-165.
Kim, Kwan-bong. "An Analysis of North Korea's Policy Toward
Japan," Politics and Administration
,
I, (December 1973).
. "Changing Perspectives in North Korea's Policy Toward
Japan," East Asia Review
,
I, (Winter 1974), pp. 388-404.
. "Is Japan a Friendly Country?" Sedai, (July 1970).
Kim, Nam-shik. "The Decision-Making Process in the Foreign




"The Movement of North Korea's Three Great Revolution-
ary Circles: Its Organization, Activities, and Function,"
East Asia Review , III, (Winter 1976), pp. 418-437.
Kim, Tae-suh. "North Korea's New Constitution and New Power
Structure," East Asia Review , IV, (Spring 1977), pp. 23-42.
Kim, Yoon-hwan. "Economy and Trade of North Korea," Collection
of Social Sciences
,
I, Koryo University, 1972.
"Tasks and Prospect of North Korean Economy in the 70' s,"
East Asia Review
,
I, (Spring 1974), pp. 12-36.
Ko , Seung K. "North Korea's Relations with Japan since Detente,"
Pacific Affairs
,
Vol. 50, (Spring 1977), pp. 31-44.






Langdon, Frank. "Japan-Soviet 200-Mile Zone Confrontation,"
Pacific Community
,
IX, (October 1977), pp. 46-58.
Lee, Myung-sik. "Korea in the Soviet Union's East Asian
Policy," East Asia Review
,
I, (Winter 1974), pp. 405-424.
Lee, Young-ho. "Major Power Detente and Peace Engineering in
the Korean Peninsula," East Asia Review
, I, (Summer 1974),
pp. 130-144.
McCracken, H. E. "Japan's View of Korea," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings
, Vol. 98, (February 1972), pp. 41-47.
Park, Bong-shik. "North Korea in Sino-Soviet Dispute," East
Asia Review , III, (Winter 1976), pp. 496-514.
Rhee, Seung-keun. "Japan's Foreign Policy toward North Korea
and its Impact on Korean Security," East Asia Review
,
I,
(Autumn 1974), pp. 286-300.
Rowen, Henry S. "Japan and the Future Balance in Asia," Orbis
,
Vol. 21, (Summer 1977), pp. 191-210.
Seymour, Robert L. "Japan's Self -Defense : The Naganuma Case
and its Implications," Pacific Affairs , Vol. 47, (Winter
1974-75)
, pp. 421-436.
Sigur, Gaston J. "Japan's Broadening International Role,"
Pacific Community , Vol. 9, (October 1977), pp. 17-30.
Simon, Sheldon W. "The Japan-China-USSR Triangle," Pacific
Affairs
,
Vol. 47, (Summer 1974), pp. 125-138.





Weinstein, Franklin B. "United States-Japan Relations and the
Fallacies of Burden-Sharing," Pacific Community, Vol. 9,
(October 1977), pp. 1-16.
Yoon, Sang-chul. "Chochongnyon Koreans in Japan and Korea,"
East Asia Review , III, (Summer 1976), pp. 188-203.
C. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS
Area Handbook for North Korea. 1969.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Foreign Broadcast Information
Service: Asia and the Pacific. 1972-1978.
U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report, FY 1977. 1976.
214

U.S. Department of State. Department of State Bulletin.
August 1, 1977.
U.S. Government. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments .
U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Economic Report
on North Korea. (Periodical)
.
. Industrial Development in North Korea. (Periodical)
. Political Report on North Korea. (Periodical)
U.S. House of Representatives. "Shifting Balance of Power in
Asia: Implications for Future U.S. Policy," (Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy of the
Committee on International Relations, House of Repre-
sentatives, 94th Congress). 1975-1976.
. "Activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency
in the U.S.," (Hearings before the Subcommittee on
International Organizations of the Committee on Inter-
national Relations, House of Representatives, 94th
Congress) . 1976.
U.S. Scap. Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945
to September 1948. 1949.
U.S. Senate. Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea. (Hearings
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 83rd Congress,
2nd Session). 1954.
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan.
""(Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th




Christian Science Monitor. 1977.
Direction of Trade. International Monetary Fund, Washington.
East Asia Review. 1974-1978.
Facts on File.
Far Eastern Economic Review. 1972-1978.





Japanese Defense. Japan Defense Ministry Publication, 1976
Journal of Korean Affairs.
Journa.1 of International Stud ies
.
Mont hiY Statistics of Korea.
Naval War College Review.
Nodong Sinmun.
One Korea.
Paci fie Affairs .
Paci fie Communi ty.





Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314




Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Professor Claude A. Buss (Thesis Advisor) 2
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Professor Frank M. Teti (Second Reader) 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
LCDR William J. Hulsey, USN (Student) 1
USS Dahlgren (DDG-43)
Fleet Post Office
New York, New York 09501
Mr. Robert Dorr 1







c.2 Japan and North Ko-
rea: the growing ac-
commodation between
Japan and North Korea









Japan and North Ko-
rea: the growing ac-
commodation between
Japan and North Korea




Japan and North Korea :
3 2768 001 03576 9
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
